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Though the origins of the Anglo-Maori wars, their 
influence on Imperial relations, and their effects on the 
Maoris have been studied by Professors Sinclair, Dalton and 
Sorrenson, and by Dr Alan Ward, there has been very little 
attempt to study colonial opinion on the wars, or of the 
effects of the wars on settler politics. Historians have 
r 
i~ 
not· found it surprising that an aggressive policy should have 
appealed to large sections of the colonists in the NQrth 
Island, but they have been more surprised both by the bellicose 
attitude of the•South Island colonist towards the Maori~s and 
by the parsimonious attitude of the Southerners when it came to 
helping to pay for the wars with the Maoris. 
The original intention of this thesis was to study the 
South Island opinion on native affairs in general and on the 
Anglo-Maori wars in particular. I intended to attempt to trace 
the origins of the bellicose attitude of the South Island 
colonist towards the Maori back to the colonist's Victorian 
origins, his motivations for emigrating, and his disillusionment 
caused by the disparity between his expectations and the harsh 
realities of the colonial situation. Further, an attempt was 
to be made to explain the parsimonious attitude of the South 
Island colonists to the financing of native policy and later to 
the payment of war costs. Here, preoccupation with local 
interests and problems, and the jealous concern to preserve the 
v. 
provincial land funds, the symbols of provincial wealth, were 
seen as possible explanations. However, as research progressed 
two things became increasingly apparent. First, South Island 
opinion as an identifiable entity that could be labelled "South 
Island" was fast becoming-submerged beneath a welter of opinions 
held by individuals, by local interest groups and now and then 
distinguishable as a provincial opinion. There was an opinion 
in the South Island on the Anglo-Maori wars but there was no 
South Island opinion as such. Secondly, the reaction of the 
Neison settlers to the news of the commencement of hostilities 
in Taranaki and the opinion on the war expressed by the two 
Nelson newspapers had an edge and a quality to them lacking in 
the reactions and opinions discernable in other South Island 
settlements .. 
The choice of Nelson as a case-study of opinion in the South 
Island on the Anglo-Maori wars may also be justified on other 
grounds. First, unlike Otago and Canterbury, Nelson was a needy 
rather than a wealthy province, Nelson's land fund was relatively 
insignificant. Thus there is need to seek for other explanations 
... , 
of the opinion expressed in Nelson. Secondly, the Nelson newspapers 
were not only the most vocal in the South Island on the war question, 
but they had differing ap·proaches to the question. Given the 
partisan nature of colonial newspapers the possibility arises:that 
the differences in approach may be explained in terms of local 
political conflict. Thirdly, during the period under consideration, 
vi. 
Nelson, represented by Edward Stafford, enjoyed the possession 
of power in colonial politics. This suggests the·possibility 
that opinion in Nelson may be linked with s.upport of the 
Stafford "war" ministry, Therefore a study of opinion in 
Nelson on the Anglo-Maori.wars may not only enable us to 
understand the bellicose attitude of the coloni~t in the South 
Island but may throw some light on the nature of the political 
conflict in New Zealand during the Provincial Period, 
A topic in the history of race relations or one concerning 
attitudes towards racial groups can.be rather difficult for the 
n6n-Europea,n; especially one who was first attracted to the study 
of 1istory by a need to try and understand, without bitterness, 
the behaviour of Europeans towards his own people in his native 
land during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, The 
intention of the first two chapters is to attempt to understand 
the superior attitude adopted by the South Island colonists 
towards the Maoris by attempting to understand the mind of the 
emigrant and the condition of the Maori as the emigrant found him. 
If our view of the early pioneers is a reaiistic ~ather than an 
idealistic one then their behaviour and attitudes are easier to 
understand .. 
The s~ttler in the South Island, where there was little to 
fear from the Maoris, was more concerned with his own progress and 
the problems of building a European society than with native 
vii. 
· problems. The native problems of the North Island were treated 
at best as a distraction and at worse as of no concern of the 
South. Chapters Three to Five attempt to show how one South 
Island community attempted to deal with a distraction that 
became -a nuisance. 
The basic sources for this thesis have been the files of 
•.'. 
the two Nelson newspapers. It is unfortunate that there is no 
reliable way of ascertaining the writers of any p~rticular 
editorial. Further, manuscript collections were searched for 
' . 
letters from South Island, and in particular Nelson, residents, 
and for references to conditions and attitudes in Nelson. 
This thesis is presented merely as a case-study-and its 
generalizations await testing against the experiences in other 
communities. 
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PART I 
THE SOUTH ISLAND SETTING 
CHAPTER I 
VICTORIANS AT THE Af.TTIPODES 
"•·• the seeds of the race, the forerunners: 
offshoots, outcasts, entrepreneurs, architects 
of empire, romantic adventurers; and the 
famished, the.multitude of the poor •••• 11 
A.R.D. Fairburn. 
The attitude of the settler towards the ~faori cannot be entirely 
explained in terms of economic and social rivalry or understood simply 
as irrational fear and dislike on the part of the immigrant towards the 
alien community he meets. In the South Island, the struggle for the land 
ended quickly and peacefully, blood being drawn only at Wairau; the struggle 
in the South Island was against the soil not .f.9£. it. While race relations 
form an important part of the North Island story, the South Island Maori 
, 
population was relatively insignificant and came little·in contact with the 
Pakehas. The South Island story is one of Europeans, sheep and gold - the 
history of developing European societies. Yet southern bellicosity touards 
the lYia.ori during the Maori wars has been attested to by contemporaries 1 and 
re-affirmed by recent historians. 2 Though there was some settler mobility 
between the two islands, the attitude of the settlers towards the Maori was 
not wholly a product of their colonial situation. Nore must be known about 
the settler, his motivations, the society he left, and the society he hoped 
to find in the New World. 
1 • For example: 
26 1:[a.y 1860; 
2. W.P. Morrell, 
PP• 124-125; 
K. Sinclair, 
Henry Sewell, Journal, ii, p. 209, 1 Eovember 1863; LT 
NC 2 October 1860. 
The Provincial S stern in New Zea.land, ( 1 964 edition) , 
J. Rutherford, Sir Geor~e Gre, 1961), p. 451; 
Origins of the Ifaori Wars, 1961 ), pp. 10, 210-211. 
2. 
Historians have tended to concentrate on the ~tudy of formal colonization 
- the study of the official mind .and of colonial policy - or of the effects 
of western contacts on the Haori. The official mind, the theorists, and 
constitutional experiments have been studied rather than the settler, his 
origins and his mind. There is need for more social analysis and investig-
ations into the origins of the emigrants who sail 12,000 miles to the 
antipodes. The mind of the emigrant should be explored in terms of his 
motivations and the ideas and prejudices he brought out with him. Something 
needs to be known of the settler's response to the colonial environment and 
of his reactions to the obvious disparity between his expectations and the 
.. , 
harsh realities of colonial life. 3 In this chapter a possible framework 
for this kind of study is suggested. Out of the complexity of factors 
influencing the settler's decision to emigrate and the multiplicity of 
experiences and ideas that go to make up the mind of the settler, my 
intention is to identify those elements which are most likely to contribute 
to our understanding of the settler's attitude towards the Maori. 
* * * * 
Among the early New Zealand settlers there were a few romantic 
adventurers such as Arnold and Cholmondoley, but most of them soon left, 
usually disillusioned. 4 The adventurer and the idealist could leave, most 
3. Two recent theses show some attempt to deal with these problems. See 
I,R .... J~p.i_llip_l3_1_ A Social History of Auckland 1840-53, unpublished M.A. 
t.i1esis, A.U., 1966, especially chapter 3; and B.J .• Poff, William Fox, 
. Early Colonial Years, 1842-1848, unpublished. M.A. thesis, C.U., 1969, 
especially chapter 1. Some of the better provincial histories are also 
useful, see especially R.M. Allan, Nelson, ( 1965), Chapters 2-4; A.H. 
McLintock, n:ie History of Ota~?' (1949), pp. 234-238. See also J. Miller, 
Early Victorian New Zealand, · .. 1958):, Chapter 4. 
4. See D.G. Herron, 11 Alsatia or Utopia? New Zealand Society and Politics in 
the Eighteen Fifties", Landfall, 52, (December 1959), pp. 325-327. 
of their less fortunate fellow emigrants had to stay. The majority of 
immigrants had come to New Zealand to escape the effects of industrialization 
which acted as much on the middle as on the lower classes. The bankrupt and 
the remittance man fled social disgrace, seeking in distance anonymity, safety, 
and the chance of a regenerate life. Some came to heal a broken heart among 
strangers. 5 Younger sons.sought in the colony the opportunity and wealth 
denied to them at home by primogeniture. 6 Poor health drove others such as 
John Robert Godley and C.W. Richmond to search for the sun and cleaner air 
under southern skies. 7 The labourer, fleeing famine and low wages at home, 
came in expectation of higher wages and an improved station in life.8 These 
)' 
were the hard facts of economic and social change, of reality, whi,ch lay 
behind the aspirations and dreams, the 
Restlessness of mind, Castle building, Profitable and 
useful employment. The true fraternity of the future. 
Our future home. • •• which gave an impulse to the 
colonization of New Zealand. 9 
The settlement of New Zealand was part of the vast outpouring of 
British peoples, goods and capital in the nineteenth century, an expansion 
5. For example Thomas Arnold, see introduction by James·Bertram to New 
Zealand Letters of Thomas Arnold the Younger, (ed. James Bertram, 1966), 
PP• xxix-xxxi. 
6. J. Logan Campbell, Poenamo, (1953 edition), p. 1. See also Phillips, 
Social History of Auckland, pp. 52-53. 
7. For Godley, see A History of Canterbury, Vol 1 (ed. J. Hight and C.R. 
Straubel, 1957), pp. 152-153. Richmond's reasons for emigrating are 
given in Richmond-Atkinson Papers, (ed. G.H. Scholefield, 1960), i, p.27, 
8. A Clayden, England of the Pacific, ( 1879), made lfow Zealand out to be a 
labourer's paradise, the cost of living being the same as in England but 
with higher wages. Workmen in New Zealand were said to be able to own 
their own houses in a short time. 
9. Miller, Early Victorian New Zealand, p. 35. 
4. 
which has been described as the "spontaneous expression of an inherently 
dynamic society. 11 1 O It was partly a response to' the problems created by 
industrialization. New lands and new homes were thought to be safetr 
valves for the discontents of those who were not benefiting sufficiently 
or rapidly enough from the progress taking place around them. Contrary 
to what some of its contemporary apologists would have us believe, Victorian 
expansion was not in answer to the needs of what we would nowadays call the 
underdeveloped regions of the world, nor was it to fulfi9''the designs of 
the Creator or to civilize savages. "The cry· of distress is at home; to 
assuage the calamity we are naturally directed to colonization, 11 admitted 
the Aborigines Protection Society in 1841 9 11 and five years later the 
Economist joined in with an admonition to its readers, "the '·duty of England 
is to its own subjects, not to the natives of Africa or the slaves of the 
Brazils. 11 12 Emigration was to be a palliative for the social distress 
accompanying industrialism. 
In the seventeenth century, religious misfits, "vexed and troubled 
Englishmen", left England to found the New England colonies. The colonizers 
of the nineteenth century may also be regarded as misfits; they could not 
find a satisfying place in the new social and economic order being created 
by the rise of an industrial society in England. Religious discontent had 
10. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, (1963), p. 3. 
11. England and her Colonies, (1841), quoted by K. Sinclair, Aborigines 
Protection Society and New Zealand, unpublished M.A. thesis, A.U.C., 
1946, p. 32. 
12. Economist, 25 July 1846, quoted by W.L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise, 
( 1 964) , p. 70. 
driven out the Pilgrim Fathers; economic necessity and social discontent 
lay behind the action of the nineteenth century emigrant and colonizer. He 
too crossed the Atlantic or he sailed to found new colonies in Australasia. 
Underlying the desire of the emigrant for better opportunities and living 
conditions was the feeling that his human dignity and proper pride would 
suffer if he remained in EI).gland, where the worth of men was seen as being 
denigrated by the machine. The social discontent which pushed the emigrant 
out of England sprang from "the resentment of men convinced that there is 
something false and degrading in the arrangement and justice of their world. 1113 
In studies on the problems of rapid social change there has recently 
been an emphasis on the psychological factors,.of pernonal adjustment to 
change and the search for a new identity. 14 Economic development and social 
change does not benefit all. Indeed the increasing of the chances, the 
range and the speed of social mobility, and the creation of a competitive 
society produces anxiety _as much as contentment. Those who do-not benefit 
from the developments occurring around them are not only faced with economic 
distress, but have a psychological need to reassert their self-confidence 
and to prove their personal worthiness, a need usually met by revolutionary 
action or by attachment to a mass movement. 
130 J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Age of the Chartists, (1962 
edition), p. 2. See also W.S.Shepperson, British Emigration to 
North .America, ( 1957), pp. 4-11. . 
14. See in particular: S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Chane, 
(1966); E.E. Hagan, On the Theory of Social Change, 1962; E. Hoffer, 
The True Believer, (1951) and The Ordeal of Change, (1963); D. Lerner, 
The Passin of Traditional Societ, (1962); L.W. Pye, Politics, Person-
ality and Nation Building, 1962); M. Walzer, The Revolution of the 
Saints, (1966). 
6. 
Nineteenth century England was a society undergoing rapid social and 
economic change. The transformation of the eighteenth century agricultural 
order into one able to cope with the demands of the nineteenth century · 
industrial nation did not occur smoothly. Discontent and condemnation of 
the new economic system was created, and many thousands of people had their 
social moorings swept away from them by the momentous changes. Both 
OWenite Socialism and Chartism may be interpreted as means by which a person, 
finding himself thrust into an economic comple:ic neither of his making nor to 
his liking, could respond to his feelings of social "unsettledness" and 
. 15 
disordero Robert Owen offered a vision of an equitable brotherly commun-
ity in which mutual aid would replace aggression ~d ·competition. 16 .A 
motive force behind the Chartist movement was the desire to remodel the 
political system in an effort to gain control over the social changes taking 
pl~ce and increase feelings of personal worth. 17 The Owenites and the 
Chartists were seeking to regain their identity by creating a utopia in 
England; the emigrant sought in the colonies, the distinction, place and 
,.,..,---: 
status they.felt were denied to them at home. Emigration might be regarded 
as a nineteenth century mass movement; the settlement of New Zealand was 
one of its outcomes. 
Though no doubt there were a few individuals, lacking neither success 
nor security in England, who emigrated to New Zealand in a spirit of 




E.P. Thompson, The Making of 
Edition, 1968), pp. 857-915; 
Chartists, pp. 1-3, 263-276. 
Thompson, op.cit., p. 884. 
Thompson, op.cit., p. 913; 
the English Working Class, (Pelican 
Hammond and Hammond, The .Age of the 
Hammond and Hammond, op.cit., PP• 273-274. 
th · . d . 1 ·t· 18 ht d 'f t improve eir econonuc an socia posi ion, w a encourage i no 
forced, most to leave their homeland was economic necessity, the knowledge 
that they could not improve their position by remaining in England, ahd a 
psychological need to regain self-confidence, self-esteem, and their 
individual balance. 
Thomas Arnold, writing of Domett's initial failure as a poet perceived 
that Domett 
!fortified at this - too proud to complain - resolved. 
that "they shall hear of me" - he bought land in New 
Zealand in 1842,· and silently withdrew himself from 19 
amongst his friends to the new land beyond the sea.~ 
Domett's own expectations might be shown by this passage from one of his 
poems published in 1839: 
There lurks the raw material of Renown! 
There Genius yet shall dare the perilous verge 
Of passionate Thought - some Bacon there hurl down 
Old prejudice, and urge 20 
The tide of mind to channels new •••• 
Maria Richmond admitted that though she was thankful to be an English woman 
she preferred to live in New Zealand where her brothers "a.re influential men 
where there is ample scope for activity of mind and body, and the employment 
of their capital in safety .... II 21 William Rolleston emigrated because he 
felt excluded from the only society he cared for, that of "Home and the 
University". Wanting to escape the trammels and conventions in England, 
18. See Poff, William Fox, pp. 9-11. 
19. Thomas Arnold, Passages in a Wandering Life, ( 1900), pp. 109-111. But 
cf. E.A. Horsman's introduction to The Diary of Alfred Domett, 1872-1885, 
(ed. E.A. Horsman, 1953), PP.• 13-14. 
20. Venice, a reflective poem, (1839), p. 27. 
21 o Jane Maria Pd.chmond to Margaret Taylor, 21 June 1850, Richmond-Atkinson 
Papers, i, p. 61. 
8. 
he saw in New Zealand the chance of building a new and better social order 
in which there would be "better heads and what I value more, better, hearts 
than are to be met in any country district in the Mother Country. u 22 
Rolleston, like many other Victorian young men, sought a country still 
unfettered by tradition and precedent, where a man would not be smothered 
by old world restrictions. 23 The first Otago settlers, according to their 
historian, A.H. NcLintock, "turned to emigration ••• to gain for themselves 
and their families that social independence and pecuniary security which 
were denied to them in a world where the principles of free trade and laissez-
faire were sacrosant. 11 24 The mass of lower class emigrants f~ed p~rp±exed 
industrial conditions, work-houses and unemployment, and hoped even for some 
rise in their social status by coming to New Zealand - for it was expected 
that the lower rungs of society would be occupied by the Maoris. 25 
The anxiety and insecurity created by social and economic change 
provided the push from England; what provided the pull to New Zealand? 
There is little doubt that the main reason most emigrants came out was in 
hope of finding economic opportunities denied to them at home. But the 
great wave of emigrants leaving Britain sought their fortunes in the new 
22. Rolleston to Duncan Mathias, n.d., Rolleston Papers. 
23. W.D. Stewart, William Rolleston, (1940), pp. xi and 9 
24. McLintock, History of Otago, Po 236. 
25e M. Turnbull, The New Zealand Bubble, (1959), pp. 48-51. See also 
Phillips, Social History of Auckland, pp. 38-40; Miller, Early 
Victorian New Zealand, pp. 8-10 
26 
El Dorado across the Atlantic - in the United States and Canada. Why 
and how was a small trickle of emigrants diverted to become the colonizers 
and settlers of New Zealand? Free passages and land grants, the myth of 
the wide open spaces, provided part of the bait. The newness and remoteness 
of New Zealand were in themselves attractions to emigrants fleeing from the 
competitive society developing in Britain. To be on the ground floor of a 
new colony offered assurances of success and security. To found a new 
society, helping to fashion it according to one's needs,.is often easier 
than to find a satisfying place in a society already established. The 
idea of founding a new society and the myth of the decadence of England 
were combined by Edward Gibbon Wakefield to form an ideolog;y- for the colon-
J 
ization of New Zealand. For many emigrants the final pull to New Zealand 
was provided by the vision of Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the propaganda of 
the New Zealand Companyo 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield's vision of building a Jerusalem in "the new 
land beyond the sea" made emigration respectable for the middle classes, but 
26. Db.ring the period 184-0 to 1860 a total of 4,062,84-0 emigrants left 
Britain. Of these 2,630,441 (64.74%) went to the United States; 
696,622 (17.15%) went to British North .America; 649,776 (15.99%) 
went to Australia and New Zealand while 86,001 (2.12%) went to other 
countrieso Between 1840 and 1848 the New Zealand Company brought 
out 9,859 emigrants from Britain to New Zealand. This was oiily 
10.40% of the total number (94,746) of emigrants leaving Britain for 
Australia and New Zealand during the same period. See table giving n 
number of 11 Emigran ts sailing from the United Kingdom, 181 5-6011 in 
Shepperson, British Emigration to North America, PPo 257-259, and 
Statistics of New Zealand for the Crown Colony Period, p. 28. 
10. 
it was the unscrupulous and often amoral high pressure sales technique 
employed by Wakefield and his age~ts that lured 15,000 people to New Zealand. 27 
Wakefield based his theory upon the fact of social distress in Victorian 
society which made emigration inevitable. He sought to organize this 
emigration so that it would benefit both the mother country and the emigrant. 
By systematic colonization Vakefield hoped not merely to transport people but 
to transplant asociety. "In his own words colonization resembled the 
transplanting of full-grown trees, nrot young plants, the removal of society, 
28 not of people. 11 Others, such as Wilmot Horton and Mal thus, had concen-
trated on 11 the shovelling out of paupers" by which they hoped both to improve 
the lot of the pauper and to save Britain from the revolution they thought 
imminent. 29 Wakefield went further. To the compelling need for emigration 
provided by social distress he added a purpose; the founding of new and 
better societies. He went beyond a simple response to economic necessity 
and social distress. Emigration of the poor and the transportation of 
convicts were but parodies of colonization, the true model of which Wakefield 
considered to be the founding mf the New England colonies in the seventeenth 
century. 30 Nineteenth century 11pilgrims 11 were to make New Zealand into a 
27. For accounts of New Zealand Company propaganda see: ~liller, Early 
Victorian New Zealand, pp. 5-7; Turnbull, The New Zealand Bubble, pp. 
37-53. Note that the numbers brought out by Wakefield and the New 
Zealand Company, while not insignificant, were by no means dominant 
in the population after the 1850 1s. See Sinclair, A History of New 
Zealand, (Penguin, 1959), PP• 96-97. 
28, R.C. Mills, The Colonization of .Australia, 1829--42, (1915), p. 120, 
quoting from Wakef~eld's New British Province of South Australia, 
l2nd Edition, 1835), PP• 5-6. . 
29. K.E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories 1 0-18 O, ( 1963), pp. 269-294-. 
30. J.S. Marais, The Colonization of New Zealand, 1927), p. 4o 
11. 
"Britain of the South", a transfigured English agricultural society populated 
by respected squires and contented labourers. Wakefield's Utopia was to be 
a recreation overseas ct: pre-industrial England; the England of 174-0 n·ot of 
1840. 
Wakefield had touched upon the spirit of the age. The spirit of which 
Sir George Grey spoke in the House of Representatives in 1890: 
Honourable members will scarcely believe now the kind 
of fervour which existed in Great Britain in my youth 31 
to found a New World differ.ing from the Old World •••• 
Robert Owen and the Chartists had both attempted to found the New World in 
England; Wakefield offered a kind of Utopia, but a spatial rather than a 
temporal one, across the oceans. Wakefield's ideas appealed to people made 
anxious and insecure by the development of a socio-economic system in which 
they felt degraded. Systematic colonization and the vision of a Brighter 
Britain in the South Seas provided the emigrants with a rationalization. 
Rejecting England's dark satanic mills, feeling they were escaping from an -· 
unjust situation, the emigrant, leaving his homeland in search of a better 
, life and- more security, was provided with the rationalization that they 
were in fact moving in the forefront of civilization by leaving England 
I 
to create a regenerate society, to build a better social order, and to 
establish a transformed and purified England. Civilization was being 
destroyed in Britain, but a new civilization would arise in the Antipodes 
31. PD, LXIX, p. 610, 6 September 1890. During debate on the Federation 
Conventiono 
32 to replace the old. 
The nineteenth century observer, A.S. Thomson records: 
12. 
The emigrants were apparently bewitched; and there 
was a feeling among them that they were moving with, 
and not away from, the civilized world; and from the 
wealth of some, the migration was not a flight from 
starvation to exile but a short road to abundance and 
affluence. 33 
The colonists even considered it likely that New Zealand would rise to 
rival the greatness of Britain and to remain great when.Britain had ceased 
to be so: 
And if the same mysterious round of fate 
':.'.Wiich humbled Rome make England desolate, 
Perchance that younger empire yet may thrive, 
.And England's greatness in her child revive. 34 
The emigrant, then, was offered the advantage b.cith. of economic gain and of 
taking part in the founding of a great new nation: 
Come to the Isles - the Southern Isles! 
Away - leave grinding desk and loom 
Come, be a nation's honoured sires,. 
The subject of all future lyres - 35 
32. For a discussion of these attitudes especially as they relate to N.Z. 
literature see E.H. McCormick, New Zealand Literature: A Survey. 
(1959), especially chapter 2, and "The Happy Colony", Landfall, Vol. 9, 
No. 4 (December 1955)~ pp·, 300-334; C.B.K, Smithyman, "Reflections of 
Social .Attitudes in 'Epic' Poetry of the Drawing-Room, in pre-1900 New 
Zealand", University of Auckland Historical Society Annual, 1967, pp. 
28-41; W.S. Broughton, W. D'Arcy Cresswell, A.R.D. Fairburn, R.A,K, 
I'iJ.ason, .An Examination of Certain Aspects of their Lives and Works, 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, A.U., 1968, pp. 4-31-44-8. 
33. Thomson, The Story of New Zealand, (1859), ii, p. 14. 
34. Mrs. R. Wilson, New Zealand and Other Poems, ( 1851 ) , p. 1 7. 
35. Southern Cross, 13 September 1851, quoted in Phillips, Social History 
of Auckland, p. 50. 
13. 
Models for the _antipodean society were brought out _from England. But with 
these models came the determination to reshape them according to the ideals 
of a pre-industrial England. The colonists would readily agree with 
William Fox that they had emigrated 
not to 'grub for money', but to convert the wilderness ~ 1 ~ 
into farms and gardens, and spot it over with smiling 
villages and pleasant homesteads. 36 
Thomas Cholmondoley, an early Canteruury colonist, thought 
It is not too much to say, that New Zealand will become 
an exact copy of England. Churches, houses, roads, inns, 
hedges, trees will be almost entirely English •••o 37 
The Wakefieldian ideology provided the colonists with the means of 
rationalizing their action in emigrating as movement with civilization to 
rebuild English society in the South Seas. What of the mass of emigrants 
who came to New Zealand 'tween decks? Little is kno~m of the minds of the 
emigrants, poor and illiterate, who travelled in the steerage. · Nor is 
much knolm of their response to Wakefield's ideas. Only a few would have 
needed more than the push of economic necessity and social distress in order 
to make the decision to emigrate, most were lured to New Zealand by the 
offer of a free passage and the inducements of goods wages from guaranteed 
employment. 38 The uneducated labourers had to be given more tangible 
assurances of security rather than the ideal of helping to found a Brighter 
36. W. Fox, The War in New Zealand, (1866), p. 15. 
37. T. Cholmondoley, UJtima Thule, (1854), p. 32. 
38. See filller, Early Victorian New Zealand, pp. 121-122, for an extract 
from the petition of "The '\ll0rking Men of Nelson to Captain Wakefield, 
14 January, 1843. 11 See also Marais, Colonisation of New Zealand, 
pp. 62-63. 
Brita:in- they crune in expectation of finding a&topia rather than with the 
,_,_--
desire to build one. 
Zealand was to be a 
To the mass of emigrants, as to the colonists, New 
Havenof hunger; landfall of hope; 
goal of ambition, greed and despair. 39 
The primary concern of Wakefield, the settlers at large, and of the 
colonists was with the creation of a European society. Their actions were 
not related to the welfare of the I1aori people excepting where it furthered 
their interests and purposes. Wakefield regarded New Zealand as a whiteJan's 
country. At the colonial end of his system he was concerned with the 
settler rather than with the Haori.!+O The settler and the colonist had 
come, not in response to a humanitarian concern for the well-being or 
civilization of the natives, but in an_ effort to raise their own standards 
of living and to achieve an increase in feelings of personal worth by 
improving their position in society. 
this: 
11hey were not at all reticent about 
The Bishop of New Zealand said he had come here to 
civilize the Maoris; let him apply himself to that 
work, but the colonists came for a very different 
purpose •. 41 • 
39. From A.R.D. Fairburn's poem Dominion. 
40. Historians have generally regarded Wakefield's native policy as a 
hastily formulated attempt to conciliate humanitarian opinion and 
to gain support for his colonization scheme. See A.H. McLintock, 
Crovm Colony Government in New Zealand, (1958), pp. 33-35; Miller, 
Early Victorian New Zealand, pp. 8-12 Sinclair, History of ~Tew Zealand, 
p.·62. Wakefield's and the New Zealand Company's native policy would 
bear further and more sympathetic investigation. 
41. Southern Cross, 10 January 1862, quoted by Sinclair, Origins of the 
Maori Wars, p. 26. 
15. 
David Garrick, a passenger on the John Wickliffe, to the church settlement 
of Otago, frankly admitted 
We have all come here either for the purpose of 
aggrandizing ourselves and families, or for the 
benefit of our health. 42 
Indeed they were ill-fitted to be humanitarians. The foregoing discussion 
of the emigrants' reasons, motivations and rationalizations suggests_that 
they were in fact nineteenth century Prosperos and Robinson Crusoes. 
The French psychologist, o. IVIannoni, in his Psychologie de la Colonis-
ation (1950), published in English as Prospero and Caliban, (second English 
edition 1964), suggests a possible analysis of the colonial personality.43 
According to Nannoni the colonial is not looking only for profits but is 
seeking psychological satisfactions which are dangerous in colonial situation 
involving race relations.44 A person becomes a colonial because he sees in 
the colony the chance to manifest his latent possibilities. The colony 
becomes part of an unreal world wherein the colonist believes he can marshall 
the facts of life to his own perpetual convenience. In European civilization 
it is the sense of inferiority that drives a man upwards45 and the colonies 





Quoted by McLintock, History of Otago, p. 236. 
Oo Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban, Part 2. See also Philip Y.tason, 
Prospero' s Magic, ( 1962). But cf. B. Y.tazlish, "Group Psychology and 
the Problems of Contemporary History 11 , Journal of Contemporary History, 
v. 3 No. 2 (April 1968), pp. 163-177. 
Ifannoni, op.cit., pp. 32-33. 
ibid., P• 128. 
16. 
and wish to reject it.46 In the colonial situation where he will be 
surrounded by native dependents the colonist will gain the needed reassur-
ances of his superior status.47 "To the spirit convinced of its own 
inferiority, the homage of a dependent is balm and honey and to surround 
oneself with dependents is perhaps the easiest way of appeasing an ego 
48· eager for reassurance. 11 Thus a person has a 11 settler mentality11 long 
before he becomes a settler. Shakespeare's Prospero and Defoe's Crusoe 
are to Mannoni archetypes of the colonia1.49 
It is possible, then, to regard emigrants as nineteenth century examples 
of Prosperos and Robinson C:rusoes bringing with them the "Prospero complex 11 -
proud paternalism, neurotic impatience and desire to dominate. Such a 
mentality easily compensates for its personal inferiority with cultural 
arrogance and assertions of racial superiority. 50 Paradoxically the 
settlers and colonists, especially the better educated and more wealthy 
in the Company settlements, brought with them to Iifew Zealand the prejudices 
and attitudes towards other races, and the ideologies, the Victorian Weltans-
chauung,. of the dynamic and expansive society they were rejecting. 51 
* * * * 
46. ibid., P• 108. 
4 7. ~. , PP• 110-121 • 
48. Philip Mason, Forward to Mannoni, Prospero and.Caliban, p. 11. 
49. ibid., PP• 98-109 
50. ibid., PP• 110, 120-121. 
51. The following discussion is intended simply to sketch some of the 
influences the aggressive and expansive nature of Victorian society .had 
on the colonist's attitude towards the native race he met. For a more 
general and detailed account of the settlers' attitudes towards the 
Maori see Sinclair, Origins of the Maori Wars, pp. 1-11, 19-26. 
Britain in the nineteenth century had become the world's workshop, shipbuilder, 
carrier, banker and clearing house. Prosperity had led to optimism, a sense 
52 of national unity and self-assurance, and a spirit of progress. The 
rapid expansion of the British economy and society inspired the VictoEians 
to believe they had discovered the philosopher's stone of progress with 
which the condition of men everywhere could be improved. The Victorians, 
like many before and after them, projected their ovm image as a universal 
ideal. This belief that Britain had a divinely ordained mission, a moral 
obligation, to share the benefits of its experience and civilization with 
the rest of mankind, 53 provided a rationalization and an ideology for those 
driven to emigrate by economic and social discontent. In all this there 
was a sense of superiority and self-righteousness. Bri t~in stood at the 
top of a ladder of progress, at the bottom of which were the aborigines. 54 
The Victorians aspired to raise all the races of the world up the steps of 
progress which they had climbed. British laws and institutions were to be 
reproduced wherever "it pleases Providence to create openings for us••·•" 55 
A change in the nature of humanitarian opinion encouraged the attitude 
of superiority and the belief that the British race was "the chosen instrument 
for mighty things 11 • 56 The romantic, and essentially conservative humanitar-
-, 
ianism represented by Edmund Burke 7and the concept of imperial trusteeship, 
52. A. Briggs, Victorian People, pp. 13-14; W.E. Houghton, The Victorian 
Frame of Nind, pp. 27-53. 
53. See Knorr, British Colonial Theories, PP• 310-315. Gover.nment, 
54. See J .s. !fill, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative/(1946 
edition), pp. 118 ff~ 
55. W.E. Gladstone, "Our Colonies", 12 November 1855, in P. Knaplund, 
Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, (1927), p. 203. 
56. Archibald Alison quoted by Knorr, British Colonial Theories, p. 315. 
18. 
n 
was being replaced by the more militant humanitarianism of the evangelicals 
and utilitarians. 57 Instead of the protection of the noble savage and the 
preservation pf his civilization advocated by the romantics, who did not 
encourage colonization; the evangelicals supported a policy of assimilation 
and anglicization. The salvation of the nativ~as to be achieved by· 
11 inducing th"2!!L- to embrace the language, customs, religion and social ties 
of the superior race. 11 58 The colonist was to offer the 1'1a.ori the 
benefits of his civilization and to change him into a bro1-m European. 59 
The presence of the settlers in New Zealand was to benefit the Maoris, 60 
and the colonist was sure that 
the formation of a settlement ... 
where Natives and Europeans would reside, side by 
side, would tend materially to elevate the-former 
into a condition of comple.te civilization .. "° 61 
However, the altruism of the British version of "la mission civilisat-
rice" should not be assumed too readily. In any case to most emigrants 
it was little more than a rationalization, a more presentable slogan than 
one which might more blatantly express the real motives and purposes of 
57. For this change in attitude in relation to India see E. Stokes,~ 
English Utilitarians and India, Chap. I; see also Knorr, British 
Colonial Theories, pp. 382-388. 
58. E.G. Wakefield to C.0. Torlesse, 12 i'l'.tay 1837, Canterbury Papers, 
Letters from Wakefield, Vol.I. 
59. Cf. T.B. Macaulay's Minute on Education, 2 February 1835, in which 
he explained that the first object of English education in India was 
to create "a class of people, Indian in colour and blood, but English 
in tastes, in opinions·, in morals, and in intellect. 11 See Stokes, 
English Utilitarians and India, (1959), p. 46. 
60. Mantell to Merivale, 12 August 1856, Mantell M:Ss, 1~3A. 
61. PD, 1858-60, p. 2, Blakiston in the Legislative Council. 
19. 
emigration. The South Island settler certainly could not claim he had 
come to civilize the Maori - if this was his motive he surely had settled 
in the wrong island. A policy of outright extermination would have 
offended the sensibilities of the better educated colonists as well as 
humanitarian sentiments, thus settlement was said to be of benefit to 
the Maoris. 62 At best, the civilization of the Maoris was regarded as 
an expedient and judicious policy for settlements being established in 
the midst of the ¥1aoris, as were the settlements in the North Island. 
By turning the Maoris in to a brmm skiE, European not only would the Maori 
be raised from barbarism but in so doing his opposition and potential 
danger to the small European settlements would be removed. Instead of 
being a foe in his savage state, the civilized Naori would not only be 
~ friend but also a consumer of the .material incidentals accompanying 
western civilization and which the settler-trader had to sello 63 
Further the cause of humanitarianism in Britain suffered a heavy blow 
with the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Macaulay records in his diary 
11he cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the 
Nation to·a degree unprecedented within my memory. 
Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and 
the societies for the reformation of criminals are 
silent. There is a terrible rage for revenge. 64 
62. See M. Turnbull, The Colonization of New Zealand by the New Zealand 
Company, 1839-1843. unpublished B.Litt. thesis, Oxford University, 
1950., PP• 246-249. 
63. W. Howitt, Colonization and Christianity. (1838), p. 504, writes 
11 Let anyone look at the immediate effect among the South Sea Islanders, 
the Hottentots, or the Caffres, of civilization creating a demand for 
our manufactures." 
64. Quoted by D. Woodruff, "Expansion and Emigration", Early Victorian 
England, (ed. G.M. Young, 1951 ), ii, PP• 404-4-05. 
20. 
The massacre at Cawnpore in 1857 powerfully affected the mind of the 
Victorian 1'nglishman. 65 Not only did it affect the Englishman's view 
of India but it forced him to reconsider his attitudes towards coloured 
races in general and to colonization. 66 The possibility of civilizing 
native races except at the point of a sword was brought into doubt, and 
in India reforms were to be carried out in a spirit of racial conquest; 
a benighted people, it was now believed, had to be compelled toward the 
light. 67 Writing about the Indian mutiny .Jand1~ria .Atkinson admitted 
I fully believe Carlyle's dictum that it is the ,right 
of the foolish to be governed by the wise, and I am 
strengthened by the wonders done in India in the opinion 
that the British have only to be determined on doing 
a thing, in order to get it done. 68 
Thomas Carlyle and his ideas were to have an important influence in 
the nineteenth century. Because he was not concerned with colonies or 
colonization as such; Carlyle propounded no colonial theory. 69. His 
importance lies in how his ideas of hero-worship and his identification 
of right with might were used to support attitudes of racial superiority 
of the AngP.Saxons, and to justify governing native races with an iron 
rule which need not take native rights into account. 7° Carlyle's philos-
ophy suited the aggressive nature of nineteenth century British expansion 
65. Briggs, Victorian People, p. 19; W.L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise, 
ppe 84-85. 
66. Woodruff, op.cit., p. 404-. 
67. See Stokes, English Utilitarians and India, pp. 268-269. 
68 • .Jane Maria Atkinson to· Emily E. Richmond, 12 May-1858, Richmond-
Atkinson Papers, i, p. 396. 
69. C.A. Bodelson, Studies in mid-Victorian Imperialism, (1924), pp. 22-32; 
Knorr, British Colonial Theories, pp. 400-:-404. 
70. Knorr, op.cit., p. 404-; see also Houghton, Victorian Frame of }und, 
:PP• 209-213. 
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the ruling spirit of which was described as 
••• absolute individuality. It is unwilling in its 
contacts with foreign nations to aclmowledge any other 
system than its own, and labours to enforce on all 
who are under its control its own peculiar principles. 71 
The ideas of Carlyle also recognized the elements of rowdyism and interest 
in violence which lay beneath the apparent placidity of Victorian society. 72 
The instinct for violence was satisfied at home by the reading of semi-
pornographic "horror" tales, by witnessing public executions, or at.election 
time when rowdyism reached its peak. 73 The same instinct for violence 
could be diverted abroad by the Crimean adventure, the Indian mutiny, and 
by the distant struggle against the coloured people in the colonies. 
Frederick Weld wrote 
••• say what you will, we English are one of the most 
bloodthirsty races in the world once our blood is up, 
look at the Ionian Islands, look at India •••• 74 
Elements of rowdyism and violence were also present in New Zealand 
colonial society. Assault and drunkenness accounted for half of the con-
victions in New Zealand during 1858, many other cases would never have come 
before the courts. 75 Newspapers published very detailed accounts of court 
proceedings and delighted in the gory details contained in the evidence of 
witnesses. There were often unnecessarily gruesome descriptions of bodies 
71. Eo ])iffenbach, Travels in New Zealand, (1843), ii, p. 172. 
72. Briggs, Victorian People, p. 19. 
73. Burns, Age of Equipoise, pp. 83-85. 
74. Weld to J,R. Godley, 18 July 1860, Canterbury Papers, Letters to 
Godley, vol. 3. 
75, See N.Z. Statistics, 1858, p. 84. 
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found after suicide or murder. 76 Public executio4s came to an end in 1858 
by an act passed by the General Assembly after some debate in the Legislative 
Council concerning the advisability of continuing to allow Maoris to witness 
executions. 77 Politics was the occasion for a good deal of violence, 
' 11 t 1 t' t' 78 especia ya e ec ion 1me. Physical coercion was frequently used to 
79 r.ally support. Revans, a prominent member of the first General Assembly, 
is said to have drawn a knife on one of his opponents at a public meeting, 
, and William Noorhouse of Canterbury was involved in at least one braw1. 80 
W.T.L. Travers, another member of the first Assembly, a lawyer and prominent 
in N'elson politics, often allowed uhis Irish blood 11 as he called it, to get 
81 the better of him and lpded in court. Indeed the first session of the 
,,-
82 1854 Assembly itself ended in a brawl. 
Thomas Carlyle had his disciples in New Zealand, the most obvious 
and blatant being Alfred Domett against whom the Canterbury Press 
warned its readers, describing Domett as 
A Votary of Carlyle I s hero-worship theor-in a worshipper 
of-Cromwell and other autocrats••·• 83 
76. See for example NC 9 August 1859 on. the discovery of the body of Thomas 
Gibb in a well with his throat cut. 
77. PD, 1856-58, Po 432. The Bill did not cause any debate in the House 
of Representatives, though Hugh Carleton remarked that "the colony ought 
to wait until the Mother-country had taken action in the matter, seeing 
that the colony had not such good 'headpieces' as the Nother-country. 11 
PD, 1856-58, p. 441. 
78. D. Herron, The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 1853-1858, 
unpublished PhD thesis, o. U., 1959, p. 43. 
79. ioid., pp. 151, 153-154. 
80. ibid., P• 43. 
81. C.B. Brereton, Vanguard 
106; Saunders, History 
82, PD, 1854, PP• 338-339; 
830 ~' 12 August 1863. 
of the South, Nelson, New Zealand, pp. 101.,103, 
of Hew Zealand, i, 283,311, 330-333. 
Saunders, op.cit., pp. 306-308. 
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Domett was to have an important part in moulding Nelson public opinion as 
editor of the Nelson Examiner and in 1862 ari.d 1863 headed the colonial 
ministry with the policy of confiscation. 
The attitudes of superiority and arrogance adopted by the British in 
the nineteenth-century arose partly from their consciousness of Britain's 
power in the world and of -the technological advances she had made. 
were not the first nor will be the last people _to make the mistake of 
elevating fortunate trends of history into natural law, unique racial 
They· 
characteristics, or the gift of God to an elect nation. The attitude 
of the British settler towards the native race he met is also understandable. 
Without the advantage of any knowledge supplied by anthropological or 
sociological studies he was faced with the impact of a totally different 
way of life, a people with different habits, customs and values, and who 
spoke a strange language.Bl,. Conscious of the material and technological 
superiority and the military power of his own people, unconscious of the 
deeper psychological satisfactions the native derived from his indigenous 
culture, the settler may be excused for assuming the superiority of his 
way of life. It is not surprising though unfortunate that the settlers 
did not conceal their contempt for the brovm-skinned 
men, who were once cannibals, claimed land without 
title-deeds, disfigured their faces for ornament, lived 
in dog-kennels, fed on putrid fish and fe~n-root, and 
spoke a language in which there were no written literature. 85 
* * * * 
81+-. Studies are usually concentrated on the impact of the European on 
native cultures and peoples. It would be interesting and important 
to investigate the effects of these contacts on the European, on whom 
the psychological impact of meeting a totally different culture would 
have been no less than that on the native. 
85. A.S. Thomson, Story of New Zealand, ii, p. 43. 
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The motives and colonial mentality of the early New Zealand settlers 
together with the ideas and prejudices they brought with them to the 
.Antipodes, gave little foundation to the humanitarian hope that the 
settlement of New Zealand would be for the benefit of the Maori. The 
settlers were ill equipped by their background and their knowledge to 
cope with the tensions and potential conflicts present in a colonial 
situation in which two races meet. Such situations demand sympathy 
and understanding from those involved - the possession of an ability 
to perform 11 the mental act of imagining ourselves in the situation of 
others. 11 86 Few Europeans - humanitarian, missionary, or settlers -
possessed this ability to imaginatively place themselves in the position 
of the Maoris, and see things through their eyes. This lack of sympathy, 
a limitation of the human understanding, is unfortunately too often revealed 
positively in national and racial antagonism and conflict. 
There was indeed much in the New Zealand colonial situation that 
made conflict more likely and understanding between the races more difficult 
to achieve. Real economic distress, or the insecurity and anxiety accompany-
ing the r~pid social and economic changes taking place in Britain drove the 
emigrants out of their homeland where they felt their identity threatened. 
They came with a psychological need to reassert their superiority and regain 
a sense of personal worthiness, they sought an improvement of their own 
condition and a rise in their standard of living. In.the New Zealand 
situation the way to achieve personal worth was through the making of money 
and the building of the ideal society - the settlers' preoccupation was with 
86. 'l'homson, op.cit., i, p. 82. 
profits and social progress. In the North Island the settler found his 
path to profits and progress barred by the Maoris, who were unwilling to 
part with their land, the very basis of the settlers' progress to their 
utopia of a pre-industrial English agricultural society. Though ·there 
was little direct conflict of interest and few contacts between Maoris and 
settlers in the South Island, while the colony was united under one central 
government the South Island settlers found their progress hindered by the 
native problems of ·the North. 
latent antagonisms6 
Thus a conflict of interests aggravated 
Their colonial experiences did little to improve the sympathy and 
-understanding of the settlers. In the South Island, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, there was much in the condition of the Southern Maori to 
convince the settler of his own superiority, of the inevitable extinction 
of the Maori, and that the cheapest and most desirable elevation of the 
. 8 
Maori was 11a speedy passage to a better world above. 11 7 Further it soon 
became apparent that the "Brighter Britain° was not to be easily built in 
the South Seas. Some found they had not come to Utopia after all, while 
others suffered a more gradual disenchantment. 
colonial situation fell far short of the ideal. 
87. OW~ 5 November 1859. 
The reality of the 
This was particularly so in Nelson where there were too little farm 
88 land, too few capitalists, but too many labourers. The anxiety for 
land led, in 1843, to precipitate action and to a brief but disastrous 
and humiliating conflict with the Maoris at Wairau. The would-be 
landowner and the unemploye-d. labourer both sought compensation from the 
equally indigent New Zealand Company. When the Company eventually came 
to its end in 1850, the landowners and the land--less were left to 
so/ggle against each other for control of the insufficient land and 
meagre resources available. The conflict between land and labour was 
t~ be a feature of Nelson provincial politics for many years. 89 
88. Allan, Nelson, PP• 183-192, 229-240, 353-399. 
89. McIntosh, Marlborough, PP• 131-151, 193-206. 
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CHAPTER I.I 
THE DElCLIJ.ITE OF '.PHE SOUTH ISL.AHD ~iAORI. 
" ••• defeat, disease and loss of their 
land •• ,. 11 
---Lady Martin, 1884. 
The South Island Haori presents the scho+ar with a good case-study 
1 of the assimilation of an insignificant minority by an invading people. 
The pre-European history of the South Island Maori, and the story of their 
early wester-.a contacts with sealers, traders, whalers, and missionaries, 
lie outside the scope of this thesis. Local and provincial histories 
usually provide an account of the pre-European Maori and of early western 
2 contacts in the province. A study has recently been written on the 
early wo1·k of Christian missionaries among the South Island Ifaoris. 3 
These early western contacts played a significant part in reducing the 
Maori population and thus preparing the way fo:r the large scale colonization 
that was to take place. 
1 • R. Duff, Tribal Maori and the Great Society, unpublished MA thesis, 
C.U.C., 1935·, and "South Island l'ilaoris 11 , The Maori People Today, (ed. 
I.L.G. Sutherland, 1940), p.378, 
2. See in particular: R.M. Allan, Nelson, 1965, Chap.1; A History of 
Canterbury, Vol.1 (ed, J. Hight and C.R. Straubel, 1957), section 3; 
A.D. McIntosh, Marlborou~h, 1940, Chaps. 1-2, Appendix~; A.H. McLintock, 
'.I'he History of Otago, 1949, pp. 25-148; R. !foNab, Muril1iku, 1909, passim. 
See also J.H. Beattie, Our Southernmost J.l'Iaoris, 1954; H.C. Evison, 
A History of the Canterbury Maoris with special reference to the land 
question, unpublished IvIA. thesis O.U., 1952. 
3. Margaret E. Major, Christian Flissions in the South Island in the 1840's, 
lmpublished MA thesis, C. U., 1964. 
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Roger Duff estimates that in 1820 the minimum South Island Maori 
population would have been eight to ten thousand. 4 At the 1858 census 
the number had been reduced to 2,983, including 510 on the Chatham Islands. 5 
Contemporaries attributed the swift decline to the raids of Te Rauparaha 
and to the intruduction of new habits and diseases by the Europeans. 6 
The Maori chief, Tuhawaiki, speaking at the sale of the "Otago Block", 
thought back to the days when the Ngaitahu were a large and powerful tribe 
and described its decline thus: 
The wave which brought Ra.uparaha and his allies to the 
Strait, washed him over to the Southern Island. He 
went through us, fighting and burning and slaying • 
• • • But we had a worse enemy than even Rauparaha, and 
that was the visit of the Pakeha with his drink and 
his disease. You think us very corrupted, but the 
very scum of Port Jackson shipped as whalers or landed 
as sealers on this coast. They brought ~s new plagues 
unknown to our fathers, till our people melted away. 7 
Tuhawaiki further gave a description of the destruction wrought by an 
attack of measles; 
but one year, when I was a youth, a ship came from 
Sych1ey, and she brought the measles among us. It 
was winter... • In a few months most of the inhabitants 
sickened and died. Whole families on this spot disappeared 
and left no one to represent them. 8 
4. Duff, "South Island Maoris", op.cit., p.375. 
5. N.Z. Statistics, 1858, p.10. 
6. Shortland to the Chief Protector, 18 November 1844, A. Mackay, 
A Compendium of Official Documents relating to Native Affairs 
in the South Island, 1873, ii,p.125; 'Shortland was reporting 
the views of the settlerso 
7o G. Clarke, Notes on Early Life in New Zealand, 1903, pp. 62-63. 
8. ibid., p.63. 
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0-.a the other hand, Edward Shortland argued that the decline in population 
had been exaggerated as a result of over estimation of the original Maori 
population. He pointed to the nomadic nature of the South Island lfaori 
and suggested that the occasional concentration of tfaoris around trading 
and whaling stations gave observers a false impression of the size of the 
' 9 
native population. Shortland refers to Cook's observation on the Middle 
Island "that its population appeared trifling, and that a great part of it 
was destitute of inhabitants. 1110 
Though the extent of the decline may be debated it is clear that the 
raids of Te Rauparaha and new diseases killed off a great number of the 
South Island Maoris. Early settlers noted the Maori's lack of immunity 
to diseases such as measles. In 1848-49 an epidemic of measles struck 
the Pigeon Bay Haoris. James Hay records that almost half of the Maoris 
were killed, and that the survivors were quiet and peacefully disposed; 
there was 11a marked change in their demeanour, which, previous to the 
epidemic, was often boastful and threatening." 11 
12 greater in Otago. 
The mortality was 
9. E. Shortland, The Souther.a Districts of New Zealand, 1851, pp.39-42, 
74-78. 
10. ibid., p.75. 
11. J. Hay, Reminiscences of Earliest Canterbury. 1915, p.10. 
12. See W. Wakefield to the Secretary of the Company, New Edinburgh, 
31 August 1844, in T.M. Hacken, Contributions to the Early History 
!2%. Hew Zealand (Settlement of Otago), 1898, Appendix D, p •. 270; F. 
Tuckett, Diary, 22 May 1844, in Hacken, 0·12.c.it., Appendix A; p.223; 
Hacken, op.cit., p.51; :McLintock, H:j,story of Otagq_, pp.93-94. 
30. 
Duff estimates that Te Rauparaha killed off half the Maori population 
in the South Island by 1831 and that this was followed by another forty· 
per cent depopulation, brought about less suddenly but more insidiously 
before European settlement became effective, this second period of 
depopulation ending by 1860. 13 The decimation and depredation of the 
South Island Maori by Te Rauparaha and epidemics relieved the settlers 
from fear of any native insurrection. The settlers rejoiced with James 
Hay that 
Providence allayed all doubts in this connection by an 
epidemic of measles which so ravaged the various kaingas 
that their ranks were left thin, and the survivors cowed 
and only too willing to become law-abiding subjects. 14 
Two sudden successive shocks of defeat and decimation left the 
South Island ¥iaori paralysed. The fabric of hj,_s society was being torn 
by the impact of an alien culture which questioned the social, economic 
and religious values of traditional Viaori society. The destruction was 
not solely physical but also social and psychological. The once flourish-
15 ing Ngaitahu tribe, strong enough to defy the might of Te Rauparaha and 
to contemplate driving out the Pakeha, 16 was laid low by disease and 
in 
broken/spirit. The settlers were not the only ones who considered the 
extinction of the Vlaori only a matter of time. Their traditional mode 
13. Duff, nsouth Island Maoris", op.cit_., p.375. 
14. Hay, op.cit., p.49. 
15. ibid., pp.44-46; McLintock, op.cit., pp.89-91. 
16. Hay, op.cit., pp.23-26, gives an account of a plot by the Canterbury 
r/Jaoris to massacre the early settlers and whalers following the news 
of the Wairau massacre in July 1843. The European residents at the 
Otago whaling stations were also held in contempt and often threatened. 
McLintock, op.cit., pp.91-92; McNab, Murihiku, pp.327-328, 405-406, 
4'16-418. 
31. 
of life breaking up and their culture debased, the Maoris themselves 
began to believe their end was nearo William Wakefield on the com-
pletion of the purchase of the Otago block in 1844 reported that 
• • • the Wa ti ve chiefs, in parting with their tmoccupied 
lands, gave as their chlef motive for so doing, and as an 
inducement to us to take possession of them, the conviction 
they labour under, that in a few years they and their tribe 
will be no more. 17 
Otago Ifaoris were the worse affected· by the_ir contacts with the 
European. George Clarke, noting their degeneration in numbers, in 
physique, and in mo!als, considered the Otago Maoris to be in "a more 
pitiable state than any of the tribes in the Northern Islandtto 18 Twenty 
years later, in 1864, Clarke's brother was sent to report on the condition 
of the Otago Maoris. He found them "in a most unsatisfactory condi tion. 11 
Instead of enjoying the benefits that the presence of a large European 
population was supposed to bestow, they were 11 as a people ••• squalid, 
miserable and ignorant, 11 and "the most inert and listless 11 he had ever 
met. Clarke saw no future for them. t11t is a melancholy fact that the 
aboriginal race is fast disappearing from these Provinces." 19 
The Canterbury Maoris were slightly better off, though there were 
conflicting opinions as to their condition in the 'sixties. The Rev. 
J.W, Stack writing in 1870 noted 11a great want of earnestness in character 
17. Wo Wakefield to the Secretary of the Company, New Edinburgh, 31 August 
1844, in Hocken, Contributions, Appendix D, p.270. 
18. Clarke, Early Life in New Zealand, p.61. 
19. H.T. Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 29 September 1864, riackay, 
Compendium, ii, p.89. 
32. 
of the Maori, a deficiency only observable since the colonization of the 
country," and pointed to the attitude of isolationism adopted by the 
Maoris, who felt they would be unable to compete satisfactorily with the 
European in the "higher walks of civilized life 11 and were too proud to 
20 throw in their lot with the lowly. Further Stack noted the poverty 
of the Maoris, claiming that none could command an income of £100 or even 
half that amount, and that even if they rented their fourteen acre farms21 
they would realise only £14 each family. 22 However, Walter Buller, the 
Resident ¥1agistrate, in his reports on the oonaition of the Canterbury 
Maoris, gave a much brighter picture. Though of poorer physique than the 
Northern Maoris, the Maoris in.Canterbury formed 11a vigorous and health:z 
community, 1123 and were on the whole in a flourishing conditiono 24 Bulier 
wrote of the social advancement of the Fiaoris at Kaiapoi and estimated their 
reserves to be worth £67,00o. 25 He noticed none of the listlessness and 
aimlessness that so struck Stack only a few years later, Buller remarked 
only on the discontent of the Yiaorisover the unsatisfactory tenure of the 
Native reserve at Kaiapoi, which they desired to be individualized. 26 
The great need of the Canterbury Maoris was for 11some better provision for 









Report prepared by J.W. Stack, 
The Kaiapoi Native Reserve was 
mostly 14 acre lots in 1862. 
Stack, op.cit., p.27. 
in Mackay, Compendium., i , p. 27. 
partitioned and individualized into 
See Mackay, Compendium, ii, pp.95-104. 
W.L. Buller to Native Secretary, 8 March 1860, 
p.129. 
Mackay, Compendium, ii, 
Mackay, op.cit., ii, p.130. Buller to Native Secretary, 19 September 1861, 
ili.fl,,. 
Buller to Native Secretary, 27 December 1859, Mackay, op.cit., ii, p.129, 
Buller to Native Secretary, 19 September 1861, VJ.ackay, op.cit., ii, p.131. 
be an example of Maori isolationism, namely the native runangas, Buller 
considered 11absolutely the only means and mode of preserving themselves 
28 from anarchy which the Maoris of this Province possess. 11 
Buller and Stack looked at the condition of the Maori from different 
angles. Buller emphasised the material changes taking place in Maori 
society and measured social advancement in terms of the Maori's rejection 
of cannibalism and the adoption of European style housing and clothing. 29 
The Naori's desire for the individualization of their reserves he interpreted 
as an eagerness to adopt European economics as the road to improvement; 30 
he overlooked the possibility that the Maori dislike.d the idea of reserves, 
which took little account of tribal rivalries and local circumsta11ces but 
31 herded all together. Being trained in law he welcomed the attempt of 
the ~iiaoris to govern and enforce law and order themselves, and regretted 
the government's inabili t3; to do so. 32 Buller, like John Gorst, mi.sinter-
preted the Maori attempt at self-government as the result of government 
neglect. Looldng more into the state of the Naori mind rather than at the 
veneer of European civilization being adopted, ,Stack emphasised the Maori I s 
mood of reaction against colonization, which expressed itself in an attempt 
to withdraw from contacts with the E.'uropean society and a want of interest 
in life. Unable to compete with the European or to understand his laws, 
28. i~Jd., p, 132. 
29. Buller to Native Secretary, 8 ~larch 1860, Maok;ay, CompendiUIQ., ii, p.128. 
300 Buller to Native Secretary, 9 September 1861, Mackay, op._cj_,i., ii, p.131. 
31. J.G. Joh..r1son to D. McLean, 7 June 1856, rfackay, op.cit.,:i:ip.10. 
32. Buller, op.cit., p.132 
the Maoris 
••• prefer to consider themselves a separate nation -
allies rather than subjects of the Crown. • •• They_ 
prefer to stand aside on neutral grounds, where they 
34. 
can meet us as equals - where they can govern themselves, 
and provide for their own wants in their own way, only 
having recourse occasionally to the white-man for 
assistance. 33· 
The condition of the Canterbury Maoris was unsatisfactory in Stack's 
opinion, their advancement towards Europeanization was being hindered 
by an attitude of isolationism and by the Maori sense of hopelessness. 
Changes had occurred in the life of the Canterbury Maori since the 
coming of the European.34 Though they were to offer some resistance to 
the extinguishment of their title,35 e~pecially after they heard their 
lands were being resold at a much higher price than they were paid, 36 
the Canterbury Maoris were the remnants of a broken society, their 
reserves to which they were now restricted easily became gh~t~oes in the 
midst of an increasing European population. They could not compete in 
the new economic race brought by the newcomers. The Maoris realised 
their inferiority and felt deeply the humiliation of being considered 
of no importance or use in their own country. 
33. Stack in Mackay, op.cit., i, pp.26-28. 
34. See A History of Canterbury, i, pp.31-32, 103-112. 
35. ~-, pp.103-112; Mackay, Compendium, i, pp.207-222, 11, pp.3-37• 
36. J.W. Hamilton to W. Fox, 11 January 1850, Mackay, op.cit., ii, p.6. 
35. 
About half of the total South Island ¥1aori population was to be 
found in the Nelson province - the 1858 census giving the'figure 1,120. 37 
Of these 752 resided in what was to become the province of Marlborough, 
only 9 were in the town of Nelson and 24 in ?Uburban Nelson. 38 Writing 
in 1849 William Fox drew attention to the steady progress especially in 
agriculture and commerce of the Maoris since the settlement of land claims 
in 1844, and he attributed this progress 
entirely to their juxtaposition with European Colonists • 
••• The example and success of the Colonists have stimulated 
their industry, and led them to imitate their proceedings. 
It proves in a great degree the wisdom of the scheme devised 
by the Company for intermixing the two Races. •·• 39 
But Fox went on to point out that though the capabilities of the Maori 
for civilization might be as great as was attributed to them; the actual 
degree of civilization attained was not very great. Indeed there was 
very little in their character or habits to entitle 
them to rank as civilised men - very much which can 
only be regarded as distinguishing marks of Savages. 40 
Though it contained the largest population of Maoris in the South 
Island, Nelson had little to fear from them for they were greatly out-
numbered by the Pakeha and divided amo~gst themselves into several tribes. 41 
37. N.Z. Statistics, l858, p.10. 
38. Statistics of the Province of Nelson, .1.§i2, p,2. The figures given 
for 1858 were the same as for 1855. 
39. w. Fox, Report on the· Settlement of Nelson, p.22. 
40. ibid., p.24. 
41. NC 3 April 1860, letter from W. Jenkins. ihe Nelson and Marlborough 
Maoris were divided into the following tribes: Ngati:rarua, Ngatiawa, 
Ngatitama, Ngatikoata, Rangitane and Ngaitahu. See James Mackay, Jnr., 
to Native Secretary, 3 October 1863, Mackay, Compendium, ii, 137-138. 
36. 
In 1863 James Mackay found it was 11far easier to ·prognosticate the 
ultimate degradation and extinction of the Maori, than to.prescribe the 
proper course to be pu.Tsued to avert those evils. 11 He found them confined 
to reserves, hemmed in by settlers, fearful of being massacred by the 
Europeans and with a general spirit of despondency growing up among them. 42 
The Maori was unable to cope with the new economy and way of life introduced 
by the European. Though many tried to purchase Crown Land, a right they 
were entitled-to by Grey's provision, difficulties had been thrown in their 
way by the Provincial Counci1. 43 The multi-tribal nature of the Nelson 
I~laori made the Native reserves system especially unsatisfactory and there 
was agitation for the individualization and granting of Crovm titles of 
the reserves 'under occupation. The reserves of land-set aside by the New 
Zealand Company to provide a source of revenue for native purposes created 
difficulties in the allocation of funds. 44 
* * * * 
The ,destruction and changes in the· life of the South Island Maori w.er.e 
' \i~•l .. ~ '\ ' 
no differe1~{ in fact from the de!3truction and changes taking place among 
the North Island Maori. In the Horth Island, inter-tribal warfare, made 
more effective and more destructive by the introduction of the musket, was 
as lethal as Te Rauparaha's raids were in the south. 'l'he North Island 
lViaori had no more i1mauni ty to disease and epidemics than his southern 
brother. Indeed a recent scholar concludes that the population of the 
42. James Mackay, Jnr., to Native Secretary, 3 October 1863, Mackay, 
C om·Qendi um, ii ,IP1 38-1 3 9 • 
43. The regulation made by Sir George Grey, "that any native residing in 
a district in which he had been one of the sellers of land to the 
Government, should be entitled to purchase land therein at ten shillings 
per acre," had been rendered void by subsequent Provincial Council 
enactments. See James Mackay, Jnr., .2.1?...Lcit., p.138. 
44. James Mackay, Jnr., on.cit., PP• 139-140. 
37. 
South Island as a whole was reduced in much the same proportion as that 
of the North Island.45 Maori society in the Horth Island was in a state 
of disorganization and transforn1ation - it too was shuddel'ing under the · 
impact of wester-11 civilization. '.l.1he Haori initially welcomed the 
European and his ways: the Maoris were not coerced into trade, hoodwinked 
into self-destruction, or· taught to make war more effectively; rather they 
adopted the new practices as more effective means of pursuing traditional 
Maori goals, to extend their competence in warfare, to increase their 
prestige and wealth. Ho,-rever, even as the Ifooris were selecting and 
adopting western articles which seemed best to serve their Haori purposes, 
and were using the Europeans as means of trade, they were unwittingly 
helping to create the forces which were to apply pressures and create 
situations which they could no longer explain in terms of their own culture 
which 
and/could no longer be controlled by their traditional society. The North 
Island Maoris differed from the South Island Maoris in the marm.er in which 
these pressures and situations were faced, and in their ability or willing-
ness to resist the most lethal weapon in the European arsenal - that of 
land purchase. By 1860 the Southern Maoris were in the position of 
dispossessed tribes - the position into which the Northern Haoris were 
thrust by confiscation, land courts and land sales in the period after the 
Maori wars. 
The bulk of the Haori population had always be.en in the North Island, 
so that the depopulation by muskets and measles, while proportionately no 
45. K.B. Cumberland, 11 A Land Despoiled: New Zealand about 1838 11, New 
Zealand Geographer, VI, i (April 19'56), p.21. 
worse in the South than in the North, left the South Island Maori fewer in 
number and more scattered. The South Island Maori was made more painfully 
aware that his people were disappearing and his tradihonal society breaking 
..----
up. Weakened in numbers and in spirit he could not resist the European 
demand for his lands with the same strength and appearance of unity 
displayed by the northerner. 
Studies need to be made into the manner in which the South Island 
J.VIaoris were dispossessed of their la."Yl.ds and the ef:f ects this alienation of 
their lands had on the i\liaori. 46 .An attempt could be made to apply in the 
South Island the methods developed by Dr. Sorrenson for the North Island 
Maori. 4 7 The land to the l1aori did not only represent an economic 
commodity or just a means of subsistence; the land_ was clothed with 
emotional values and sentiments, 48 and ancestral associations. Tribal 
traditions gave every piece of le,nd a significance, which the European 
survey line often did not take into account. The Kaiapoi Naoris refused 
to reoccupy or allow the Pakeha to settle on the scene of the defeat of 
their tribe, Kaiapohia, and asked that it be regarded as sacred. 49 At 
46. Some attempt has recently been made by R.W. Chapman, The South Island 
Maoris and their Reserved Lan_<y, 1 1860-191 O, unpublish~9-_ MA thesis, 
C. U., 1965. 
47. M.P.K. Sorrenson, "Land Purchase Methods and their effect on Maori 
population, 1865-1901", Journal of the Polynesian Society, 65 (1956), 
PP• 183-199. 
48, See R, ]!'irth, Economics of the New Zealand Haori, (2nd Edition, 1957), 
Chap. XI. 
49. Mantell to Private Secretary, 21 September 1848, Mackay, Compendium, 
i, p.214. 
the sale of the Ota.go Block, Tuhawaiki, stretchi!!-g his arms and pointing 
with his finger said 
~ . . 
Look here, Karaka, here, and there, and there and yonder; 
those are all · burial places, not ancestral burial places, 
but those of this generation. Our parents, uncles, aunts, 
brothers, sisters, children, they lie thick around us • 
• • • My people lie all arom1d us, and now you can tell Wide- -
awake (Wakefield) why we cam10t part with this portion of 
our land, and. why we were angry with 1\rnket for cutting 
his lines about here. 51 
]'urther, land acted as the social cohesive of the tribe and deter.mined 
the social and political relationship within the tribal organization. 
To the settler the land represented money; to the :flaori it was life 
itself and more. 
Details of the purchase of the. South Island will .not be dealt with 
hereo 52 Some suggestions will be made as to the reasons for the relative 
docility of the South Island Maori in parting with his land and the effects 
this alienation of the land had on the Maorio It should be noted that the 
dispute at Wairau which ended in bloodshed was, on the Ms,ori side, the 
assertion of a North Island chief, Te P.auparaha, of his rights of conquest. 
The South Island Maoris resident in the district were not involvedo 53 
The land purchases in the South Island made during the governorship 
of Sir George Grey were regarded by Herman Merivale as 11 Highly important, 
• and a fit close to Sir G. Grey's most useful career as regards his trans-
'54 actions with the natives'! By 1853 most of the South Island had been 
50. l\iaori name for George Clarke 
51. Clarke, Early Life in New Zealand, pp. 62-63 
52. See Chapman, op.cit_.; AJiistQ.,U of Canterbury, I, 
Jo Rutherford, Sir George Grey, 1961, pp. 165-176; 
.Q.9mpendium, passim. 
53. W. l!7ox, Report on the Settlement of Nelson, p.24 




purchased without much difficulty and before large numbers of Europeans 
began to occupy the. land. 
The psychological effects of defeat and depopulation had made the 
South Island Maori disheartened, with very little hope that a future lay 
ahead for his race. This attitude of dejection and hopelessness influenced 
the Maori to part with his land in return for a monetary payment, together 
with the protection of certain areas, "reserved for ourselves and our 
children. 1155 Probably by surrendering their unoccupied lands, the Maoris, 
with little knowledge of the nature of large scale European colonization 
and not expecting the influx of settlers that was to occur, felt that they 
could maintain their identity as a distinct people. Like the North Island 
Maoris before t~ {ealized the nature of the 1u.ropean'demand for the land 
\ 
and the uses to whic1'__ the Pakeha could put the land, the South Island Maori 
sold for the benefits~ thought he would obtain through the purchase money_~ 
the acquisition of a local 1~lropean market, and a source of supply for 
future exchange of goods. .Almost the whole of the Canterbury Block56 and 
the Otago block were purchased before the influx of settlers began. This 
is an important factor, for the North Island opposition to land sales began 
when the Maoris saw they were in danger of being overwhelmed by, what must 
have seemed to them, an inexhaustible supply of settlers who demanded more 
and more land instead of providing a market for Maori goods. In the 
55. Deed of Sale, Otago Block, in Hocken, Contributions, p.276. 
56. Excluding Kaikoura purchased in March 1859 and the West Coast 
in May 1860, both completed by J. Mackay. See Mackay, 
Compendium, ii,pp. 33-41. 
41. 
South Island, by the time the Maoris realized what colonization meant and 
why the European desired his land, it was too late. 
An important factor in Walter Mantell's success in persuading the 
Maoris to agree to the extinguishing of their titles for small monetary 
return and insufficient rese.rves, were the promises he made of the provision 
of schools and hospitals, and for the general welfare of the Maoris. 57 The 
area covering what is now Canterbury and 0tago, an area of twenty million 
acres, was purchased for little more than £5,00058 and the whole of the 
South Island was purchased for £25,139 plus an estimated £1,800 worth of 
goods distributed by the New Zealand Company at the purchase of Nelson. 59 
The manner. in which Grey had intended to carry out the purchase was 
by reserving to the Natives ample portions for their 
present and prospective wants; and, then, after the 
boundaries of these reserves have been marked, to 
purchase from the Natives their right to the whole of 
the remainder of their claims to land in the Middle 
Island. 60 
Mantell felt that reserves averaging eleven acres for each individual 
"amply provided" for 11 the wants of the Natives 11 • 61 The promises made by 
62 
Mantell were not kept. The reserves turned out to be inadequate and 
unsuitable for development by European agricultural methods. The Maoris, 
in territories being rapidly occupied by Europeans, were unable to support 
themselves by their former methods of food-gathering. 
57. See Mackay, Compendium, ii, PP• 75-88. 
58. Mackay, Compendium, i, p. 3. 
59. ibid., P• 5. 
60. Grey to Eyre, 8 April 1848, Mackay, Compendium, i, p.208. 
61. Mantell to Colonial Secretary, 24 January 1850, Mackay, op.cit., p.228. 
62. Mackay, op.cit., ii, PP• 75-88. 
Land purchase, which was to prove so lethal in the detribalization of 
the North Island Maori and in accelerating their decline, proved to be just 
as lethal in the South Island. A study could be made on the effects of 
land purchases on the South Island Maori. It is here suggested that the 
demoralization of the South Island Maori, and the disintegration of his 
traditional tribal social system, were results of the extinction of hi,s 
land titles. Tne great destroyer of the Maori was neither the raids of 
Te Rauparaha nor the diseases brought by the t'uropeans, but the dispossession 
of his land, which acted as a far more powerful solvent of the basis of 
Flaori society, the tribe. The psycholog;ical state of the dispossessed 
South Island Naori was very vividly and understandingly described by the 
Rev. J.W. Stack in 1870 thus: 
••• the entire change in his position from being Lord of 
the soil _to a tolerated occupier of a very small portion, 
appears to have bewildered and paralysed the faculties of 
the J.viaorio Look where he will, he is hem.med in by customs 
and laws that he does not clearly understand. He feels a 
stranger and a foreigner in his own land. He can .no longer 
fish and shoot and hunt without permission. He cannot keep 
a living creature about him, ••• lest it should involve him 
in the transgression of some known or unknown law. Everywhere 
law confronts him, and casts a shadow on his path. Yet he 
does not hate the law, or try to resist it. ••• The fault, 
he confesses, rests with himself; yet, nevertheless, he seems 
powerless to remedy it. The future. offers no hope. He 
cannot look forward to his children entering upon some 
honourable career now closed to him, for they precede him 
to the grave. 63 
Unlike the North Island settlers the Southerners had no need to fear 
their local natives. Indeed on the outbreak of the Taranaki war the South 
Island Jiiaoris hastened to present declarations of their loyalty to the 
Queen and of friendship towa,rds the Europeans. 
63. Mackay, Com-r:Jendium, i, p.26 
They we:ce sufficiently aware that, situated as they are, 
they have nothing to gain and. everything to lose by dis-
turbing the friendly relations at present subsisting 
between them and theL" European neighbours. 64 · 
With no land to defend, and vastly outnumbered, the South Island Maoris 
neither had the inclination to join nor saw any advantage in joining, 
the hot-heads in the North Island, and they regarded the King Movement 
as "a child's play-thing." 65 
64. Buller to Native Secreta:r.';y-, 19 September ·1861, Mackay, Compendium, 
ii, p.130. 
65. NC 28 October 1859. 
PART II 
NELSON AND THE NATIVE REBELLION 
45. 
CHAPTER J'.II. 
THE INITIAL RESPONSE - PUBLIC REACTION .ANJ2 LOCAL POLITICS., 
During the I fifties the situation in '11aranaki was complex and 
, . . t· 1 1 oecoming cri ica o 2 Many of the preconditions, suggested by Alan Ward, 
for racial conflict in Waikato in 1863 were in fact present _in Taranaki in 
18600 The 11greed of land sharks.arid the genuine distress and fear of 
frontier families 1 the cultural snobbery of the educated settler elite and 
the brutish racial superiority of ignorant whites, the desire of the 
Governor and the magistrates to end the humilia,tion of not being able to · 
rule in the outdistricts o •• 11 , 3 were all as much present in the Taranaki 
situation of 1860 as they were in Waikato in 18630 
The New Zealand Company settlement at New Plymouth was not a great 
success, by 1854 a European population of 2,094 o"\'med only 60,000 acres, 
far less land per person than in any other settlement, and a higher proport-
ion of this land was being cultivated. 4 Inter-tribal warfare in the two 
decades before European settlement had confused the Maori title, and 
destroyed the tribal cohesiveness of the Atiawa, thus making the task 
of land purchase pa1°ticularly dif'ffoul t in Taranaki. The New Plymouth 
1 o For the Taranaki situation see Sinclair, Ori_gins, Chap. 8, upon which 
this introductory section is based. 
2. A.D. Ward, 11 '11he Origins of the Anglo-lliaori Wars, a Reconsideration 11 , 
New Zealand Journal of Hi£3tory, October 1967, pp. 148-170. 
3. Ward, .9.:Q• cit., p. 170. 
4. From statistics given in Sinclair, Orip;ins, po 277. 
46. 
settlers had never been very secure, their arrival late in 1841 coincided 
with the return of the Atiawa recently freed by the Waikato, thus Maori and 
settler became competitors for the land from the beginnings of settlement. 
The land hungry settlers looked upon the fertile lands to the north of their 
confined settlement as the Promised Land and the Waitara as their River 
Jordan. On the Maori side, the return of Wiremu Kingi and hi.s followers 
from Waikanae in 1848 strengthened the resistance to land sales and acted as 
a stimulus to Maori quarrels, the division among the Maoris over land sell-
ing merging with tribal disputes. The tribal feuds added to the anxiety 
and fear of frontier families and the tendency of the settlers to side with 
land-sellers contributed to the anarchyo War between Maoris and settlers 
could occur anytime, a fact well appreciated by the government and a prospect 
not too disagreeable to the settlers. 5 
It was in the hope of controlling the situation and thus preventing a 
racial war that the Government went to New Plymouth in March 1859 to explain 
to the Maoris a new government policy on tribal feuds. The Governor I s 
meeting with the Maoris on 8 March 1859 ended with the Governor accepting 
Teira's offer of land on the Waitara and Wiremu Kingi marching off with all 
his people uwithout any salutation -.11 6 In this way the first crucial 
steps were taken in the chain of actions and decisions which led directly 
to the wars in Taranakio 7 
5o For Taranaki opinion see Sinclair, op.cit., pp. 128-129; for an example 
of South Island opinion see ,Nm, 11 June 1856. 
6. Nore Browne quoted in Sinclair, Origins, p. 137. 
7. For an analysis of the Wai tara _dispute see Sinclair, Ori:!;ins, Part III. 
.A.fter a year of so;_called investigations into Teira' s title·, the 
decision was made by the Executive Council in January 1860 to proceed 
with the( ~!chase ancV survey of the Wai tara block; occupying the block 
by force if necessary. However the Governor, contemplating not a war but 
a "bloodless victory 11 , did not expect, armed resistance from Wiremu Kingi. 
A display of force in the form of military protection for the survey party 
would, Gore Brovme hoped, be sufficient to convince the Naoris the government 
meant bu?iness and to induce Wiremu Kingi to back down. He thought he was 
8 putting an end 11 to many Maori difficulties by a vigorous and decisive act 11 • 
But Naori resistance 1-ms not to be ended without an appeal to arms and on 17 
Ha.rch 1860 a young volunteer cavalryman named J. Sarten was to become the 
matangohi 9 in the a:rmed struggle betwe.en Haori and Pakeha which was to 
continue sporadically and with varying intensity for twelve years. 
* * * * 
To the majority of Taranaki settlers the outbreak of hostilities was 
neither a surprise nor a shock, many indeed had looked forward to the event 
for a long time. ~1he Maoris would be given a good thrashing and at last the 
settlers would obtain the long coveted land. The only disappointment was 
the government's timing-'- the settlers' crops had not been harvested; could 
not the government be more considerate and delay the war for another month ' 11 O 
8. Gore Brovme quoted in Sinclair, Origins, p. 186. 
9. There was always keen rivalry amongst I✓laori warriors to capture "the first 
fish 11 (matangohi), that is the first casualty, A.W. Reed, An Tllustrated 
J,'nc;y:clopeadia of Maori Life, ( 1p 3), p. 199 and H. Williams, Dictionary Qf. 
the Maori Language, (1967), p. 189. 
10. J. Hursthouse to C.W. Richmond, 20 February 1860, Richmond-Atkinson PaJ)ers, 
i, P• 524. 
48. 
The popular feeling :i.n Auckland was for a fight, 11 and the tone of its 
press so inflammatory that the New Zealander, a newspaper noted for cha1hpion-
ing Maori rights, 12 called on the press to be more responsible and not to 
13 endanger relations between the ra.ces. In Wellington the featherstonites 
had to disguise their opinions on the war, 14 their provincial 01)ponents using 
the agitation as a means to embarrass Featherston and his pr?vincial execut-
ive. 15 J.i'ox was almost forced to resign.his seat in Parliament by his 
t . ..: t t ''l . b h d . . ' · th · ' ' · 1 · k · 1 6 cons 1 ~uen s a v' anganui ecause e isagreea wi i:;neir war 1 ~e views. 
Provincial Councils and settlers throughout the country held meetings to 
express their approval of the Governor's action in· TaranakL 17 
The popularity of the war among the North Island settlers is not sur-
prising. Convinced of the superiority of Anglo-Saxons, yet faced with the 
reality of Ifaori power, the J.ITorth Island settlers felt a state of insecurity, 
their fears being characteristic of a 1rhite population resident among a 
truculent and unsubdued coloured race. To the northern settler war rer>resent-
ed a solution to both their land-hm1ger and their anxiety. The might of 
11. Sewell, ,Jo1J:l!l..?,l, iv, p. 65, 21 Hay 1860. 
12. G.H. Scholefield, li~:.:0.'TIJaper:.,_"l_,in New Zeal§,nd, p. 80. 
13. See NC 13 April 1260. 
14. Sewell, tfotJ.:.TIJ.:§tl, iv, p. 150, 25 January 1861. 
15. See A,U!.R 1860, FJ-3 Appendix, for l)etitions from residents in·the Hutt and 
Wellington ar,r>roving of the Governor's action and· regretting the opposit-
ion of the WeJ.Ungton representatives in the Assembly, 11he :peti Uons 
were sent to the Governor by Ludham, Hart, Borlesse, Bowler, Carlyon and 
Ihmt; the first four being identified in DN~}i as opponents of 1'7 eatherston 
in the Provincial Councilo 
16. ]'ox to Godley, 13 July 1260, Canterbury Papers, Letters to Godley, vci1. 3. 
17. AJHR 1860, E-3, pp. 39-47. 
British arms ,.rould not only convince the J4aoris but reassure the settler 
of pakeha su1,eriori ty, and at the same time provide a cheap way of obtaining 
fertile lanclso 
'l'he South Island settlers had to face few of the problems that confronted 
their northem brothers. The smalJ. l'faori population in the South Island was 
mostly confined to reserves. Whereas in the north the European settlements 
were like-islands in an alien and hostile sea, in the south it was the Naoris 
who formed the islands, and more insignificant ones at that. The land 
question too had been largely settled, the South Island Maori having with 
little reluctance parted with their land. T'.ae problem in the south was not 
land purchase but rather land disposalo On the surface then, with the 
question of vihich society was to be dominant and the problem of .land purchase 
both settled, there was little reason for the South Island settler to be 
antagonistic towards the Maorio Yet the news of the outbreak of war in 
Taranaki was as popular in the South Island as in the North: the South was 
unanimous in favour of the Governor 1 s policy, the decision to take a firm 
stand against the Maoris in Taranaki being warmly applauded as being "both 
1 . t. d . t1t 18 po 1 lC an JUS • .And in one South Island settlement the war in 
Taranaki was for some time a source of excitement and often of alarm. 
* * * * 
The news of the outbreak of fighting at Taranaki reached Helson on 21 
March and plunged the community into a state of excitement and anxietyo 19 
18. LT 2 lVlay and 26 May 1860 
19. Stafford to Gore Browne, 7 April 1860, Stafford Mss 7; NE 21 April 1860; 
LT 2 May 1860. 
Within two hours of the arrival of the news three hundred attended a meeting 
called together by 11 the perambulations of a bell-man 11 • 20 Support of the 
Governor was expressed by the meeting, the Nelson steamer, Tasmanian Ifaid, 
put at the Governor's disposal and the Taranaki settlers offered refuge in 
Nelsono During the meeting the Superintendent, J.P. Robinson, reminded the 
settlers of the good feelings existing between the two races in Nelson, and 
21 hoped that no indiscriminate censure would be passed on natives in genera,l. 
The mind of the Nelson settler was uneasy" It was remembered that some 
Queen Charlotte Sounds Iviaoris had in fact gone up to IJ.1aranaki to assist Kingi 
_in 1859 22 and it was thought that the Nelson Maoris, having friends and 
relations in Taranaki, would seek reprisals on the Nelson settlers for the 
sake of utlJ,, 23 There were suggestions that emissaTies from the l\Torth Island 
had been visiting the Nelson Maoris, 24 
a native war on his own doorste1J, 
The Nelson settler bege,n to fear 
20. NE 24 Narch 1860; see also Domett to C,W. Richmond, 21 Ji[arch 1860, 
Richmond_-A tkinson Papers, i, p. 545. 
21. .An acco1.mt of the meeting is given in HE 24 March 1860. 
22. NE 22 October 1859; NC 28 October 1659. 
230 Stafford to Gore Brovme, 7 April 1860, Stafford Mss 7; NE 7 April 1860; 
but cf NC 3 April, 1860 letter from W. Jenkin, government interpreter in 
Nelson in which he points out that the N"elson Maoris were few in number, 
divided amongst themselves into several tribes, and did not sympathise 
with the war party in Taranaki. 
24. NE 11 April 1860. Though the report was never substantiated it should 
not be lightly dismissed. There was a certain amount of movement by 
1-faoris between the islands, the distance being relatively short. King 
Ifovement emissaries were reported in Cante.rbury and in Otago see W .L. 
Buller, "Report on the Canterbury Native Settlement" 27 December 1859 in 
Mackay, Compendium, ii, p. 128; and also OW 30 June 1860. In September 
1863 five Waikato .Maoris were caught trying to incite the Nelson and 
Marlborough Maoris against the settlers, see ]'TC 8 September and '13 October 
1863. It was also noted that the Maoris had a better communication systen 
than the Europeans and often had news from the north before their Pakeha 
neighbours, see NC 12 June and 14 July 1863. 
51. 
It is not surprising, given the state of the s·ettler mind, that the 
local good feelings between the races was forgotten when it was learnt that 
the I{aoris intended holding a meeting in Nelson to give their oath of 
~llegiance to the Queen. 25 The settlers viewed with alarm the prospect 
of having a party of 150 to 200 Maoris in their midst. Public pressure was 
so great that the native meeting had to be called off, the Provincial Elxecut-
ive was told by the Examiner in no uncertain terms that they had no right to 
arrange such a meeting when there was insufficient means of ensuring the 
safety of the citizens. 26 For several more weeks excitement in Nelson was 
maintained at a high level by each arrival of news from the north, by public 
meetings, the arrival of Taranaki refugees, and by 11 rmnour, with her hundred 
1127 
tongues. 
1I'he next mail brought rumours that Auckland was about to be attacked and 
that as a result a naval brigade had to be removed from Taranaki to defend 
the capital. 28 The rumours confirmed the fears of the Nelson settlers of 
their own vulnerability and of the inability of the inadequate military forces 
in the colony to deal with more than one outbreak at a time. Another public 
meeting was called, this time not to consider what as.sistance could be 
rendered to the supposedly threatened settlers in Auckland but to decide 
what steps should be taken to "impart a feeling of perfect security" to 
Nelson. The meeting resolved that 11 the proper time has arrived for ca,lling 
out the Nelson Mili tia 11 • 29 The same day Stafford was writing to Gore Browne 
25. NO 3 April 1860. 
26. NE 4 April and 7 April 18600 
27. LT 2 I;Iay 1860 (Nelson Correspondent). 
28. On 7 April see NC 10 April 1860 and NE 14 April 1860. 
29. ,N], 14 April 1860; the meeting was held the day the rumour was 
received on 7 April. 
52. 
appealing for weapons and ammunition, and fo1° the necessary authorizations 
for forming a militia. 30 'Pwo days later, 9 April, another rumour gave. a 
semblance of substance to the worst fears of the settlers. A Pelo1°ous 
Sound.s settler reported sighting a body of five hundred Maoris moving 
towards Nelson from the Ka_ikouras. Robinson proclaimed a state of emergency 
' d d th · t · d · of t111e mi· 11· ti· a. 31 ana or ere e or,ganiza ion an arnnng Later even the 
Examiner admitted that the "mischievous report was injudiciously circt1la ted 11 o 32 
Later in April the Helson settlers were given a chance to vent some of 
their pent-up feelings. A rumour had been circulated in Mew Plymouth that 
Bishop Selwyn had gained influence over the Governor and that Gore Ero~me was 
considerine the cessation of hostilities. '.Ihese rmnours were published in an 
11 extra 11 to the Tara.naki Herald on 21 April which arrived by steamer ii1 Nelson 
on 23 April together with J.C. Richmond who had come to ask Stafford the 
truth of the rumour. Stafford who received a Jetter from Auckland by the 
same mail had no knowledge of jt, yet, Maria Richmond wrote 
All Welson is in a ferment at the bare idea of a peace being 
patched up with the natives - the Taranakians themselves cannot 
be more indignant - there is to be a meeting ••o to remonstrate 
•• o against such a measure. 'l'his seems to me premature as there 
iR nothing but rumour to rest u:9on ••• o 33 
.A.J.thou,~:h .the Tarana,_ki Heral::1 wa.rned there was little substance in the rumour, 





Stafford to Gore Broi;,me, 7 April 1860, Stafford Mss 1 7. 
TI_Q. 1 O A:pril 1860; see also 1'11 2 i1iay 18600 
NE 11 April 1860, 
Viaria Richmond to Emily Richmond, !J!.'j_7 .April 1860, Ri.chmond-.Atkinson 
Pa.J2..e:]'_~, i, 570 o 
by marines 11 , 34 the Welson settlers considered the rumour to be "pretty 
strongly foundecl 11 35 and four hundred attended a meeting on 23 April to 
show these would-be interferers with the exc_ellent policy 
hitherto pursued by the Governor, that they were wrongly 
estimating- the opinion of the settlers of New Zealand, if 
they thoue;ht that a.ny such peace would be acceptable or 
accepted. 
The meeting cheered anti-Maori and anti-missiona!'"IJ remarks and finally 
d t 1 .,_ · · t} · t I l · ' m k · 36 passe wo reso_u 1,ions approvJ_ng 1e govern.men s po icy in larana i o 
Neither Canterbury nor Otago experienced the public ferment a.n.d excite-
ment over the news of the outbreak of fighting as occurred in Nelson. 
During 1860 both provinces were preoccupied with local controversies: 
Canterbury settlers attended meetings on·Moorhouse's railway scheme and Otago 
was agitated by the Murihiku separation movement. Distance was another 
factor. News from Taranaki, several days old by the time it reached Nelson, 
was nearly two weeks old when it reached Dunedin. Remoteness from the 
scene of battle gave the southe1~.a settlers a greater sense of security, the 
fear that the Jiiaoris were planning a diversion of the war to the South 
Island 37 would be more real in Nelson than in Dunedino On the other hand, 
fear concerning the possible belligerent behaviour of the local Maoris was as 
real to the common settler in Dunedin as in Nelsono Rumours in Christchurch 
of their disaff~ction led to the Kaiapoi Maoris sending letters to newspapers 
expressing their loyalty, 38 and the 1!,~on Times cautioned its readers 
340 CS 3 May 1860, also LT 2 May 1860. 
35. Statement by J. Lewthwaite at meeting; see NE 25 April 1860. 
36. MQ 24 April 1860 and NE 25 April 1860. 
37. For rumours of this•in Nelson see LT 9 March 1861, report from the 
Times' Nelson correspondent. 
380 LT 1 August and 8 August 1860; see also Wellington Independent 
7 August 18600 
against provoking the rliaoris by spreading baseless f'umours. 39 Similarly, 
Otago news1Japers stamped down on rumours concerning the belligerence of the 
1 l ., . 40 oca MaorJ.s. Only in Nelson were the settlers encouraged to believe in 
the credibiJ.ity of such rumours, 
However lack of excitement did not mean lack of concern or interest, 
nor did it indicate disapproval of the war. The Sou.th Island was almost 
tmanimous in favour of the Governor I s policy. 41 The Canterbury Provincial 
Council sent an address assuring Gore Browne of its support and offered to 
d t n f m k' 42 accommo a e reiugees rom larana 1.. A public meeting was held in Dunedin_ 
43 on 12 April to express tl'~ir sympathy with Taranaki. Later Canterbury and 
- 44 Otago both established public subscription funds for Taranaki relief. 
That the war was popular among the settlers is undoubted, the Nelson 
settlers were not eiceptional in this. Initially the war was popular 
throughout the colony. Hor were the Helson settlers exceptional in their 
feelings of fear and insecurity. In 1860 the New Zealand settlements were 
39. LT 1 August 1860. 
40 .. OC 14 September 1860. Remark on Portobello natives by James Adams. 
See also OW 15 September and 20 October 1860. 
41. LT 26 May 1B60. 
42. Journal and Proceedings, Canterbury Provincial Council, Sess. XII, 1860, 
p. 33; for the address see AJHR, 1860, E-3. 
43. OC 13 April ·1860, 
44. Canterbury established a fund at a meeting on 25 July at which £300 was 
collected, LT 28 July 1860. LT 19 September 1860 reported that the 
Relief Fund stood at £1,700 and later Moorhouse stated in the General 
Assembly that Canterbury had contributed over £2,000, see PD. 1860, p. 383. 
OC 18 September 1860 reported the establishment of a fund at a meeting 
held on 11 September and that the Provincial Council had already sent 
£1,000. 
55. 
still very much frontier communities scattered around the coast and separated 
from each other by high mountains, turbulent rivers, dense bush, or uncertain 
natives. Isolation made the settlers keenly aware of their vulnerability 
al though they were often reluctant to organize their 01,m defence. 45 Lack 
of efficient communications increased their susceptability to rumour and ex-
aggerated their perceptions of danger. 14here Nelson was exceptional was in 
the excessive res1Jonse made in comparison with the response of other settle-
ments. How is the anxiety and excitement, almost panic, in Welson during 
March and April 1860 to be explained? 
* * * * 
Proximity to the trouble spot did :provide a source of danger, the "war 
zone 11 was but a few hours sailing from Nelson. But both this and the 
imagined danger from local Maoris were exaggerated. There was never any 
indication that Wiremu Kingi even thought of attacking the South Island and 
those with knowledge and experience of the Nelson IJiaoris attested to their 
loyalty and their weaknesso 46 The tribal connections of the Nelson Maoris 
,vi th those in Taranaki were thought to constitute a danger but then the 
Naoris were equally apprehensive of the 11 tribal 11 connections between the 
Pakehas in Nelson and New PJ.ymouth. 47 The closeness of NeJ.son to 'faranaki, 
and the similarity in the found_ing of the two colonies as Company settlements, 




rme vulnerabi1i ty to external' attack was often stressed bv southern 
newspapers in 1859 and 1860 see NE 13 August '1859, CS 2 A;gust 1860. 
See for example NC 3 April 1860, letter from W. Jenkins; Mackay 9 
Compendium, ii, 137-139, James Mackay j1mr, to Native Secretary, 
3 October 1863. 
NB), 1 September 1860. South Island r-Taoris feB.red tha.t the settlers 
would exact revenge for the Taranaki killings from the South Island 
Maoris. 
56. 
F'urther, some Taranaki settlers, di.siJlusioned by conditions in New P1ymouth 
or apprehensive of the future, moved over to Nelson before the 1'TB.r bringing 
1tri tl1 therrr the a,ntagonisn1,s and 11rej11.dices formed Otlt of f1,1.r~tratiorto Indeed 
John Lewthwai te, who played a prorninr:m t part in the :Nel,son public meetings 
f'' h ,, ·1 48 1a' ' t· m ak" t' n d o_ Ma:-r:'C ano. Apri , 1a . oeen prominen , in laxe.n _ J., represen J.ng 1.,rey. an 
Bell in the 1856-58 General As.sembly. 49 Lewthwa.i te settled in NeJson early 
in 1860 and had reason to hold strong views on the Wa.i t8.ra question; he h2.d 
been a.mong the settlers ejected from Wai tara :i.n 1844 hy Ii'i tzroy. 50 
The Wairau incide:nt in 1843 c2.me as e, great shock and disaster to 
'T•"' 7 51 1\!e_sono In one blow the infant colony lost some of its promising leaders, 
and few settlers escaped being involved in the loss of a friend or relation. 
The effect of the so-c9,J.Jed 11massFJ,cre II on the settler's 'mind was no less 
shattering. The success of the Maoris compared with the almost cowardly 
action of the Pakeha survivors WELS both an affront and an hu..ro.iliation to 
48. Lewthwaite was a member of the committee to organize the reception of 
the Taranaki refugees, see NE 24 March 12-60. At the meeting on 23 
April caused by the rtLmour of the cessB.tion of hostilities Lewthwai te 
moved a strong motion condemning Bishop Selwyn fo1· his interference, 
see NE 25 April 1860. 
49. DNZB, i, 496. There is no record of Lewthwaite taking part in any 
debates in the Assembly, PD 1856-60. He resigned hi,s seat on 22 March 
1E'-58, see N.Z. Parliamentary Record (1913), p. 93. On Lewthwaite's 
resignation C.W. Richmond commented "We are well rid of Lewthvrn,ite. 
For Heaven'R sake send us a man next time who knows which way he is 
going to vote. 11 C.W. Richmond to I.N. Watt, 12 April 1858, Ricl:mi_ond-
Atkinson.~~:Q.ers, i, po 387. 
500 DNZB, i, P• 496. 
51 o }l,or an account of the Wairau incident and of its aftermath see H..N. Allan, 
Nelson, (1965), Chaps VIII and IX. 
57. 
settlers who believed in the courage of their race and the superiority of 
British law and arms. 52 Further,-the killing of the prisoners by the Maoris 
horrified emigrants who had been led by Company propaganda to believe "that a 
total reformation had been effected in the character of the aboriginal· 
inhabitants." 53 Wairau, by confirming the settler's ideas of Maori barbarity 
while undermining his sense of security and self-confidence, left.a legacy 
of racial hatred and fear, and a desire for revenge. Colonel Wakefield 
declared "that the time was not fa,r distant when the rising generation of 
.Anglo-Saxons would take ample vengeance for the opposition their father.a, 
had encountered." 54 ..Another settler said, after the tragedy, that he 
hoped to live till the day when a Maori might be shot like a dog. 55 During 
the 'forties some opportunities to expiate the humiliation of Wairau·were 
fo1..md in forming a volunteer force in Nelson and in the "successful" expedition 
against Paramata in .1845. 56 
The desire to revenge the humiliations of the 1840'~ may,· as we shall see 
in the next chapter, help to explain the asperity of the opinion expressed 
on the Taranaki waro Vindictiveness may explain settler attitudes and 
opinions; behind the vindictiveness lay not only humiliation but also fear 
and insecurity, the ingredients of anxiety and p8nic. The experiences of 
52. See for instance A.S. Thomson, The Story of 1few Zealand, (1859), i, 4 
where he notes that in 1842 the feeling was universal "that one English-
man was a match for several 'black fellows, 1 the term frequently applied 
to the natives ••• 11 0 
530 NE 8 July 1843. 
54, Thomson, ~1he Story of New Zealand, ii, p. 79, 
55. Eo Home to Shortland, 15 October 1843, Hocken Mss, 520 
56, For an account of this incident see B.J. Poff, William Fox - the Earlv 
Colonial Years, unpublished J.Yf.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1969, 
Chap 4. 
the 1840 1 s contributed to this fear and insecurity.' The failure of their 
appeal to arms at Wairau, the increasing assertiveness and bellicosity of the 
Maoris during the i 840 1 s, 57 revealed the weaknes_§ and precariousn_§.§s of their 
position to the 1folson settlers. LJving in fear of a general uprising of the 
natives, 58 the unwillingness or inability of the colonial government to 
59 . 60 
provide military protection infuriated the Nelson settlers - for it 
emphasized their defencelessness and helplessne~s against attack. 
Nelson settlers were often reminded of the Wairau 0 massacre 11 during the 
i850's. News of the Indian mutiny atrocities led to parallels being dra.-m 
between the Indian mutiny and the Wairau massacre. 61 In 1859 complaining of 
the lack of militia to defend Nelson from attack in case of a European war 
involving England, the Nelson Colonist urgin,g the necessity of a volunteer 
corp pointed out 
The Wairau Massacre is too sorrowfully an instance of sending 
a party unused to arms to a scene where action was necessary. 62 
Proximity to Wai tarn,, the presence of disgruntled expatriates from 
'1.'aranaki, remembrance of Wairau, the experiences of the I forties and the 
pattern of panic established by these experiences are all part of the matrix 







F1or accounts of the re-assertion of the Maoris in the 1840 1 s see 
Ian Wa~s, The Shadow of the Land, (1968), esnecially Cha1)s 4-10; 
J. Hill~, Early Victorian New Zealand, ( 1958), Chap 6, 
For reaction of Nelson settlers to the racial conflict during the 
1840 1 s see Wards, pp. 84-90, 356-357; Allan, PP• 271-275, 280-295; 
Poff, pp. 54-74. See aJso NB ;J June 1844-, 28, December 1844, 29 March 
1845, 5 April 1845, 22 Bay 1847, 29 January 1848. 
See Wards, passim. 
NE 1 June and 28 December ·1844; Allan, Chap IX. 
lifE 27 February, 3 March, 1 May 1858. 
NC 29 July 18590 
59. 
It is understandable, then, that the response of the :Helson settlers 
to the news of the outbreak of war in Taranaki should be one of anxiety and 
fear. Indeed, initially, this was the response of most settlers in the· 
colony. But in Nelson the anxiety and excitement was kept at a high level 
for several weeks by public meetings. How and why were three to four hundred 
settlers brought together so easily and quickly? Why in Nelson were settlers 
encouraged to believe in rumours other settlements rejected as being without 
the slight-est.foundation? 
* * * * 
What did the public meetings achieve? Nothing was learnt about the war 
itself. The meetings had not been called in order to inform, nor were they 
called together to discuss and question the war or the policy leading up to 
it, the justice of both being assumed. 
63 
In contrast to the generosity, 'if rather belated, of the Canterbury 
and Otago settlers, no :public subscription fund for '.l1arana.ki relief was 
established in Nelson. 64 Instea.d the meeting to discuss aid for Taranaki 
held on 21 March offered to accommodate the Taranaki refugees, assuming; 
without any information, that there would be refugees. Alongside an 
humA.ni tarian concern for the safety of their fellow colonists in 1ra.ranal.d 
the HeJ.son settle1°s had less altruistic motives. The refugees wov.ld boost 
63. The southern provinces W8re chided by Welson for their supposed 
slowness in offering to helyi the Taranaki settlers see NE 30 i'ilay 
and 6 Aue,ust 1860; and the .!:.T ;::,3 June 1860 did complain of the 
apathy of the ,1.populE1tion. 
64. Probably the experience of the Indian Mutiny Relief J.i11md discoura,ged 
any suggestions of another public subscription fund in Nelson see 
1TC 29 July 1 E59. 
60. 
the depressed economy by providing the much needed labour as well as a 
65 source of revenue for Nelson shopkeepers and farmers, Past experien9e 
made it obvious th::J,t even in times of emergency Nelson could not expect a 
military establishment from which it could obtain both protection and profit. 
But refugees while not affording protection would at least provide the profit, 
and Nelson pockets would be left 1mtouched for the cost of accommodating and 
provisioning of the refugees was to be a charge to the general government 
66 
of the whole c~lony. Tne benefits enjoyed by Nelson from the presence of 
refugees at the expense of the rest of the colony were remarked upon by 
several members of the General Assembly which met later in the year. 67 
Nelson did send £400 to Taranaki for relief, but it was out of the .TI..::r..ovip._gJal 
tre_1_3.,§_ury and even this was regarded as an advance which-with all others 
entailed by the War in which Imperial interests and the maintenance 
of Her Majesty's supremacy are involved will ultimately have to be 
adjusted accordingly. 68 
The meetings did draw attention to the Dnsatisfactory state of Nelson 
defences and thus provided an opportunity to attack the provincial administr-
ation. It is suggested that it is in their use in the arena of provincial 
politics that the public meetings are to be 0,~mde~stood, Tne latent fea,r, 
racial antagonism, and excitability of the Nelson populace was played upon 
and their expression organized in public meetings in order to embarrass the 
provincial government. 
* * * * 
65 o '11.he economy had become de1n·essed and labour short with the loss of 
Narlborou,;h and the move of some settlers to the Collingwood gold 
fields, see NE 23 February 1859 and Southern Provinces Almanac 1860, 
pp. 33; ,46 and 1861 , pp. 84-86 • 
66. PD 1860, p, 383, statement by Stafford. 
67. fD 1860, pp. 519-524; tox p. 520; Fitzherbert P• 521; Williamson P• 521. 
68. Stafford to Gore Brmme, 7 April 1860, Stafford Nss 7o 
The political conflict in Nelson was reflected.in the oppoEiing interests 
of the two Felson newspapers. In early New Zealand newspapers tended to be 
the mouthpieces of political groups and interests. In Nelson the Colonist 
opposed the ciominance of the runholders, whose views were represented by the 
Elx . 69 ami:ner. The Examiner supported Stafford, vrho headed the colonia,l ministry, 
In 1856 Stafford resigned his Superintendency of Nelson to become Premier. 
In the ensuing elections John Robinson, a former Birmingham Libera170 and 
influential with the Welson La.bourers, 71 was persuaded to stand by Wi1liam 
Wilkie, a local radic~.l, 72 and a shareholder of the Colonisto 73 Robinson 
defeated Dr Mon~o, leader of the Old Original Land-Purchasers' Association 
and one of the largest Wairau pastoralists. 74 Ifonro represented Stafford's 
II t 11 • ' t . "T 1 75 d t tl . J..i Cl 7 El 1 . tt· t} f d par -y 1n1;eres s 1.n l~e_son an oge 1er wi 1.,n 1ar_es __ 1.0 , 1e oun er 
d · t f t'· ·;-,... . 76 b 1 d f tl . t; t R b. an. proprie or o 11e ~.11.arrnner, ecame ea, er o 1e oppos1. 1.on o .. o 1.nson 
in the Provincial CotLnci1 0 77 It might be said that at the local level, in 
provincial politics, the Colonist supported the Provincial Executive headed 
by Robinson; the Examiner was not only the opposition to the Colonist but 
1 th t , · f R ' · o ' t on the Pro,ri' nc1· a1 c·ounc1.· l. 78 a so e mou npiece o o oins n ,s opponen s , _ _ 
69. Scholefield, New~Pf:l,P..§fLin Hew Zeal and, pp. 156-159. 
70. Alfred Saunders, History of l\Tew Zeala.nd, (1896), p. 331; DNZB, ii, p. 248. 
71. ,;i.bid. See also Allan, pp. 188, 277. 
72. DNZB, ii, p. 508. 
73. Scholefield, ppo 158-159. Smmders, i, p. 351 states that Wilkie 
founded the Colonist. 
74. McIntosh, Marlbor9u_g_h_, (1940), p. 195. 
750 Saunders, i, pp. 328-330; IoJipintosh, pp. 195-197. 
76. DNZB, i, pp. 229-230; Sch,olefielc~, pp. 156-157. 
77. Saunders, i, p. 332. 
78. Robinson was opposed by a maj'ority of the Provincial Council and in 1859 
Elliott attempted to get the Governor to dissolve the CounciL .However 
Dome.tt noted that 11 The public are just as likely to return a C01mcil & 
Supt. o2posed to each other, again as before." Domett to C,W. Richmond, 9 .June,. 185.9/, llt_chmon<l-:.ll,'tkinson Paners_, i, p. 462, See aJ.so Domett to 
C.W. Hicbmiond, 23 Hay Z185"'j/,_ :Lbid, p. 459. · 
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Both :m.liott and J.Vlonro feature prom:i.nently in the March and Apr:i.l 
t· 79 mee ingso Elliott used both the meetings a.nd the Fixam:i.ne:r. to attack 
the Robinson ad!!'.inistration. 
The danger of a Maori attack on Welson and the need for a militia were 
both exaggerai;ed to emphasize the apathy of the Robinson a,dmi:nistraUon which 
no 
had neglected to riroYide for the proper defence of the settJ..ernent. 0 Because 
of Robinson and his execvti.ve I s compJ_a.cency the :rrovince WR,R inadeq_ua teJ.y 
11repared to meet a. cJ'.'isis and yet they were willing to expose the population 
t - t . t t. t. . th t Si o Ci.anger ~y agree1.ng o a na 1 ve mee ing J.n , __ e 01-m. It was of no con-
secinence that the f/fo.oris· were coming to demonstrate their loyalty, and that 
22 
similar ·nati Ye meetines had been held in Wellington and- Marlborough. In 
any case, the E~ .. sl_f'l]..Jlfil chided, the provincial ai1thori ties had exceeded their 
fnnctions in attempting to arrn.nee the native demonstration - native affairs 
W/3.S the concern of the Genern.l Governrt1ent e,nd. not within the jvrisdiction 
of the FrovincieJ_ ExecntiYe. 83 In a, sc,9.thing retort the Cclqp..:.'L§.t poked fun 
at ttthe able, warlike, and courageous g1.lidance of one of the editors in this 
city - who on this occasion as on many others tried to cause a panic ••• 11 and 
pointed out to its readers that i:n the aba:ndonine of the native meeting nwe 






newspaper reports of the meetin€'S record the presence of Elliott Bnd 
lVIonro a.t all meetings. Elliott chaired the meeting on 7 April 1860 
to discus8 the nunoured attack on Auckle,nd and which recommended the 
calling out of the Nelson militia. Both men spoke at all meetings. 
See liflD 24 Ha.rch, 14 April, 25 .April, 1860. 
NJlJ 21 April 1 e-60. 
IifE 4 April 1860. 
NC 4 May 1860. 
Nlj)_ 7 April 1860. 
frequent writer to 
received a snecial 
The e;0Yer-1.1.n1ent interpreter, Willie,m Jenkins, a 
the Colon:i.st who was scor-ilful of the panic in Nelson, 
dose of the E]xami.ner' s venom; he was accused of 
"fancying himself as a iViinister of Native Affairs. 11 
84. ;_N"C 4 May 1860. 
The very necessity 0f holding public meetings was pointed to as 
illustrating the inca.paci i;y of the provind.R,l government, and the supr,osed 
large attendance a.t- the meetings as evidence that Robinson had lost the con-
fidence of the popula,tion. The inefficie11c\\T of Robinson's executive had 
led to the rule by puhlic meetings with"all its attendant dangers. 1185 
Not that Elliott would hesitate to use the pnb1:i.c meeting as e, weapon 
against his provincial political enemy. 
When news that Auckl-9.nd was threatened with attack reached Nelson 
on 7 April a meeting was called at which it was resolved that "the proper 
time had arrived for calling out the :t:-:felson Militia u, not to send to 
86 Auckland but to defend J:ifelson. The editor of the-Examiner it seems -, 
was prepared to fabricate in order to excitt: in his newspaper. In the 
report of the meeting a week after it was held the impression is given 
that there we.s' great excitement on the arrival of the Airedsi,_le in the 
evening with the report of the threat to Auckland. A great crowd waited 
to receive more information and at 9.30 had managed to force an impromptu 
87 
meeting in the old Court Rouseo However the Ai_;re<igl~ arrived in the 
afternoon, not the evening, 88 and the old Court House was the smallest of 
the three public buildings available for the meetingo 89 It is not 
85. NFJ 21 April 1860. 
86. l'JE 14 April 1860. 
87. i bis1:,. 
88. WC 12 Jlme 1860. Comnnmicated to the Editor. 
89. The meeting called on 21 March was held in the :B'reemasons' Hall and 
the meeting on 23 April to discuss the cessation of hostilities was 
held in the Odd Fellows' HalJ., both halls holding consider,ci bly more 
than the old Court House. See NE 24 March, 25 April 1860. For 
criticism of the use of the Court House see NC 22 June 1860, 
Communicated to the Editor. 
64. 
surprising then th9,t a Nelson settler was very s11s·picious of the promotors 
of the meeting and of their motives. The militia,, he claimed, haiL_J2.~_§n 
called Otlt · by a ~eked up "public II meeting because its promo tors had 
hoped that the m:i.li tia being a compulsory force would be tmpopular and 
thus make the Superintendent unpopula,r. 90 
In Nelson then the anxiety ana. fear of the popular mind was pJ.ayed 
upon by the provincial opposition to forward their political ends. The 
'l1aranaki war was used to serve political interests at the local level. 
Another example of this is provided by the unsuccessful attempt of the 
opponents of the Canterbhry railway scheme of Moorhouse to postpone the 
scheme by arguing that "in face of the Rebellion amo_ngst the Natives in 
the Northern Island" the customs .revenue would be uncerta.in and therefore 
the necessary finance for the :ra.ilway might not become available. 91 
'lne initial res:9onse of the Nelson settlers to the outbreak of war 
in 'J.1arana.ki was one of fear and anxiety born out of the· past experience 
of failure and humi1iation. Thi,s pop11J.ar moci.d of fear and anxiety was 
used by the opposition to discomfort the provincial gover-.o.ment. Thus the 
events in Nelson at the beginning of the Anglo-Naori wars in 1860 are the 
expression of accumulated grievances of the lJast and the reflection. of 
local conflicts of the present. 
90. NC 12 Jlme, 15 June, 22 June 1860, communicated to the JDditor. 
But see reply from J oh.'l'l. Hume, NC 26 June 1860. 
91 o ,JolJ.rnals a.nd Proceedings, QfilLterbu:r,:.y I:_royincial Council, Sess. XII, 
P• 37, 
CHAPTER 11[ 
A S.[ORT SHARP STRUGGLE, 
Nineteenth century New Zealand newspapers were not only almost the 
sole vehicle conveying information and opinion to the local colonists and 
settlers, they were also intended to inform arid mould
0
opinion in England. 
De1)ending on the Imperial Gover-.o.ment for defence and with native affairs 
an Imperial responsibility the colonial newspapers, with their monthly 
summaries for England, provided the colonists with a means of expressing 
their opinions in England and of making their feelings_ lmown to the 
decision makers in the Colonial Office and Westminster. The fact that 
the colonial newspapers were intended not only for colonial but also for 
'Home' consumption should be kept in mind when reading their views on 
native policy and the Taranaki war. 
Further, the partisan nature of the colonial newspapers must be 
remembered. The reflection of local political conflicts by the two 
Nelson newspapers has already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
In Canterbury :B'i t~erald published the Press largely to oppose Ifoorhouse' s 
tunnel scheme and Crosbie Ward's notion of separating the two islands, . 
both policies being supported by the 1,yttle;lwn ,1"'imes, 1 a newspaper Fitzgerald 
) 
1. Fitzgerald to Selfe, 5 June 1861, Selfe Letters, ii, p.27. See also 
Press, 25 May 1861 (first issue). The .~t~;(eton Times, 29 May 1861, 
warned j,,tf s opponent that "a paper which is the mouthpiece of one party 
cannot prosper. 11 Ward was a frequent contributor to the L:?;t-tleton 
Time~1/see Scholefield, N'ewspapers in New Zealand, p.213. For the 
Lyttf&ton 1l.1imes 1 8 support of Ward's separatism see LT 23 October 1861. 
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2 had helped found. Indeed Fitzgerald reported he had been accused of 
using the Press to secure political office. 3 A difference of opinion 
in 1 e56 between James Macandrew and the editor of the Ota.go Witness was 
primarily responsible for the establishment of the Ota,go Colonist. 4 A 
similar situation existed for the North Island newsp~pers. 5 
· The southern newspapers faced problems in commenting on native affairs. 
In Canterbury and Otago the public was more interested in local problems 
(rathe1 than northern ones, and thus the leader writers' time was absorbed 
by railW§:Y schemes in Canterbury and by the separation of Southland. in 
Otago. In fact local concerns occupied the leader writers' time so much 
in Otago that, though the news of the outbreak of fighting in Taranaki was 
published on 30 March 1860, 6 there was no editorial comment on the outbreak 
'7 of war until early May. Another problem was the availability of inform-
ation. The Lyttleton Times complained that it lacked a correspondent in 
New Plymouth and had, as did the Otago papers, to rely on information from 
northern newspapers, in particular from Nelson. 8 Thus, preoccupied with 
local problems and. lacking information, the southern newspapers were usually 
content simply to reprint comments on native affairs and the Taranaki war 
2. Scholefield, opoci_i., p.212 • 
.3. Fitzgerald to Selfe, 29 July 1861, Selfe Letters, ii, p.28. 
4. Scholefield, op. ci_t., p.170. See also A.H. McLintock, The History 
of Otago, pp. 366-367. 
5. See Scholefield, op.cit., and G.M. Meiklejohn, Early Conflicts of 
Press and Government, (1953). 
6. OC 30 Harch 1860 and OW 31 March 1860 published accounts of the 
commencement of hostilities from NC 23 liiarch 1860. OC 16 March 1860 
had published without comment reports of disturbances in Taranakio OW 
17 March 1860 gave an editorial on the disturbances hinting that they 
may lead to war and advocated confiscation as punishment for the rebels 
if war should break out. 
7. OC 11 May 1860 and OW 12 Nay 1860. The Colonist's editorial com1)lained 
about delays in the mail service. 
8. LT 18 April 1860. 
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from the Nelson newspapers, and mainly those of the Examiner. 9 In fact 
it may not be a very wild exaggeration to say that the :Nelson Examiner 
moulded much of the opinion of the rest of the South Island. 
Not that the Nelson papers had better means of obtaining information.: 
they too relied on North.Island newspapers, in particular the Taranaki Herald. 
Their advantage over their more southern contemporaries was PI'.iority of 
information rather than quantity or g_uality, they too complained of lack of 
. f t· 10 in orma ion. Where the Nelson Examiner was exce'.f)tional, not only from 
the more southern newspapers but also from its opponent, the Nelson Colonist, 
was in its readiness to comment. 
]from the first news of disturbances in Taranaki received on 7 March 
1860 the Nelson Examiner published reports or editorial comments almost 
every issue on the Taranaki dispute and on the justice of the government's 
actions. In contrast the Colonist was more concerned with provincial 
problems and warned its readers not to let the excitement of the Maori war 
distract attention from 'the less exciting warfare of a Provincial Counci1. 11 
11he Colonist contented itself even in editorials with factual reporting of 
the conflict in Taranaki12 and it attacked the Examiner for the "sombre 
11 
ravings upon the subject of the present native outbreak, perceiving that 
the Examiner's editor saw in the war 11fresh fuel for his endless but harmless 
onslaught upon our somnambulist Executive, as he is funnily pleased_to 
h . t 't II 13 c ris en J. •••• 
9. All the news of the Taranaki disturbances were received by the southern 
newspapers through Nelson, see LT 14 and 28 · March 1860 and .QQ 16· ·and 30 
March 1860. 
10. See for example NE 5 July 1860. 
11. NC 27 March 1860. 
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As the editors of the Colonist saw clearly enough the Taranaki war was 
being used as a pawn in the game of provincial politics. In the previous 
chapter it was argued that the provincial conflict in Nelson partly explains 
the abnormal anxiety, excitement and panic displayed by Nelson settlers at· 
(\ 
the outbreak of war in Taranaki. Provincial politics also partly expJ.ains 
the differing positions adopted by the two Nelson papers on the native war 
question. In Nelson the Superintendent, J.P. Robinson, supported by the 
Colonist, was opposed by the majority of his Council, the opposition being 
headed by Dr Monro and supported by the Examiner. By keeping the excitement 
and interest in the Taranaki war alive with o/s editorials the Examiner 
attempted to divert attention from the proceedings and the obstructionist 
tactics of the opposition in the Provincial Council which was in session from 
27 March to 4 Nay 1860. In fact the Examiner did not bother to comment on 
the Provincial CouncU till 2 May 14 and claimed that little interest had been 
taken in the session because of the distraction of the Taranaki waro 15 
l!1urther as was shown in the previous chapter the Examiner used the war issue 
to embarrass the Robinson executive, and, the Colonist claimed, almost blamed 
the Taranaki war on the election of Robinson as Superintendent. 16 On the 
other hand the Colonist, while factually reporting the war and attacking the 
immoderate tone of the Examiner on the war issue, by placing provincial issues 
first was attempting to consolidate Robinson's position as Superintendent. 
A further fact that needs to be taken into account in interpreting 
newspaper opinion in Nelson is the connection between the Examiner and the 
·14. NE 2 May 1860, 
15. NE 9 May 1860. 
16. NC 5 June 1860. 
Stafford ministry. Stafford in fact could be termed the 11 titulartt head of 
the opposition in the Helson Provincial Council 17 and was thus supported by 
Examiner. As will be shOim later this explains the position taken by the 
Examiner when disillusionment e,nd doubts about the war set in after June. 
The Examiner tended to blame the military commanders for badly conducting the 
war and the.Governor for his policies rather than to blame the Governor's 
advisers, the Stafford ministry. On the other hand, the .Colonist was more 
moderate in its criticisms of the conduct of the·war but attacked, especially 
after the opening of the General Assembly in August, the colonial ministry. 
It would be tempting, given the run-holding interests behind the Examiner 
and the more radical, almost working-class, origins of the C9lo.Bl.tl, to 
interpret their differing approaches to .the Taranaki war in terms of differing 
economic interests and class attitudes;. and1· to see in the influence of men 
such as Elliott, Domett and Monro, who had been so concerned with the Wa:irau 
18 incident in 1843, a greater resentment· of Maoris reflected in the opinion 
of the Examiner. However, in their attitudes towards the belligerent Ma,oris, 
and in their opinion of the conflict itself and of its justice, there was little 
difference between the Examiner and the Colonist, nor indeed were they very 
different from any other newspapero 
17. See McIntosh, friarlborough, pp. 195-197, 
18. In fact the editor of the Examiner in 1843, G.R. Richardson, was 
killed at Wairau, see Scholefield, Newspapers in New Zealand, p.157. 
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Opinion, during 1860, on the native problem in Taranaki and on the 
Taranaki war may be conveniently divided in to four phases. The first phase, 
from ei'!l.rly February when the first news of trouble brewing in Taranaki ·°l'ras 
received till the news of the outbreak of fighting received late March, was 
characterized by the demand for decisive action against the Maoris and con-
fidence that, given the decadence of the Maoris and the superiority of the 
British, a mere show of force -would be sufficient to overawe the Maoris and 
~ bloodless victory achieved. During the second phase, April and May, with 
hostilities in progress the discussion turned to the necessity of a decisive 
victory to demonstrate to the Maoris the helplessness of their resistance,· 
and the war was rationalized as a means of civilizing the Maoris. The 
justification of the war was beginning to move away from the rights and 
wrongs of a land dispute to the quelling of a native rebelliono With the 
blunders at Waireka and the winter inactivity of the military it was 
becoming apparent that no quick victory was to be obtained. The third phase, 
from Hay to August, was one of disillusionment deepened by doubts cast on the 
justice of the govermnent' s actions in the Wai tara dispute. However this 
mood of disillusionment was accompanied by the assertion that whatever the 
justice of the war it must be brought to a successful conclusion, and by the 
denial of any colonial responsibility for the war or the expenses associated 
with it. The fourth and final 1860-phase began with the opening of the 1860 
session of the General Assembly in Auckland on 30 July. The whole question 
of the origins and responsibility for the war was re-opened, the policies 
of the Governor and of Stafford's ministry being subject to scrutiny. With 
the ac:dn1onio-us debates in parliament and with the availability of documents, 
71. 
opinion became more informed, though not necessarily with any more under-
standing, of the basic issues involved. In this chapter_ we shall be. 
concerned with the first three phases,vpublic opinion up to the meeting of 
the General Assembly in August 1860. 
* * * * 
When news was received that the Waitara purchase was to proceed under 
mili ta:cy protection if necessary and that~ artial law had been proclaimed 
in New Plymouth on 22 February, the two Nelson_ newspapers took the opportunity 
to release some of the resentment built up by past failures and humiliations, 
and no doubt shared by the majority of :Nelson settlers. For too long, the 
Colonist argued, "the dominant race had not domineered, and justioo has been 
sacrificed in many instances in favo·r fsii/ of the native", in Taranaki 
there now appeared the chance to show the Maoris which was the superior race 
and to 
impress upon the native population their utter subjection 
to the British Cro't'm, and the absurdity of any attempt to 
assert independence of it, or to break the law with impunity,· 
or to submit to it only when it suits them •• ,o 19 
The Examiner's editorials reveal very clearly this resentment of the 
humiliations suffered in the past. During the 'forties and 'fifties the 
?•'.la.oris had been "petted and treated as cu:riousi ties 11 20 with patience and 
.. t 21 magnamini y. But with what results? Rebellion had become the cheap 
pleasure of every turbulent chief 22 for the Maoris had mistaken the 
19 • .N.Q. 6 JYiarch ·1860. 
20. NE 31 May 1856. 
21. NE 21 March 1860, 
22. lifil 7 March 1860, 
72. 
European's forbearance and kindness as signs of timidity, fear and weakness. 
They look upon us as a very industrious, but cowardly 
people; and having seen us tolerate so much, are 
persuaded that rather than face their grimaces and 
tomahawks we will take anything at thej_r hands. 23 
It was time the 11.Iaoris were humiliated by giving them a "sharp but necessary 
lesson ••• by hemming the:(11 in so completely that they shail have n.o means of 
escape, no alternative between destruction and entire submission •••• " 24 
11he newspapers were reflecting the cu!rent pub).ic opinion in Nelson which 
regarded all natives as "treacherous scoundrels" who ought to be treated 
as "conquered slaves." 25 
The newspapers made little attempt to disguise their racialism 
or their attitude of superiority. The Colonist regarded the Maoris as 
savages who were little above the level of wild beasts but more dangerous 
because the iVf.,,i,ori possessed the cunning -and intelligence the beasts lackedo 26 
However the progres·s of the local Maoris, among whom could be classed some of 
"the real gentlemen of this province" who had 11intelligence uncommon in its. 
amount 11 , 27 was contrasted with the "low level in which the vast majority 
. 28 
still remain in the Morthern Island." The cri terim the Colonist used 
was the extent to which the lf1aoris had "assimilated themselves to European 
habits and civilized manners ••• 0 11 29 The Examiner did not share this 
23. NE 21 March 1860. 
24. NE 7 lviarch 1860. 
25, NC 3 April 1860, letter to the editor from W. Jenkin. 
26, NC 6 Narch 1860. 
27. NC 12 August 1859. 
· 28, :t-TC 6 Iifiarch 18600 
29. NC 12 August 1860. 
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favourable view of the Nelson Maoris pointing out that there were many "whose 
habits of drunkenness alone are a very sufficient bar to any very intimate 
fraternization. 11 30 Later the Examiner was to blatently proclaim that the 
whit~~n, using this more racial and colour prejudiced term rather than 
Englishmen or British, 
in every quarter of the globe have given proof of their 
superiority in intelligence, in courage, in physical 
strength, and in humanity, to every coloured race that 
has ever sought to bar them in their progress. 31 
The order of the supposed qualities of the Europeans, intelligence, courage, 
physical strength and humanity, is interesting. For it was argued that the 
iYiaori had to be shovm that the Pakeha's possession of intelligence, humanity 
and justice did not make him weak, and further that the-Maoris, lacking in 
the intellectual and moral faculties, highly regarded physical force. 32 
· The Maori had to be shovm the physical superiority of the European, 33 after 
it was .argued, 
showing the Naoris your poweivyou may then be as merciful as you like. 34 
But it was this supposed courage and physical superiority of the British 
that had been brought so much into doubt by the conflicts of the 'forties and, 
given the weak state of colonial defence in 1860, there was still little cause 
for settler confidence. 35 There was, then, a need to reassure the settler, 
as much as to convince the Maori, of the superiority of the Pakeha through 
30. NE 7 April 1860. 
31. NE 11 April 1860. 
32. NE 11 April 1860. 
33. NE 21 March 1860, 
34, NC 6 March 1860. 
35, NC 6 April 1860 doubted whether it was possible to put dovm the Maoris 
by physical force, William Fox and Frederick Weld both complained to 
J.R. Godley about the insufficient military force in New Zealand for 
the successful conduct of a war: ]'ox to Godley, 5 May 1860; Weld to 
Godley, 18 July 1860, Canterbury PapersQ 
editorials which bristled with claims of superiority,36 and more importantly 
through an actual demonstration of this superiority, an opportunity for which 
was presented at Waitara. 
Not only would decisive action at Waitara reassure the settler while 
convincing the Maoris of the hopelessness of their resistance to colonization 
and- the advance of European civilization, 37 but, by giving the rc1ra.oris a 
convincing proof of British power, the much needed land would be made avail-
able to the northern provinces and the government freed from native problems. 
At last the government would be able to devote itself to its real task, for 
alongside the native race 
one of the most interesting problems in the world/is? 
being worked. out: a body of British colonists is- -
growing in numbers and weal th, ••• and gradually 
swelling to the dimensions of a nation, shaping them-
selves into society, and framing laws for their own 
guidance and governance •••• let the movements and 
struggles of this young British offshoot in its political 
infancy receive ail countenamand support. 38 
The implication that New Zealand was to be a European society is clear, 
The native problems of the North had for long enough distracted government 
attention from the growing pains of the South. A short sharp struggle in 
Taranaki was.welcomed as a cheap and easy solution to the divided interests 
of the two islands - it would remove the North Island's native problems. 
rfue land funds and other revenues would be safeguarded and the proposals 
for separating the islands being advocated by Henry Sewell and the 1Y!:tl-eion 
360 See for example NE 21 March 1860. 
37. NE 23 March 1860; also LT 2 May 18600 
38~ NE 17 March 1860. 
Times would remain pipe dreams because such an extreme measure would be 
rendered unnecessary. 39 Nelson never favoured separation of the isla~ds 
while it was in a position of power with Stafford at the head of the central 
government - in a separated South Island Otago and Canterbury would relegate 
Nelson to a secondary pos~tion. Further Nelson was not too concerned about 
safeguarding the land fund as her area of-remaining available land was almost 
finished. 40 
A further reason for the :Nelson demand for a decisive act in Taranaki 
was the discovery of gold on the Buller Ri.ver in November 1859. The land 
purchases from the Maoris had not been completed and the Examiner warned 
against any premature move on the part of individuals to stake claims in case 
interference from the natives is provoked for 11 even where the power of 
R'nglish law is suppose0, to be paramount we have lately heard of instances 
in which they have taken upon themselves to decide disputed questions by 
. f It 41 main orce •••• The defeat of Wiremu Kingi at Waitara would be a warning 
to the Fiaoris around the Buller River not to interfere. 
Thus as a chance to humiliate the Maoris, to reassure the settlers of 
European superiority and their security in the colony, to end the native 
problems and thus make the demands for separation irrelevant, and as a warning 
to local T✓iaoris against land disputes, the Nelson newspapers advocated a hard 
390 NE 3, 7, and 14 March 1860. Cf OW 24 March 1860 which arg'Ues that the 
possibility of a native war in Taranaki bring~ the South Island land ~-
in danger and thus it is necessary to consider Sev1ell's separation scheme. 
40. 1:TE 21 march 1860. 
41. NE 4 January 1860. 
line on the Waitara dispute. What was their opinion on the dispute itself? 
* * * * 
Further investigation into Wiremu Kingi 1 s title to the disputed land was 
not considered necessary. Confidence being placed in the Government's 
investigations of the title and its conduct of the purchase, the South,Island 
. 42 
newspapers did not doubt that the land at.Waitara had been fairly bought. 
There was little 1-mderstanding, and even. less sympathy, displayed by the 
newspapers and settlers, of the nature of Maori society, or of Maori customs 
and land tenure. Maori tribal society had b~en commonly described as 
"debasing socialistic commvnism" 43 or as a nslough of' barbarism11 • 44 
Indeed it was this communal nature of Iv£9,ori society which would have to be 
destroyed before the Naori achieved any form of civilization and "good 
relations and 1mion between the races 11 established. 45 Wiremu Kingi's 
conduct at the Governor 1 s meeting in March 1859, when Teira offered the 
· '46 
land for sale, was not understood. His behaviour was regarded as of an 
insolent and rebellious bully rather than that of a haughty chief.• Kingi I s 
42. T'fle question of Kingi 1 s title to the land was not thought to be of 
importance by the South Island newspapers. 'l'heir information on the 
dispute was mainly from official Government sources or the TaJZ,_an~Jd 
He,.KliJ.d, both prejudiced in favour of the official line. See NE 
7 March 1860; LT 10 fJJarch 1860; OW 17 March 1860. 
430 Henry Sewell, J<2.ill-"11al, iii, p.924, 27 July 11:356. 
44. O.W. Richmond quoted by Sinclair, O:r_:i.p.:i;t1s-9_:t__the J1fJaori Wars, p.198. 
'11here were many examples of such scathing descriptions of Maori society. 
45. NE 16 Ifay 1860 commenting on Weld's election speech. See also OC 4 
January 1861, letter to the Editor from "A Friend of the Society" (Society 
for Elevating the Condition of the Maori), and LT 31 October 11:.60, 
letter from J.E. Fitzgerald. 
46. See Sinclair, J).rigin.Ji, PP• 137, 195. 
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' tt7 tribal position as the aclmowledged paramount chief was not recognised; ' 
48 the Col<2_1JJst claimed that Kingi was a former slave, and the Exarg.,iner 
pointed to a supposed discovery of 11a blot in Wiremu Kingi 1s escutcheon 11 
which would not enable Kingi to claim descent from one of the original canoes 
and thus place him below Teira. 49 Kingi's refusal to define his individual 
claims or to discuss his titles was regarded as his recognition of Teira's 
right to sell. 50 The position adopted by Kingi, being based on his rank 
in his tribe and on a conrrQunal concept of land ownership, was incomprehensible 
to colonists imbued with western concepts of law and individualism. The 
Auckland newspaper, the Sg].lthern Cross, perceptively regarded the native 
problem as a conflict between Naori law and customs and English concepts of 
law. 51 The Maori wars in New Zealand were not the OD.lY wars in the nine-
teenth century which in part resulted from the refusal or inability of the 
British to recognize or understand the le-gal and diplomatic practices of 
another culture. For instance twenty years previously the so called opium 
wars in China were fought not so much over the issue of opium prohibition 
but because the British became impatient of Chinese law and diplomacy. 52 
470 See Sinclair 9rigins, p.174. 
48. NC 6 March 18600 
49. NE 2 June 1860. 
50. NC 6 :March 1860; NE 7 Narch and 25 April 1860. 
51. Southern Cross, 6 March 1860 reprinted in LT 4 April 1860. 
52. See Li Chien-lung, Political History of China, (1956), PP• 12-46. Both 
in New Zealand and in China the basic conflict between cultures was 
heightened by economic factors, in New Zealand the need for land, and in 
China the British desire to open the door to western trade with Chinao 
However the modern emphasis on the economic causes of wars has tended 
to push into the background the fact that many wars result from blunders 
caused by the human failing to appreciate another nation's or culture's 
point of view and way of life. 
78. 
Wiremu Kingi, it was pointed out, had not denied the legality of the 
sale, but simply asserted the right to disallow it. The question was con-
53 sidered to be one not of ownership but of authority. How was Kingi's 
opposition explained? Wiremu Kingi, it was argued, opposed the sale "out 
of consideration for the interests of his race, and in pursuance of a policy 
partially.adopted by the natives in the North Island •••• " 54 
The argument that Kingi was acting in the capacity of a land leaguer 
features prominently in South Island, and particularly Helson, comments on 
the Waitara dispute. The first editorial comments of most of the South 
Island newspapers on the Taranaki question all used the explanation that 
Kingi was acting as the leader of a land league or combination of anti-land-
sellers. 55 Few historians now believe in the existence of a Taranaki land 
56 league headed by Kingi but the belief in the league by the settlers is 
understandable enough. The myth enabled them to explain Maori behaviour 
in the eighteen fifties. 57 In 1860 the myth of a Taranaki land league 
enabled the settlers, unable or unwilling to comprehend the intricacies of 
native land ownership, to explain the actions of Wiremu Kingi and to transmute 





NC 6 Narch 1860; NE 7 J\farch 1860; LT 10 i'-Tarch 1860. 
LT 14 Narch 1860. 
NC 6 March 1860; NE ··-'7, March 1860; LT 14 J.Vf.arch 1860; OW 17 March 1860. 
But cf. Sinclair, Q;~e,'Maori Land League, pp. 30-32, in which he asserts 
that the notion of a land league,· in which Kingi was a leading member, 
did not become used as an explanation of Kingi 1 s opposition until August 
1860 when the Assembly met and the existence of the league .became part 
of the government's apologia. 
Sinclair,rMaori Land League, and 11 Te Tikanga Pakeke the Maori Anti-Land-
Selling Movement in Taranaki, 1849-59n in The Feel of '11ruth (ed. by Peter 
lVlunz, 1969.) PP• 79-92; B.J. Dalton, Wa1° and Politics in Wew Zealand, 
61-92. But cf. Edward Hill, '11here was a Naori Land Lea e in Taranaki, 
published by the Wellington Historical Associa,tion 1969. 
See further Sinclair in The Feel of Truth, pp. 90-91. 
79. 
of the Gove1'D.or. 58 Further, action against Kingi could be rationalized 
as defence of native rights as much as the assertion of British sovereignty. 
lilready in March before hostilities had commenced the Examiner was using the 
myth of "aboriginal trade imionism" to argue that. the problem had arisen 
because the land league "like the unions in England has forgotten they have 
control only over those who had given their assent to join 11 and were trying 
to ucoerce 11011 land-league members. 11 59 Wiremu Kingi was a Hbully11 and 
60 
attempting to prevent 11 rightful ovmers from exercising their property rightso n 
Indeed the Maoris in Marlborough were told the Governor was fighting in 
m l . t f d t' · ht f th T" • 61 t 1 ' tl · ht t 11 1aranan o sa eguar ne :rig s o e r11aor1s, a east , 10 rig o se 
their land. 
By claiming a right to disa1low a land sale and by heading a land league, 
Wiremu Kingi was attempting to regain rights that had been ceded by the ifa.oris 
to the Queen with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. .-- In return for the 
securing of their territorial rights by the Treaty of Waitangi the JYiaori 
chiefs had ceded their sovereignty and rights of chieftainsbip to the Queen. 62 
7 
The Land League'and the Maori King Movement were seen, not only as attempts 
5~ 
to prevent the Naori race from dyine; out ) but. as J'IIaori attempts to 
subvert the '.l.1reaty of Wai tangi and to pursue their 11 feeline;s of savage 
58. NC 6 March 1860; NE 14 Narch 1860. 
59. NE 14 March 1860. But cf. Sinclair, ~_j,§.nd~.gu§_, J?Po 39-47 and 
Origins, pp. 214-215, who suggests that the idea of aboriginal trade 
imionism originated· .with the government defence of their actions during 
the debates in the General Assembly after August 1860. 
60. N~ 25 April 1860. 
61. NC 18 Nay i860. Report of Marlborough native meeting. Statement made 
to I✓iaoris by Dr1diiuller, the Resident Magistrate. 
62. EE 7 ¥1arch and also 25 April 1860. 
63. NE 14- March 1860. 
80. 
64 
independence II and II chimerical ideas of national separation. 11 
\I 
Both Land 
League and King Novem.ent were attem]_)ting to maintain their authority over 
land. Kingi I s opposition at Wai tara had brought matters to a crisis. 
If Teira I s right to sell was substantiated then not only would there always · 
be indiv:iduals willing to sell but nothing more would be heard of land 
. . 65 
leagues or King JVIovements. Thus the mantle of rebellion was placed upon 
the Maoris in Taranaki, who in their opposition to land sales were breaking 
the Treaty of Waitangi and thus "have rendered some manifestation of for.ce 
against them necessary." 66 
* * * * 
Though their comments were belligerent and fiery the newspapers shared 
Gore Browne's hope for a bloodless victory if not his reluctance to go to 
war. 67 There was a tendency to believe that the sight of a regiment of 
British soldiers would show the Maoris the worthlessness of their 11 gasconading" 
68 and thus allow the Waitara survey to proceed peacefully. The Examiner 
69 
was unwilling to believe that conflict between native and settler was imminent. 
When hostilities had actually commenced and blood had been shed, this 
unwillingness to believe in the imminence of war was held. up as a reflection 
of a superior national character rather than a reflection of overconfidence 
64. NE 7 March 12>60, 
65. NC 6 :March 1860; N~ 7 March and 14 March 1860. See also M: 2 Nay 18600 
66. L'J;'. 14 March 1860. 
67. See Sinclair, _Origins_, pp. 184-186, 191-192 for Gore Browne's hope that 
the Maoris would be awed into submission by a mere show of force. 
68. NFJ 18 February 1860. 
69. Hill 3 lVIarch 1860. 
81. 
in European superiority and of settler underestimation of the Maoris. 70 
Having been 11 rudely awakened 11 from their ''dream of peace and fancied 
security" 71 the newspapers, and especially the Examiner, set about mould- · 
ing the opinion of their readers. Some elation was felt at the chance to 
revenge past humiliations, the Maoris were to be dealt with at last, and 
the temporizing policy of petting and giving way to the Maoris was to be 
ended. This policy of moral suasion had led the British government to 
colonize llTew Zealand with insufficient military forces to assert her 
physical superiority and the early governors were left powerless. 72 .... The 
failures of the eighteen forties were .recalled: 
Affronts in former times have been submitted to, compromises 
entered into, and the great emblem of British authority, the 
national flag, violently displaced, without being restored 
to its ancient pre-eminence, 73 
Now at last, though war and fightingwa__salways to be deplored, the present 
physical struggle votikl show the Maori which is the superior race and convince 
him "that neither the peaceful industry nor the lea.rning of the white men has 
unnerved his courage or enfeebled his arm.0.0 11 Indeed by teaching the 
Ivfaori to submit to authority the war would not only benefit the settler by 
making his life and property secure, but the Maor:Lswould be ready to be 
converted from s~vages to civilized men. 74 
the civilization of the J.l'Iaori. 
70. See NE 24 J.l'Iarch 18600 
7-1 • HE. 21 April 1860. 
72, NE 11 April 1860. 
73, NE 26 May 1860. 
The war was given a mission -
74. NE 11 April 1860, See also LT 13 June 1860 and 20 March 18610 
82. 
That the Maoris were still in a savage state and in need of civilizing 
was held to be demonstrated by what the Examiner regaro.ed as "the cowardly 
and brutual murder of unarmed men and boys 11 • 75 The murders shattered the 
belief that the missionaries had succeeded in humanizing and civilizing the 
Maoris and that they were on ttthe whole and as a nation rather better 
Christians than ourselves 11 • The Omata murders called back to mind the 
. Wairau massacre and was proof of the large amount of "innate savagery11 
still existing in the natives. 76 In a taunting attack on the editor of 
the Examiner for his "sombre ravings" the Colonist reminded him that sub-
sequent enquiries had sho'l'm that the Maoris were in the right at Wairau, but 
we should not assume the Colonist had an enlightened view of the Maori for 
it went on to assert "if you will fight with savages you must expect to be 
savagely dealt with if you fall into their clutches." 77 
The justice of the war was not doubted. "We have right on our side" 
the Examiner proclaimed; Wiremu Kingi was defying the justice and authority 
78 of the British government and was denying the rights of private property. 
The Governor had been forced into war by the actions of the natives. 79 
The Otago Colonist commenting on the war for the first time in May asse!~ed 
that the Governor had to choose between °at once teaching the Maories,a 






NE 21 April 1860. 
and Passmore, a New 
Parker, at Omata on 
(1955), i, p.172. 
NE 21 April 1860. 
NC 1 May 1860. 
]]!_ 11 April 1860. 
NE 28 lilarch 1860. 
Weld to Godley, 18 
The reference is to the murders of two farmers, Shaw 
Plymouth businessman, Ford, and two boys, Pote and 
27 March. See J. Cowan, The New Zealand Wars, 
Stafford to Godley, 28 ~lay 1860, Canterbury Papers. 
July 1860, Canterbury Papers. 
outbreaks as the present whenever circumstances appear to warrent a hope of 
success." 80 As the government's conduct had not been q_uestioned_arid the 
ideology evolved before the commencement of host:Lli ties was still viable 
there was little need to discuss the rights and wrongs of the policy that 
led to war. But then B~shop Selwy:t'J. and Chief Justice Martin began to sow 
seeds of doubt with claims that the government had not suffi.ciently 
investigated the ·wai tara question before proceBding with the purchase and 
had not recognized Wi.remu Kingi's rights as a paramount chief. 81 
The lifelson settlers voiced their opinions at a public meeting held on 
82 
23 April. The meeting strongly condenm.ed the interference of the Bi,shop 
and Chief Justice and cheered when the chairman, Llewellyn Nash, affirmed 
"that the war should be pro;·secuted with English energy and determination, 
and that peace should not be :made until the Maori es,, had been entirely and 
effectually subdued." Loud cheers followed a statement that 11 but one 
national flag should fly in the colony, and that one the Union Jack." 83 
That the Nelson settlers supported a war to establish British supremacy is 
clear. lfo peace was to be made until the li'iaoris were entirely humiliated 
and subduedo The settlers cheered Dr Monro loudly when he demanded that no 
quarter be given to "bloodstained rebels who have murdered unarmed and harm-
less men and boys." The meeting finally carried the following resolution 
so. oc 11 ~lay 1860. 
81. See fl.J~R 1860, E-2. 
82. This meeting was reported in NE 25 April 18600 
83. i,lli., statement made by Mr Rankin. 
84. 
with acclamation: 
That while desirous of living on friendly terms with the 
Maories, ancl rejoicing in every instance of their progress 
in civilization and material comfort, this meeting con-
siders that it is no less due to them than to the British 
colonists, that proceedings on the part of any of them, 
subversive of all natural justice and moral law, and 
leading, as at Taranaki, to bloodshed and destruction of 
property, should be promptly and decidedly punished by 
the Government. 84 
No inkling of justice or right was conceded to the Maoris whose actioi1s 
were condemned by an appeal to "natural justice and moral law". The 
Examiner had certainly moulded publfc ~pinion successfully. The meeting 
made no attempt even to consider the grounds of Selwyn's and Martin's 
argument; their attitude, which was reflected in the Examiner's editorial, 
was simply that 11having marched across the Rubicon with a decided step" 
there was only one policy to be adopted by the government - complete vict9_J:. 
Later, the Examiner was to argue against those who doubted the justice of 
the Waitara purchase by reminding them that 11a year elapsed between the 
beginning of that transaction and its forcible completion, during which 
time no voice was raised to question its fairness and legali ty11 • The 
Examiner went on to assert, probably with the Colonist in mind 86 that to 
raise doubts about the justice of the war once the final appeal to force 
had been made was merely intended to embarrass political opponents and would 
"weaken the moral influence of the Government. 11 87 
84. ibid., the resolution was proposed by Charles Elliott, the editor of 
the Examiner. 
85. NE 25 April 1860. 
86. NC 22 JVJay 1860 had suggested thaJc a judicial enquiry be held to 
investigate native land tenure and the question of the Waitara title. 
See also NC 19 June 1860 which supports Bishop Selwyn. 
87. NE 30 :May 1860. 
However the doubts persisted and were not alleviated by '\'Ield's ,letter .. to 
~ct01:J at Wairau. 88 Regarded as as-_pokesman for the government Weld in his 
letter seemed to indicate. the government was changing its ground from that 
of calling in the military to quell some disorderly natives interfering with 
the survey on some land fairly purchased, to declaring rights of chieftain-
.. ... .... p 
ship to be "quasi-sovereign" and the appeal to these rights as rebellion 
against the a,uthori ty of the Crovm. 89 The implication taken from Weld I s 
letter was that the government was no longer merely settling a land dispute 
but suppressing a native rebelliono The Examiner held that Weld' s letter 
would raise the whole question of native rights and open the possibility, 
already perceived by the Colonist, that there were some rights, such as the 
f-e.udal authority of chiefs, that were not incompatible with the Queen's 
90 sovereignty. If Wiremu Kingi was merely exercising his rights as a 
chief at the head of his tribe then these rights would not be any more 
inconsistent with the Queen's sovereignty than manorial rights common in 
England and thus the original case against Kingi would no longer hold. 91 
At this point the Examiner could only fall back on the argument that force 
having been appealed to and the Maoris having committed murders and looted 
the property of settlers there could be no retracing of steps without 
disastrous results. 92 
88. See NE 9 May 1860. 
89. NE 26 May and 30 May 1860. 
90. NC 22 iVIay 1860; NE 26 May and 30 May 1860. 
91. NE 30 May 1860. 
92. NE 30 JViay and 6 June 1860. 
86. 
The dilemma was finally overcome by linking the Taranaki conflict 
with the f'laori King Movement, so that the Waitara purchase, for both the 
government and the Iviaoris, became "the touchstone to show the feeling 
towards us in the native mind. 11 93 The Atiawa and Ngatiruanui had 
tendered their tribes' f~rmal allegiance to the Maori King at a meeting 
of the Waikato on 10 April. 94 At the end of fllay at a large meeting of 
King natives support was expressed for Wiremu Kingi and on 31 lYJay the King 
) 
flag was hoisted; 95 11 they have hoisted the flag of the Maori Kingdom, they 
have · raised the.standard of native indepena.ence. • • every native knows the 
stocy of the flagstaff at Kororareka". A conspiracy, of which the first 
act was the Waitara dispute, had at last been revealed and hopes for an 
early peaceful termination were at an end. 96 Confirmation seemed to be 
given to the argument of a general native rebellion., .It was not realized 
that the new vigour of the King Movement was a result of an upsurge of 
nationalist feeling on the part of the Maoris who saw in the Taranaki. war 
confirmation of their worst fears of the intentions of the settlers. 97 
'l'he time had arrived for active military operations which would enable the 
settlers 11 to look through a short interval of confusion and bloodshed to 
98 a lengthened period of peace and general improvement.!'· 
93. NE 20 June 1860. 
94. See Dalton, War and Politics, p. 110. 
95. For an account of the meeting see Alfred Saunders, History of New 
Zealand, (1896), i, pp. 396-397; Dalton, op.ci_t., 110. 
96 • .N! 20 June 1860. See also Weld to Godley, 18 July 1860, Canterbury 
Papers. 
97. See Sinclair, Origins, p. 232; Dalton, War and Politics, 110-111. 
Also see Fox to Godley, 5 Nay 1860, Canterbury Papers, Fox asserted 
that the King Maoris would not support Wiremu Kingi unless they 
felt the King Movement threatened. 
98. J\T]l 20 June 1860. 
The hope of a short, sharp struggle based on the superiority of British 
arms was still held, but the earlier optimism was beginning·to fade. 
The early optimism of the settlers that the Taranaki war would be a 
short, sharp struggle, was based on the belief in British superiority 
supposedly demonstrated by success in previous colonial warso 99 At the 
outbreak of the war confidence was placed on the fact that Gore Browne had 
fought in the Afghan campaign against Affihan mountaineers who were "physically, 
among the finest races in the world,.. and al toge·ther a much more dangerous 
100 foe than he has now to meet;" Disillusionment was almost inevitable. 
The settlers were in fact blind to the reality of the local situation, not 
fully appreciating the capability of the JYiaoris nor 1mderstanding· the 
conditions of warfare in Taranald. 
The settlers knew little of the country and its native inhabitants 
outside their ovm areas of settlement. There was much in the condition 
of the southern Maori to confirm the South Island settlers' belief in the 
101 
11 decad_ence of the native race. 11 Decimated and demoralised the South 
Island Maoris had offered little resistance to the invasion of the European 
and had without any struggle parted with their land. 102 By 1860 the 
South Island Maoris were not only landless but had become an insignificant 
minority, outnumbered by the Pakeha twenty to one. The prognostications 
99, For example see above p.73 quote from NE 11 April 1860. 
100. NE 24 T,Jarch 1860. 
101 • NE 24 March 1860. For the condition of the South• Island r<iaori see 
above Chapter 2. 
102. For the alienation of their land by the South Island rilaori see R.W. 
Chapman, Thi§: .. South Island Maoris and their Rese~_ed Lands, unpublished 
MA thesis, University of Canterbury; 1966. 
88. 
of the decline and eventual extinction of the Maori were regarded as being 
confirmed by Fenton's report on the state of the Maoris. 103 Indeed, rather 
than being feared as a threat, the South Island Maoris feared the settlers 
and at the outbreak of fighting in 1860 hastened to proclaim their loyalty 
to the government and to as~ure the settlers of their friendship. 104 The 
progress of the war was to show that the state of the South Island Maori 
merely disguised the reality of brown power in the north. 
The lack of an immediate and decisive military success began to erode 
the settlers' confidence in the superiority of the imperial troops. Shortly 
after the war began>the fiasco at Waireka called forth a strong feeling 
nvarying between contempt, indignation and utter disbelief as to the behaviour 
105 attributed to some of the parties engaged there ••• 0 11 It was difficult 
for the settlers to believe that the British soldier did not possess "steady, 
unflinching valour ••• and real intelligence 11 , and as the actual conditions 
in 'foranaki were only dimly perceived, criticism was heaped upon the military 
commanders. More strangely, perhaps, was the criticism di11 ected at the IViaoris 
for not coming out to fight ·on open country so that the British soldier could 
display his true worth. 106 Harsh criticism was directed first at Lieutenant-
103. F.D. Fenton, Observations on the State of the Abori inal Inhabitants 
of lfow Zealand, 1859 • For newspaper comments on F'enton' s report see 
NE 13 and 23 July 1859; LT 29 June 1859. 'I'he eventual extinction of 
the Maori, which was not expected to be long delayed, was often regarded 
as the solution to the native difficulty. OS 10 February 1859; OW 5 
November 1859. 
104. NC 30 March and 3 April 1860; NE 1 September 1860; LT 8 August and 15 
September 1860; OC 19 October 1860; OW 20 October 1860. 
105. NE 24 March 1860. For details of the battle see Cowan, New Zealand Wars, 
i, PP• 171-182. 
106. See for example NE 18 April 1860. But cf. Sinclair, Origip...§.., po227 and 
Dalton, War and Politics, pp. 107-1090 
Colonel yrurray, the commander of the Imperial troops in Taranaki, 107 and 
I 
later at Colonelt',Gold, the commander of military forces in New Zealand. 
Criticism of Gold became virulent and bitter after the British defeat at 
Puke-ta-kauere, 108 and the news of his replacement by General Pr.att was 
welcomed. 109 110 Little of this criticism was just, some of it merely 
111 reflected the opinion of the Taranaki settlers and press, much was the 
result of attempting to reconcile myth with actuality. The past was 
appealed to and rather unfair comparisons made: "under the Command of 
Sir Charles Napier, 1,500 British soldiers put to flight and utterly routed 
with great slaughter 20,000 Belooches, as brave as the Fiaories, with better 
and d. . l . 11 11 2 arms iscip ine. The inactivity of British troops "burning to 
show what stuff they are made of•••" was explained by blaming bad leadership 
in time of battle for, referring to Gold, 11 the hand which forges and fashions 
the weapon is not always the best fitted to wield it••••" 113 
The winte11 inactivity of the military was beyond the understanding of 
men who were looking for 11a quick and decided blow. 11 114 The lack of 
action of the British troops in Taranaki would indeed encourage the l'fa.ori,; 
107 •. NE 14 April 1860. 
108. See especially NE 7, 11 and 14 July 1860; LT 14 July 1860. For 
details of the encounter see Cowan, New Zealand Wars, i, pp. 183-190. 
109. NE 8 August 1860. 
110. See Sinclair, .Q_rigin~, pp. 229-230 and Dalton, War and Politics, 
107-112. 
111. For Taranaki opinion see Richmond-Atkinson Papers, i, pp. 554-555, 
568, 572, 574, 582-584, 606. 
112. NE 14 July 1860. 
11 3. NE 11 July 1860. 
114. NE 23 Hay 1860. 
90. 
but 
who 1tlas not yet lmow the strength of the white man, and iP/ imperfectly 
acquainted with the nature of his weapons of war, their effects, or the. 
mode of using them. 11 1l1he opportunity of administering a crushing blow 
at the start having been lost the war would certainly be longer but the 
11.5 
outcome was never doubted. Indeed the opportunity was lost almost 
from the beginning when Wiremu Kingi was allowed to escape from Te Kohia 
116 
pah. The consequences of the failure of British arms to administer 
a decisive blow was well appreciated. It was apparent that the struggle 
would neither be short nor sharp: "we anticipate many losses, many 
.....--
sacrifices, and a per:\.od more or less prolonged of warfare and interruption 
to our usual peaceful occupations. 11 117 Even more seriously the Examiner 
told its readers their 11interests are affected by the existing state of 
things; still more must they be by the issue. 
necessarily be made on our financial resources; 
, . f h . d tt 118 or oorrowJ.ng o money, per aps require • 
become unpopular. 
Heavy demands will 
supplementary taxation, 
The war was beginning to 
fade. 
By May the early hopes for a short sharp struggle had already begun to 
With doubts being raised about the justice of the war, with the 
winter inactivity of the troops followed by their defeat at Puke-ta-kauere, 
with questions being asked about how the war expenses were to be met, and 
119 with an economic depression which the Helson settlers blamed on the war, 
11 5. FE 23 May 12-60. 
116. NE 18 April and 16 May 1860. 
117. NJiJ 16 May 1860. 
118. NE 23 Nay 1860. 
119. LT 1 September 1860. 
91. 
120 the disillusionment of the settlers was beginning to turn to despair. 
Demands we11 e made for information and explanation and as early as May it 
121 was suggested that the General Assembly be called together. At the 
beginning of Au,gust a new mili taI'iJ commander arrived and the General 
Assembly met in Auckland. General Pratt I s early statements and a_emands 
for a free hand in military matters dampened hopes for an improvement in 
th . 1 . t . t t. 1 22 e rfll_l ary si ua ion. Nor did the General A,ssembly revive optimism. 
2-'he revelations made during the parliamentary debates and in papers tabled 
in the House instead of removing doubts and relieving: the disillusionment, 
sharpened the doubts and deepened the sense of despair. 
120. Weld to Godley, 18 July 1860 and 24 August 1860; Fox to Godley, 
4 September 1860; Canterbury Papers. 
121. NJiJ 12 and 23 J\'Iay, 5 and 11 July 1860. 
122. NE 11 August 1860. 
92. 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICS .AND THE NATIVE REBELLION. 
Behind the early enthusiasm for Gore Brovme's hard line in Taranaki 
was the expectation that, ·being a departure from the vacillation and 
temporizing of the Government's native policy, it would provide a quick 
and easy solution to the chronic native and land purchase problems that 
afflicted the North Island. The South Islanders considered these problems 
to be holding up the progress of the colony as a whole, and to be a 
persistent threat to the hard earned revenues of the southern provinces. 
They feared being called upon to finance projects benefitting the northern 
provinces only. Some considered the threat so great that they suggested 
separation of the two islands as a palliative.1 Under-rating the Maoris 
the settlers believed that decisive action on the part of the governor would 
solve their problems leaving their purses untouched and the colony united. 
At first a mere display of determination and military force was thought to 
be sufficient to induce Wiremu Kingi to back down at Waitara; if instead 
·of backing down Kingi -foolishly prepared to 11 show fight 11 , then a"sharp but 
necessary lesson" administered quickly and decisively would arrest the 
progress of native disaffection. 2 However, the struggle was to prove to 
be neither short nor sharp. The quick, decisive and crushing blow, which 
1. Proposed by Henry Sewell again in January 1860, see LT 18 January 1860. 
See also LT 1 February 1860; OW 24 ~'.larch 1860. Separation was opposed 
by the Nelson Examiner see NE 3, 10 and 14- I1Iarch 1860. With the 
outbreak of the war in Taranaki the Lyttleton Times announced it would 
stop agitating for separation until the war was over, see LT 31 March 
1860. 
2. See for example: lTC 6 March 1860; NE 7 and 10 March, 23 May 1860. 
93. 
was to bring the rebels to their senses and prevent waverers from becoming 
rebels, was not administered. 
T'.ne war policy had been initially welcomed as a cheap solution to the 
native problems of the North Island. But the settlers had expected speedy 
success. The lack of an immediate and decisive victory led to a ·willingness 
to question the war polic~ which began to be increasingly unpopular. 3 As 
the war dragged on inconclusively it became apparent that the war policy was 
creating new problems but solved none of the old ones. Southerners became 
apprehensive that-the war was becoming a threat to their progress by 
pilfering their pockets,4 and by checking immig-ration and encouraging 
re-emigration to Australia. 5 South Island interests were still being 
neglected - now by a 11:Ma,ori phobicu general Government_ too far away to be 
affected by South Island public opinion. It was claimed that al though 
South Island development outstripped the Horth, the southerners were at 
the mercy of the North Island and victims of a North Island problem~ 6 It 
is not surprising that arguments for separation were revived. By the end 
of 1860, realizing that the Imperial Government was 1.mlikely to meet the 
3. Fox to Godley, 4 September 1860, Canterbury Papers; F.D. Bell, PD 
1858-60, p. 263, 9 August 1860; l!1'. 22 September 1860. 
4. Weld to Godley, 24- August 1860, Canterbury Papers; Id'. 1 September 1860; 
OC 27 July 1860, Letter from 11 An Earnest Lover of Mankind 11 • 
5. Weld to Godley, 18 July 1860, Canterbury Papers; ..QQ 27 July 1860, 
Letter from "An Earnest Lover of Hankind 11 ; see also J. Williamson, 
PD 18,58-60, P• 172, 1 August 1860. 
6. LT 29 August and 19 September 1860. See also: F, D. Bell to Gore 
&ovme, 29 May 1862, Gore Brovme Papers, 1/2/146; T.B. Gillies to 
Mantell, 17 April 1863, Dlantell Papers, 286. 
costs of the prolonged war, South Islanders began again to seek in separation 
an escape from entanglement in the difficult and potentially expensive native 
problems of the north. 7 Separation became increasingly popular as the 
possibility of extending the hostilities into the Waikato and the need for 
an active native policy raised the spectre of spiralling costs and increasing 
financial demands. The influx of population into Otago following the gold 
discoveries in 1861 necessitated more consideration of Otago problems than a 
central government pre-occupied with natiye affairs would be able to give. . . 
It became· too apparent that while the southern provinces were asked to 
contribute to the financing of solutions to North Island problems• their own 
8 local interests and problems would be neglected. The southerners determined 
not to be governed any longer from Auckland and by a "Maori ministry 11 • 9 
· Otago began a cry for the total separation of the two islands;10 in Canterbury, 
the Otago separationists were accused of identying Otago interests as the 
interests of the 11Middle Island" 11 and Crosbie Ward put forward a plan for 
the separate administration of the two islands while keeping the colony united. 12 
7. LT 17 July, 19 September, 14 November and 21 December 1860. See also: 
Sewell to Hall, 23 November 1860, Hall Papers; :l!1 tzgerald to Selfe, 7 
December 1860, Selfe Letters, 2/15; Bell to Mantell, 11 July 1860, 
Mantell Papers, 243. 
8. For instance in 1863 the Government neglected to issue writs for the new 
Otago Provincial Council. See Gillies to Mantell, 17 April 1863, Mantell 
Papers, 286. See also: Bell to Mantell, 26 December 1861, Mantell Papers, 
24-3; Bell to Gore Browne, 6 April 1862, Gore Browne Papers, 1/2/1L,-5. 
9. Bell to Gore Brom1e, 29 May 1862, Gore Bro,me Papers, 1/2/14-6. 
10. On the Otago separation movement see: W.P. Horrell, The Provincial System 
in New Zealand, pp. 124-138; McLintock, History of Otago, pp. 555-575. 
11. Press 7 June 1862. 
12. Ward to Hall, 7 May, 2 Jmie 1862, Hall Papers. 
Separation, in one form 01· another, was always offered as a panacea for the 
differing interests and problems of the two islands, but it was to remain a 
pipe dream, never achieving realization because of the divided interests of 
the South Island provinces themselves. 
Though the war polic:f was being questioned and becoming unpopular this 
did not imply disapproval of the war. Popular feeling was still in favour 
of thrashing the Maoris and against any suggestions of a patched up peace. 13 
Few settlers were sympat:P.etic towards the Haori or :were troubled by the 
doubts cast on the.validity of the ·wai tara purchase by Bishop SelmJll, 
Archdeacon Hadfield and William Nartin. 
the war was accepted or simply assumed. 
The justice and inevitability of 
'Ihe war policy was unpopular and 
criticised not because the settlers objected to the war or had come to realize 
its injustice, but because it was not fulfilling settler expectations of a 
g_uick and easy solution to the native problems. It wa·s the prospect of a 
prolonged indecisive war with the attendant financial burdens that dismayed 
the South Islander. 
The settler was concerned with the question of responsibility for the 
war and its costs rather than the moral question of its justice. The 
settlers w:ere agreed that the war was an imperial war to maintain British 
supremacy and the Queen's sovereignty, and therefore hoped, even expected, 
that Britain would bear the main burden. 14 ~1J.1e1•e was in fact li t"ble 
opposition, in Parliament or out of doors, to the war as such, except from 
13. Sewell, Journals, iv, 24 February, 20 April, 23 June and 24 July 1861. 
See also LT 20 · March 1861 • 
1 li-. See for eruple LT 1 7 July 1861 • 
the small humanitarian missionary group. 15 In Parl:i,ament there was no 
11philo-Maori", "peace-at-any-price" party, though these labels were used 
as terms of abuse. There was general agreement that the war, being a native 
rebellion, should be "vigorously prosecuted" until British supremacy was 
re-established. It was on the question how and why the Maoris came to be 
in rebellion that colonial -opinion divided. Opponents of the Government 
emphasised the mismanagement of native affairs by Gore Browne and previous 
governors, suggested that Gore Browne had been egged on by interested colonial 
ministers~ and claimed that though conflict with the Maoris was inevitable, 
th · d · had b d to ben-in host1·11·t1·es. 16 e wrong issues an occasion een use o~ 
Government supporters on the other hand held that the war was forced upon 
a reluctant governor by truculent Maoris. 17 However, opponents and 
supporters of the Government were agreed that it was the Imperial Government's 
18 responsibility to get the colony out of its mess. Indeed, much of the 
colonial opinion on the war, once it became apparent that it was going to be 
a protracted struggle, may be interpreted as attempts on the part of the 
colonists, anxious to avoid any demands on their financial resources, to 
saddle the British Government with the responsibility and. the expenses of 
the conflict. 
15. Even the missionary body was divided over the war, see Sinclair, 
Origins of the Maori Wars, PP• 222-225. See also P.C. Matheson, 
The Views of the New Zealand Cler of 1860 on Race Relations, 
unpublished research exercise, OU, 1959, Hocken Library. 
16. See for example Fox to Godley, 5 May 1860, 28 June 1860 and 4 September 
1860, Canterbury Papers; Fox to Ha:11, 31 January 1861, Hall Papers; 
Bell to Mantell, 26 December 1861, Mantell Papers, 243; g:·29 August 
., 1860. 
17. Stafford to Godley, 28 May 1860, Canterbury Papers; Weld to Godley, 
18 July 1860, Canterb.ury Papers. 
18. Fox to Godley, 5 May 1860; Stafford to Godley, 28 May 1860; Weld to 
Godley, 18 May 1860; Canterbury Papers. See also ,QQ 19 May 1860. 
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The opinion of the Nelson newspapers on the Taranaki war after the 
initial optimism, with its hope of a short, Sharp struggle, had begun to · · 
fade, reflects the South Islanders' despair of the consequences of a 
protracted conflict. Anxious that the native problems of the North be 
solved once and for all they were equally anxious that their future should 
not be mortgaged with war debts. Their hope lay in convincing the Home 
Government of the dangerous nature and seriousness of the situation in 
Taranaki, and that it was an Imperial affair for which the Colony was neither 
responsible nor financially liable. Further, Nelson opinion, as it was 
expressed by the two newspapers and by Nelson politicians, was determined 
by political, both local and colonial (and indeed imperial), considerations, 
rather than by moral or legal principles, or indeed bf simple racial antagon-
ism. The war issue, and the question of future native policy in general, 
were mere pawns in the political game being played in the provinces or 
between the provinces. 
By the end of May 1860 it had become apparent'that the war would be a 
prolonged struggle. The frustration of the settlers, denied the pleasure of 
seeing the Maoris at last thrashed and humbled, was increased by the seemingly 
incomprehensible conduct of the British troops in Taranaki. Though the 
military commanders were blamed and criticised for their inaction, the Nelson 
Examiner admitted that, in the absence of any official attempt to supply 
information, dubious private sources, "denounced as unfair, one-sided, or 
altogether unworthy of belief", were being relied upon for information on 
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the Taranaki si tua ti on. 1 8 The Examiner had frequently called on the 
Government to explain its conduct of the war and to ensure that "authentic 
information" about the war was conveyed to the public. 20 However it was 
not only the conduct of the war that required expla,nation, the whole govern-
ment policy on the Taranaki question had suddenly become puzzling~:1 or rather 
it was realized that the government had neveT bothered to state its policy 
(or in fact given any indication it even had a policy). Between the 
commencement of hostilities in March and the meeting of the General Assembly 
in August the Government had made no statement about the war or of its policy. 
Not that it mattered; the newspapers, and the settlers on the whole, had 
made up their 01m minds about the justice of the war, and initially were 
content simply to assume the Government possessed an acceptable policy. 
In April the claims of the humanitarian anti-war critics, that the Waitara 
purchase had been insufficiently investigated because Kingi 's ti·ibal rights 
had been ignored, were surnnarily dismissed and a bellicose public meeting in 
Helson voiced its approval of the war and the 0 decision with which the 
Government has acted in confronting a nativ,e rebellion in Taranaki". 2.2 
The Government was reassured by the ~xaminer that as long as it 11 acts with 
decision and firmness, it may·rest upon the support of the whole British 
population of the colony.u23 But then early in Nay Frederick Weld's address 
to his Wairau consti tuents24 raised doubts as to the Government's policy and 
190 11 July 1860. For criticism of the Examiner's repo1°ting see NC 20 
.April 1860, Letter from 11 Senex Albus 11 ; NE 11 April 1860, Letter from 
"Fairplay". 
200 NE 14 .April, 28 April, 12 Ha~,, 23 May and 11 July 1860. 
21. JIB, 26 Nay and 30 May 1860. 
22. NE 25 April 1860 and see above Chapter IV, pp .83-:84. 
23. NE 25 April 1860. 
24. See NE 9 May 1860. 
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intentions. Weld' s letter not only suggested that the Government was 
changing its gr01.md from denying Kingi had any rights, to the argument that the 
rights Y..ingi claimed were tribal rights which were incompatible with British 
sovereignty, but that in so doing it was admitting its original case against 
Kingi was not clear cut and entering the difficult controversy over native 
rights. 25 The :Nelson Colonist, for instance, called for a judicial enquiry 
into the questions of native tenure and native rights compatible with 
British sovereignty and safeguarded by the Treaty of Waitangi. 26 The 
Examiner sensed its weakriess, attempting to act as a government apologist 
without having accurate information about the policy it was trying to defend, 
and fell back on the argument that once force had been appealed to the 
question of origins was merely academic and that the Maoris had to be 
punished for rebellion, looting and murder. 
But whatever force there may be in the considerations 
we have now mentioned regarding the casus belli first 
put forward, there can be nothing to justify the utter 
repudiation and open -defiance of British authority; 
still less anything to excuse the rising of the 
natives along the coast to the South of New Plymouth. 
Uninjured and unprovoked, they came upon the settlers, 
marauding and murdering•••• 
In advocating the punishment of the rebels the editor of the Examiner 
perceived the other horn of the dilemma: 
in proportion to our conviction that they deserved 
a signal and exemplary punishment, is our suprise 
and disappointment that the numerous and well-appointed 
force, which was commissioned for thi.'.S duty, should 
have returned without performing it. 27 
The Examiner welcomed the suggestion contained in Wald's letter.that the 
25. ml, 26 May and 30 May 1860. 
26. NC 22 May and 119 June 1860. 
27. NE 30 May 1860. 
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Government had a plan to bring the whole native population under complete 
subjection to the Queen but was now less confident that this would be done 
t d d . . l 28 promp ly an ecisive Yo Conscious that prolonged warfare would entail 
demands on the colony's financial resources, the.Examiner called for the 
meeting of the General Assembly to discuss the Government's policy and the 
share of the costs the colony would have to bear. 29 Significantly, the 
Examiner added it woulcl be no business of the Assembly to discuss the origins 
30 or the justice of the warq 
The defeat of the British troops at Pu:ke-ta-kauere on 27 June may be 
regarded as a turning point. The Maori King meetings held in the Waikato 
during April and May, followed by the involvement of Waikato Maoris in the 
Pvlrn-ta-kauere affray confirmed the settlers' suspicions that the whole 
conflict had a more serious and wider aspect to it than a mere local land 
dispute in Taranaki. It was thought that the plan of a f/Iaori conspiracy 
to drive the Pakeha out of the cou.ntry had been vncovered prematurely by the 
r..b ,. . T 1 . 31 01.,1:t, rea..l\: l.n arana n. Further, though the defeat eventually led to a 
more realistic assessiD.ent of the capabilities and resources of the Haoris, 32 
the settlers fouJ1d it easie1° to conclude that British success vras tmlikely 
without a change of military comraand. 33 The Exar:tl.ner attacked the Government 
for not supplying an official· account of the Puke-ta-kauere encounter ancl 
28. NE 26 May 1860. See also NE 23 Nay and 30 may 1860. Host Examiner 
editorials between 9 Hay and 6 June dealt with points raised by Weld I s 
letter. 
29. [fil 23 Hay, 26 Fay and 30 May 1860. 
30. NE 6 Jm1e 1860. 
31 • .!:_I]! 20 June, 5 July ( s1,ecial issue), 7 and 11 July 1860. See also: Weld 
to Godley, 18 July 1860, Ca..11terbury Papers; Bell to Hanten, 11 July 
1 860, Ifan tell Pape rs, 243. 
32. HE 14 July 1860. 
33. ibid. 
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argued that if the account given by its Taranaki co1°respondent34 proved to 
be correct, then Colonel Gold was incompetent and should be relieved of his 
comm.and. 35 However the editor of the l<llcaminer did not accept the fact of 
a British defeat at the hands of the Maoris, a superstitious people fearing 
the power of the white man and te:rrified of his guns. 36 Colonel Gold's 
failure to provide support for Major Nelson's attack on the Puke-ta-kauere 
pahs, the editor argued, merely prevented a B1°i tish victory :from being 
decisive! 
The late fight at Waitara must have abated the 
boastful self-confidence of the natives. A blow 
has been struck vii th one hand; how crune it that 
the other was tied up, when it was wanted to follow 
up and make that blow decisive? 37 
In actual fact the Puke-ta-kauere pahs proved impregnable and the British 
suffered a c:lismal defeat, almost a complete rout, retreating in a disorderly 
fashion leaving their dead on the fielc1. 38 The responsibility of Gold fo1• 
the lack of success is also debatable. The weather, the day being 11 one of 
the wettest and stormiest of a wet and stormy wi11ter 11 , 39 and the absence of 
34. Probably J.C. Richmond who was writing at this time for both the Taranald 
Herald and the Nelson Examiner. See: J.C. Richmond to :Mary Richmond, 
8 June 1860, PJ.cbmond-Atkinson Papers, i, P• 595; DNZB, ii, PP• 239-240. 
Ric}1JD.ond later became editor of the Examiner in 1862. See: J.C. Richmond 
to Mary Richmond, 13 December 1861, Richmond-Atldnson Papers, i, po 733; 
DNZB, ii, P• 240. 
350 ,IT! 11 July 1860. 
36. @ 23 May 1860. 
37. !J]J, 11 July 1860 • 
. 38. T. Nelson to Major of the Brigade, 27 June 1860, AJHR, 1860, E-3, pp.48--49. 
J.E. Alexander, Incidents of the Maori ~,•c~1863J,pp. 153-164. Cowan, 
The New Zealand Wars, i, pp. 1 8 5-1 89. / • S. Atkins on, Journal, 29 June 
1860, Richmond-Atldnson Papers, i, P• 599 where Atkinson wrote: "As at 
Waireka, it was nominally a defeat, when it might easily have been a 
complete victory, •••• 11 
39. Taranaki Herald, 30 June 18604 
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the pre-arranged ,iapket to signal the beginning of the British attack,40 
1./ -- ' 
led Gold to think Nelson had postponed the attack. When heavy firing was 
41 
heard in New Plymouth, Gold, who was in bed with influenza at the time,. 
marched the New Plymouth detachment to1-mrds Puke-ta-kauere as far as the 
Waiongana Ri.ver. As the river was in flood and difficult to ford, and, 
as the firing had ceased, Gold considered there was no need for assistance 
and marched his men back to to.r.a. 42 
The Nelson Examiner editor's reluctance to ad.~it the defeat of British 
soldiers, his anxiety to convey the irnpression, initially given by Taranaki 
colonists,43 of a blow struck against the Naoris, and his peevish self-
righteous attacks on Colonel Gold, may be ascribed simply to a sanguine, 
almost irrational, faith in the superiority of the British soldier. Almost 
paranoid in his assertions of European superiority, the defeat of the British 
_:_;--
Army by 0 a bunch of savages 11 was inconceivable. Lack of military success was 
attributed to the personal deficiencies of the military commanders rather than 
explained by an appeal to the plain fact that almost ever-::l factor was against 
40. Apparently an artillery sergeant forgot to fire the rockets. Alexander, 
..Q.p,cit., P• 157. 
41. Alexander, 01).cit., PP• 163-164. See also NE 7 July 1860. 
11-2. Alexander, ~cit., p. 164. For an a,ccount of Puke-ta-kau.ere operation 
see Cowan, New Zealand Wars, i, pp. 183-189 • .An imaginative but accurate 
:reconstruction of the battle is given by Eri,ol Brathwaite in his ncvel on 
the Taranaki wars, :1.1.he F:\;Y:~ng Fish, ( 1964), pp. 235-378. :I.1he main 
Examiner report of the battle was an 11extra11 on 5 July 1860. 
43. Accounts of the Puke-ta-kauere attack in the Examiner's 11 extra 11 of 5 July 
were from Ta:ranaki sources which contained assertions that the BTitish 
would have won a decisive victory had Gold provided reinforcements. ,See 
also A.S. Atkinson, Journal, 29 June 1860, Richmond-Atkinson Papers, i 9 
P• 599. 
. 103. 
easy British success; the inadequate British force available and its 
/ 
inexperience in the g~illa type warfare the Maoris Were particularly . 
skilled at; the skill and prowess of the Maori in warfare already demonstrated 
in the conflicts of the 'forties; the nature and conditions of the Taranaki 
terrain which favoured the Maoris (who were familiar with its features) and 
prevented the effective use of regular troops. However, it is possible to 
offer another explanation, one assuming more rationality, of the Examiner's 
unrealistic attitude at this time. Significantly, the Nelson Colonist 
published, on the day after the Examiner's 11extra11 appeared, an editorial 
arguing that the British defeat at Puke-ta-kauere pointed to the courage 
and strength of the Maoris, and, probably with the Examiner in mind, that 
The conceited priggishness of those who "never set 
squadron in the field" will be somewhat abated by 
the last intelligence from the battle field of New 
Zealand. 
The Colonist's editorial afte·r referring to the bad conditions existing in 
New Plymouth, described in a "private letter" from Taranaki reprinted on the 
opposite page, went on to place the responsibility on 
••• the authorities, be they who they may, who 
have entered on a warfare that has disorganized 
our society, and which they are not prepared 
vigorously to push to a conclusion •••• 44 
Earlier, in April, in discussing the Waireka fiasco, the Colonist suggested 
that the Governor had been unwise to commence hostilities against the Maoris 
while the Imperial forces were insufficient and warned against condemning those 
in charge of military affairs by saying "accusations of cowardice and incap-
acity are hard to substantiate, 1145 William Fox, the acknowledged "leader 
44. NC 6 July 1860. 
45. NC 6 April 1860. 
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of the opposi tion 11 to the Stafford ministry and a critic of the war policy, 
had not only condemned the war as 0 unjust and 1.mnecessary11 but, in his letter 
to the Wru_1ganui Chronicle reprinted by the Colonist, attacked the Govemor 
and 11 his advisers 11 for 11 plunging the colony into war and with so little . 
preparation" and thus placing the settlers 
absolutely at the mercy of tribes with whom 
King LWiremu Kingy7 was kno't'm to have intimate 
relations, and who might, if they had so chosen, 
have swept away the population of whole districts 
before their victims could almost. have heard that 
a war was impending. 46 
The British defeats at Waireka and Puke-ta-kauere were used by the 
Colonist to criticize the gover-~ment for precipitating conflict with the 
Maoris while the British forces were inadequate and the colony unprepared. 
The Colonist attacked the Governor and the Stafford mi~istry47 rather than 
the military command; the British defeats were not blamed on the incompetence 
of Gold but attributed to the strength and superior resources of the insurgent 
Maoris. The Colonist could take a dispassionate view of the military defeats, 
they could be used against the Central Government it opposed or to taunt its 
local opponent, the Examiner. On the other hand, the Exarniner, as a support-
er of the Stafford government, had to maintain at least a semblance of 
confidence in the Government.' s war policy and to defend it against the 
corrosive attacks of the Colonist. It is suggested, then, that the attitude 
4-6. Wanganui Chronicle, 27 April 1860. Letter reprinted in !Q 5 June 18600 
The Examiner never reprinted Fox's letter but the editor was aware of 
its argument as he referred to J!1ox 1 s suggestion that the question of 
native rights should be discussed in the General Assembly.. NE 30 Hay 
1860. Fox thought conflict with the J:ifaoris would have occ1,~±ed sooner 
or later but criticized the occasion tal~en to begin hostilities and the 
lack of military preparation before beginning the waro Fox to Godley, 
5 May 1860, Canterbury Papers. 
47. See also NC 28 September and 12 October 1860. 
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of the Examiner may be explained by its role as the Government's apologist 
in Nelson. To admit the inferiority and weakness of the British forces 
available, or to acknowledge military de feat at the hands of the Maoris, 
would be to concede the cogency of the political opposition's accusations 
of government foolhardiness and irresponsibility. Having made claims of 
the invincibility of the British soldier, the adequacy of a "numerous and 
well-appointed force 11 to cope with the situation, and of the inferiority of 
the Maoris, it is perhaps not surprising that the editor of the Examiner, 
confronted with the hard facts of military defeat, should attempt to construe 
it as merely a nominal defeat and to find a scapegoat· in Colonel Gold. 
The repulse suffered by the British at Puke-ta-kauere was a turning 
point of the Taranaki war in other ways as well. The Colonial Office 
realized the seriousness of the military situation in New Zealand and 
48 ordered two more regiments to the colony. Conscious that approval, both 
in the colony and at Home, of his actions depended on the defeat of Wiremu 
Kingi, Gore Browne became increasingly anxious; he wrote to Gold asking 
for "some unequivocal success" to reinstate British prestige. 49 Then, as 
if in answer to the Examiner's constant appeals, Colonel Gold was promoted 
and thus made ineligible to continue his command. 50 Major-General;,Pratt, 
commanding officer in Australia, decided to take command in New Zealand 
himself. Finally, the long awaited meeting of the General Assembly was 
set down for 25 July. 
48. Dalton, War and Politics, p. 113, 
49. Gore Browne to Gold, 7 July and 14 July 1860, ~, 1860 1 E-3C, p. 13. 
50. W.P. Morrell, British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age, (1969), 
P• 246. 
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Though the arrival of Major-General Pratt was seen as heralding the 
beginning of a more decisive military phase in the war, 51 it was not until 
the British success at Mahoetahi in November that the tide began to turn, 
restoring some colonial confidence in the military command. 52 Impatient 
for a military victory, neither the Governor nor the settlers appreciated, 
or understood, the slow process of consolidation and strengthening of the 
British position in Taranaki undertaken by Pratt during August and September:3 
Indeed, the Nelson Examiner began to chaff Pratt for his seeming pacifism: 
Is General Pratt any relation to John Bright; or is 
he in any way mixed up with the respectable peace-at-
all-price party? 
The Examiner went on to speculate that perhaps Pratt had a secret plan to 
encourage the natives to beqome over-confident of their- strength so that they 
would group together in the open and be destroyed at one-blow. 54 The editor 
was beginning to realize the difficult nature of guerilla warfare in Taranaki. 
Though he admitted. the Maori skill at bush warfare, the editor clung to the 
myth of the fearless and invincible British soldier bridled by timid 
commanders, The war 1 the editor argued, had so far shown 
that the Generals and Colonels in her Majesty's 
service are no match at present for even a much 
inferior native force in the bush and in their 
own peculiar style of warfare. 55 
However, on his arrival in New Zealand Pratt demanded a carte blanche 
and gave the impression that it was the Governor who was hindering the 
' 
51. NE 8 August 1860. 
52. NE 17 November 1860. 
53. See: Correspondence between Gore Browne and Pratt, AJHR, 1860, E-3c, 
pp. 13-24, H.R. Richmond to J.C. Richmond, 18 August 1860, Richmond-
Atkinson Papers, i, p. 626. See also: Rusden, History of New Zealand, 
ii, pp. 23-25; Sinclair, Origins of the Maori Wars, P• 230; Dalton, 
War and Politics, PP• 121-122. 
54. NE 17 September 1860. 
55. ~ 29 September 1860. See also 10 October and 17 October 1860. 
military in Taranaki. Pratt suggested that Gold had been on the defensive 
under instructions from the Governor. 56 The Examiner was caught again in 
its dilemma e,s the defender of a policy which it did not lmow fully and which 
was not being acted upon with determination or success. Pratt, it was 
argued, must be shielding his subordinates for criticism of the Governor 
we,s impossible. 57 The editor did not admit that there was 
an uneasy feeling abroad, an idea that it { the govern-
ment_,7 is still halting between two opinions, a want 
of frank outspoken determination in its cotmcils, and 
an apparent indecision in its conduct which paralyses 
action, invites distrust, and chills co-operation. 58 
Delivering an Robbesian discourse on the nature and function of government, 
the Examiner reminded its readers the,t 11 Government represents the collective 
force and power of the comnnmity11 , the Leviathan "must be supreme, to avoid 
being contenmtible. n 59 But, the editor hastened to add, criticism was quite 
60 consistent with a 11general support of the Government. 11 It was with relief 
that, on the eve of the Nelson elections for the 1e61 General Assembly, the 
Hxaminer could claim, against its opponents, that the parliamentary papers 
revealed a consistent government military policy and the inefficiency of 








NE 8 August 1860. Pratt obviously had seen the correspondence between 
Gore Bro'vme and Gold (.&Jllli, 1860, E-3c, pp. 3-5.) which had not yet been 
made public. 
NE 11 August 1860. 
8 August 1860. 
HE 11 August 1860, 
ITE 22 August 18600 
lifil 28 November 1860. 
Historians are generally agreed that Gold ·was not a good general; however, 
the published papers did reveal that on several occasions in Harch, April, 
and May, the Governor told Gold to maintain a defensive policy and to 
avoid attacking Wiremu Kingi. mill:, 1860, E-3c, PJ?• 3-5. Dalton, War 
and Politics, p. 111. Sinclair, Origins of the Haori Wars, pp.229-230. 
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Though Pratt's saps becawe famous objects of ridicule, they provided 
rratt with the means of successfully attacking Haori strongholds. 1'Jach 
damaging blow· Pratt struck against the :Maoris was enthusiastically acclaimed 
Re:ports that the missionaries were making peace moves 
were interpreted as indications from the I-Iaods that; beginning to respect 
64 the Bri tisl:l soldier, they ·saw the struggle as hopeless and wanted peace. 
The defeat of Kingi would leave the way clear to deal with the real problem -
th. ,- . . I". 11 •• t . th ·r · k t 65 e .i-Jaori i..ing 1-iovemen in - e I/ a1 ·a o. The arrival in lfarch of 
Lieutenant-General Came1·on, _neither inexpedenced, like Gold, nor old, as 
was Pratt, and eager for action, was seen as confirmation that at last the 
issue of British supremacy in the North Island ,;rnulcl be decided once and for 
all. 
From General Cameron's arrival we hope to date. 
a new era in New Zealand warfare, and to see the 
majesty of England's name vindicated, her power 
made terrible to those who have opposed her by 
force.... 66 
Carried away by his excitement and anticipation that the long awaited victory 
would soon be a reality, and confident that the Government he supported had 
decided on a policy to establish the ttQueen's supremacy by force of arms", 
the editor of the Examiner, in an editorial bristling with references to 
past humiliations and frustrations, did not attempt to hidehis latent racial-
ism - at last the wretched Horth Island native problem would be solved "and 
what the condition of the Ifa.ori may be when that object is effected, it would 
be a waste of time to conjecture. 1167• 
63. NE 17 November 1860; NE 9 Janua_!y and 6 ,~ebruary 1861. 
64. NE 27 February 1861. 
65. NE 6 February 1861. 
66, NE 30 Narch 1861. 
67. NE 23 March 1860. 
The prognostications of victory by the Examiner were to prove premature. 
As 1861 progressed each of the Examiner's hopes was dashed in turn. In 
April, the Tara.naki war suddenly came to an end but the rebels remained 
unpunished. On 5 July Stafford's ministry was defeated in a vote of no 
confidence and the Examiner's arch-political-enemy, William Fox, became 
premier. Hardly having had time to recover from the shock of' the fall of 
Stafford, the Examiner was staggered by the news of the recall of Gore Browne 
and the return of Sir George Grey as Governor. The expected invasion of 
the Waikato did not eventua.te in 1861, indeed it was not to come until July 
1863, when an editor of the Examiner, Alfred Domett, was himself premier. 
Instead of a Waikato war, at the end of the year, the South Island settlers 
faced the prospects of financing Grey's runanga scheme. The arrival of a 
new military commander in August 1860 did not fulfill the expectations that 
it would lead to the war being conducted with a new vigour and determination 
so as to bring it to a speedy successful conclusion. 
* * * * 
The General Assembly which opened in Auckland e.t the end of July 1860 
was to satisfy neither supporters of the government's war policy nor their 
humanitarian opponents. 68 No clear statement of policy was made by the 
Government; the ministry preferred not to take the opportunity of_fered to 
"account for its stewardship" and gave the impression of trying to with-hold, 
68. For an e.ccov.nt of the 1860 General Assembly see: Dal ton, War and 
Politi.cs, pp. 115-121, Dalton wrongly locates the Assembly in Wellington, 
see P• 115; Sinclai.rt Origins of the Maori Wars, pp. 208-215. Con-
temporary accounts, often biased, are given by: Saunders, History of 
New Zealand, i, PP• 398-418; Rusden, History of New Zealand, ii, PP• 10-
22; C.R. Carter, Life and Recollections of a New Zealand Colonist, 
(1866), ii, PP• 150-159- Saunders was a Nelson opponent of the Stafford 
ministry and Carter a member of the Wellington group of politicians 
supporting Fox. 
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rather than to convey, information. 69 Though Stafford's ministry was 
attacked for getting the colony involved in a war, the expected opposition 
attack on the war did not develop with any intensity. Indeed the opposition 
leaders, Fox and Featherston, had both made it clear before the Assembly ~met 
that though Gore Browne had blundered into the war he must be supported in 
order to bring the war to a successful conclusion. 70 In fact the members' 
attitudes towards the war merely reflected those of the majority of their 
constituents - all agreed it was an Imperial war to be vigorously prosecuted. 
However, as the session progressed the colonists' confidence was gradually 
eroded. From the Governor's opening speech and from the debates it was 
becoming increasingly apparent that neither the Governor nor the ministry 
were sure of their grounds for commencing hostilities.against Kingi, or that 
either could produce inexpensive measures likely to improve race relations 
once the fighting ceased. Indeed, the colonists soon became impatient of 
the lengthy debates on ne.tive affairs and the southerners feared that the 
war question would hinder settlement of their provincial problems. For 
instance, both Canterbury and Otago saw the opposition of the Wellington 
politicians to the war as lessening their chances of repealing the obnoxious 
New Provinces Act, before its effects were felt by themselves. 71 Fu~ther·, 
the official papers printed and presented to the Assembly added to the doubts 
about the validity of the Waitara purchase, and, more frightening, revealed 
that the Home government was neither as convinced as the New Zealand govern-
ment and colonists that the war was an 11imperial 11 rather than a 11settlers" 
war, nor were prepared to foot whatever costs it entailed. 
69. NE 15 August and 22 August 1860. CS 30 August 1860. 
70. Fox to Hall, 24 May 1860, Hall Papers. Featherston to McLean, 1 May 
1860, McLean Papers (type-script), 17 1 PP• 157-159. 
71. fil 19 May 1860. OW 6 October 1860. 
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It has been argv.ed above that the con tr1rnting approaches to, and 
opinions on, the problems presented by the 'I1arana1ci war and.its prosecµtion 
held by the two Nelson newspapers are reflections of the conflicting 
interests they represented in local provincial politics, and may be 
interp1·eted in relation to their atti tua.es to,mrds the Colonial ministry 
·hea,ded by Staffo1·d. During the provincial period, politics and personalities 
on 
in the provinces and at the centi~e impinged/ and affected one another, and 
this was particularly so in the case of Nelson. Though the nature of 
72 
politics in the 1850s has been analysed by the late D.G. Herron, there 
· has been little research, which is convincing, on the nature of l~uropean 
77i 
political conflic'b and divisions during the 'sixties. ,,, It would be worth-
,rhile, then, to make an attempt to clarify the nature of colonial politics 
a.uring -1 860 and 1 861 • A brief discussion of the nature of the political 
divisions way throw some light on both General .Assembly politics m1d local 
politics in the provinces, and may further help us to 1..mderstand Nelson 
opinion on the war and native policy during the lat~r i)art of 1860 and in 1861 o 
72. D.G. Herron, The Structure and Course of Hew Zealand Politics, 1853-5_.§_, 
unpublished PhD thesis, o.u., 1959; "Alsatia or Utopia? New Zeala..rid 
Society and Poli tics in the eighteen-fifties11 , Landfall, vol.13, no.4 
(December 1 959) t PPo 324-341 ; 11 Provincialism and Oen tralism 11 , Studies 
of a Small Democracy, (ed. Ro Chapman and K. Sinclair),. PP• 10-32. 
73. 1d .P. I.forrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand 1852-76, pp. 115-1 21 • 
Professor Iforrell' s book was written in 1932, the second edition, 
published in 1964, is unrevised. See also !llorrell, 11 The Colonial Period", 
Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics, (ed. R.H._Chapman), pp. 7-12. 
A recent study of New Zealand politics·between 1858 and 1861 using the 
structural analysis approach and purporting to be a sequel to the work 
by Herron is G,A. Wood, The Political Structure ofl New Zealand, 1858-61, 
unpublished PhD thesis, O.U., 1965. 
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It is tempting to interpret the conflict in the 1860 General Assembly 
as being between two distinct "parties"; the "centralists" led by Stafford 
and the 11provincialists 11 led by Fox. 74 But such an interpretation tends 
to elevate "centralism" and provincialism!! into opposing constitutional 
principles, and tc/4:ive to the political rivalries more constitutional 
significance than they actually had at the time. 75 Herron, in his stu.dies 
on the politics of the eighteen-fifties, demonstrated that centralism and 
provincialism were alternative methods of satisfying personal and provincial 
aspirations; provincial rivalries were of more importance than rivEJ,lry 
between constitutional principles - the more general concept being evoked 
or used as a means to fonmrcr provincial interests. 76 It is suggested that 
a similar interpretation may be placed on politics in the early eighteen-
sixties. 77 The Lyttleton Times in 1860 thought the terms 11provincialist 11 
and "centralist" should be dropped as they were misleading, the real object 
of the politician was to satisfy the needs of his own locality. 78 Writing 
71+, Horrell, Provincial System, pp. 117-120. Norrell, "The Colonial Period", 
Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics, pp. 9-10. Sinclair, Origins of 
the lfa.ori Wars, p. 211. Sinclair, Naori Land League, pp. 4-4-45. Wood, 
Political Structure, pp. 111-133. Dr Wood provides a detailed analysis 
of the division lists in 12,60 but falls into the shucturalistic fallacy 
and exaggerates the existence of two parties in the General Assembly • 
.An historian should not only ask how men voted but also wl}x men voted 
the way they did. 
75. ,See: Iforrell, ibid.; Sinclaiit', ibid.; Wood, Political Structure, p. 116, 
writes ."The centralists tended to have a 11 high 11 view of government, •••• 
T:1e ul tra-provincialists wished to· reduce the Gover-.aor 1 s powe1's ••.• 11 
But cf. D.G. Herron, "Provincialism and Centralism 11, i3tuclies of a Small 
Democracy, pp. 10-32. 
76. See in particular: Herron, ttProvincialism and Centralism 11 , SD2.!_ci t., 
pp. 29-30; and The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 
PP• 631-6l1.0. 
77. But cf. Wood, op,cit., p.111: 11 ••• the centralist-provincialist explan-
ation of political division which Dr Herron strongly criticises, in 1260 
is not a school test book misconception, but the basic factor in genera.l 
politics. 11 
78. LT 4 Fe·bruB.ry 1260. 
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in 1869, J?rederick Weld. considered the intense provincial natu1°e .of 
with 
politics/ members going to the General Assembly 11as bands of provincial 
delegates", to be the ca.use of the ministerial instability of the 'sixties. 79 
Stafford and Fox provided alternative loci of power 1°ather than alternative 
constitutional principles. Ca.nterbury and Otago politicians generaJJ;yopposed 
Sta,fford because the lfffw Provinces Act, for which Stafford was responsible 
in 1858, presented a threat to Otago with her vigorous Murihiku separation 
movement, and a danger to Canterbury with a nas·cent movement for separation 
t m., eo a Lunaru. However in 1860, Cantexbury and Otago supported the Stafford 
ministl0y and saved it from defeat; Canterbury in orde1° to secure its railway 
and loan bill, 81 Otago because Fox 1 s expressed views on native affairs 1vere 
distasteful. 82 Nor were the coBrnon settlers interested in constitutional 
issues as such, or even 11national 11 issues; the 1860-61 General Elections 
wexe dull and apathetic affairs, fought neither over the war issue nor over 
the balance of power between central and provincial governments. 83 
Politicians during the provincial pexiod were divided by personal 
ambitions, provincial conflicts, and provincial interests, rather than by 
political principles and ideals rigidly held. There was in the colony no 
79 •. F.A. Weld, Notes on New Zealand Affairs, (1869), PP• 64-65. 
80. PD, 1858-60, passim: PP• 85-89, Cargill; PP• 50-51, Olliver; p. 109, 
Moorhouse. 
81. Fox to Godley, 4- September 1860, Canterbury Papers. Mrs. Selwyn to Hrs. 
Abraham, 4 August 1860, Selwyn Letters. T.B. Gillies in OW, 14 December 
1860. 
82. OW 16 June 1860. 
83. See G.A. Wood, "The Electorate's Verdict - the electoral system and the 
New Zealand General Election of 1860-61 11 , The Feel of Truth, (ed. Peter 
Munz, 1969), pp. 1 39-158, see especially pp. 149-155. 
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firm basis for political partieso The lack of co~flicting principles, the 
. e4-
social homogeneity of the General. Assembly, and the small number85 but 
high turnover of members86 all acted against the development of a systematic 
par~J combat in the Assembly. Instead of two.distinct and distinguishable 
parties contesting clear cut issues, there were a multitude of cliques coal-
escing int_o caucuses and forming factions, or disintegrating into individuals 
d . t 87 as expe ien. At the close of the 1860 General Assembly Eenry Sewell 
wrote that though it was usual and perhaps convenient to talk of two extreme 
parties, centralist and provincialist, in fact 11 everybod3r fights for himself" 
88 in the Assembly. Hany factors, petty and important, divided politicians 
and influenced their voting behaviour: the urge for power, personal animos-
ities, local politic~l rivalries, religious, national and social prejudices, 
84. Wood, Political Structure, p. 74. 
85. Thomson, Story of Hew Zealand, ii, p. 2~-3, wrote that the small number 
of members in the General Assembly meant that some measures were settled 
out of doors and "others by whispering within". Dr Monro, PD, 1854-55, 
P• 39 argued that a party system did not develop because there were not 
enough 11men of station, independence, and leisure, as candidates for 
public office from motives of honourable ambition ••• , 11 consequently 
instead of party strife there was 11 the strife of individuals. 11 
86. Wood, Political Structure, pp. 64-65. 
870 But cf. Wood, op.cii., PP• 121-1360 It may be suggested that political 
conflict during the provi_ncial period in Hew Zealand, in the absence of 
definable pa2•ties, is best described as 11f'action politics" using the 
terr:1:Lnolog-y of 11factions, cliques, juntas, and caucuses 11 developed by 
William Hisbet Chambers to describe pre-party politics in the United 
States during the 1770s and 1780s. See: William lrisbet Chambers, 
Political Parties in a New Nation, (1963), pp. 17-33, see especially 
p. 26, The term "clique" is usecl frequently in this chapter. The 
term is used in the sense defined by Chambers, that is to describe a 
pre-party political grouping "whose relationships depended upon a 
family, a commanding indtvidual, or a close coterie of personal 
associates." 
88. Sewell to John Hall, 23 November 1860, Hall Papers. 
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jobbery and patronage. 
The basic ingredients of many political manoeuvres 
seem to have been individuals seeking personal 
power, provincial parties anxious to thwart 
political opponents ••• , and provincial blocs 
concerned ••• with the interests of a particular 
province. 89 
In 1860 support for the Government came basically from Taranaki 
and Nelson, whose representatives formed the nucleus of the Stafford-
Richmond caucus in the General Assembly. But to describe this caucus as 
a party "joined by common principles - principally that of maintaining a 
unitary and not a federal state 1190 is to overlook more obvious reasons its 
supporters had. Taranaki's position in the North Island was similar to 
Nelson's in the South. They were both relatively weak and landless compared 
to those provinces with which they were united by geography, and they both 
exercised a disproportionate amount of influence in the central government 
- Taranaki through C.W. Richmond, the Colonial Treasurer and Minister for 
Native Affairs, and Nelson through the premier, E.W. Stafford, a former 
Nelson superintendent. Taranaki support, during the war, of the Government 
upon which it depended for funds and troops is hardly surprising. In actual 
fact Stafford's "centralist" party was a Nelson provincial clique supported 
by Taranaki. The Stafford ministry represented a brief period of Nelson 
power at the centre of Government. The Nelson members in the 1860 General 
Assembly were linked not by principles but by landowning interests, mainly 
89. Herron, "Provincialism and Centralism'', Studies of a Small Democracy, 
P• 30. 
90. Wood, Political Structure, p. 115. 
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91 in Harlborough, and by their opposition, in Helson provincial politics, 
to Jobn Robil1Son, the Snperintendent, who unsuccessfully contested the City 
seats against Donett and Stafford in the 1860-61 elections. The Nelson 
02 
representatives we1°e collectively dubbed the t1Helson Contingent".:,, ancl the 
11 Stafford Clique 11 • 93 'l'he solidarity of Helson support of the Stafford 
ministry was broken in the. 1861 General Assembly by the election of Alfred 
Smmders, who defeated1Kelling, in Waimea, significantly a stronghold of 
aL1-
Robinson supporters,.., and by the clef eat of Weld by W ,E. E"IJes, an opponent 
of the run-holding faction in Marlborough provincial politics. 95 Cn the 
eve of the opening of the 1860 General Assembly, the Helson Examiner was 
confident that the Helson representatives would support the executive in 
11 a decidea. and straightforward fashion u. 96 
91 • .All but H.E. Curtis, who was a merchant, owned land in i'.furlborough. 
·wood, Political S·i:;ructure, pp. 366-367, lists occupations of the 
• representatives. Hcintosh, Ifarlboro_u,.gh, pp .. 416-422, lists . · .griginal 
section holders and run-holders in Ifarlborough. The Helson representat-
ives in the 1860 Assembly were: IT.E. Curtis, Alfred Domett, J.F.A. 
Kelling, David lfonro, E.W. Staffo1°d, }P.A. Weld, and J.B. Wemyss. 
92, NC 23 November 1860 carried a back page election advertisement which 
simply read 91 BEi'iARE Olr THE NELSON CONTHJGENT11 • 
93. NC 19 October 1860 warned the 11workers of Nelson 11 against the 
aristocratic and despotic 11Stafford Clique 11 o 
921-. See NE 10 December 1856, for results of the 1856 Superintendency elections. 
95, Hcintosh, lfar_JJ:2.Q_rough, pp. 209-212. Eyes was later to become the fifth 
superintendent of Harlborough from 1865 to 1870. Weld was elected in 
1861 for Cheviot against the opposition of the Lyttleton Times which 
regarded him as a Nelson and Stafford 11nominee 11 • LT 6i 23 and 27 
February 1861., Weld was a Catholic and found his religion often a 
handicap, especially in the was:e;,-ish atmosphere of Welson. See Her1·on, 
Structure and Course of Politics, p. 250; Wood, 11 The Electorate's 
Verdict 11 , Feel of Truth, p, 1 52, 
96. NE 25 July 1860. 
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Tne opposition to the Stafford ministry tended i;o coalesce into a 
caucus led by the 11 T'.aree 1!11 s 11 : William J!'ox, who was regarded as the 11leader 
of the 01Jposition11 , Isaac Featherston, the 1{ellington superintendent, ~,.11d 
William Fitzherbert. '.I1l1e nucleus of the opposition caucus was provided by 
a clique of Wellington poli ticia,ns97 who were successful as a faction in 
Wellington Provincial politics. The opposition of the Wellington clique to 
Stafford may be explained in terms of a i'lellii:.gton v. Nelson provincial 
rivalry; however the 1858 Mew Provinces Act, passed in their absence, which 
detached the prosperous Ifu,wkes Bay cU.stdctf:c from their provincial control, 
l)rovided them with a compelling reason for opposing ,Stafford and a cause with 
which to rally support. The Helson Colonist tended to sup1Jort the Fox 
clique because of their common opposition to both the St2,fford clique and the 
Hew Prov:Lnces Act. Because the opposition in the .Assembly was based on 
the repeal of the l'ifew Provinces Act, which protected the run-holding interests 
in r.'Iarlborough from the Helson Provincial government, the Nelson. representat-
ives had an added reason for supporting .Stafford and the Government. 
Little really needs to be said about the Nelson members' speeches on 
the '.faranaki war in the 1860 Assembly. The opinions they expressed differed, 
even in details, only slig~tly from one another, and, not surprisingly, 
paralleled the opinions expressed by the Nelson Examiner, the mouthpiece of 
the Stafford clique. '11.he Nelson representatives, as supporters of the 
Government, merely embellished and developed the arguments put forward by 
C. W. Richmond in opening the debate on the Native Offenders Bill on 3 Aug1J.st. 
97. The members of the clique were: Alfred Brandon, C.R. Carter, Charles 
Clifford (the Speaker of the House of Representatives), .Featherston, 
Fitzherbert, Fox, .A.W. Renall, and W.B. Rhodes. 
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Two basic assump,cions lay behind the Gover.ament's case. The first 
was that Kingi was acting as the leader of a Taranaki land league, and the 
second, that the Ma.eris were attempting to throw off British authority and 
had to be pi..1t down vigorously before the disaffection spread. Wiremu Kingi, 
Richmond and Government supporters argued, was a rebel chief, who neither 
asserted nor possessed any·title to the land offered by Teira, but had 
objected to the sale as the leader of the Taranaki land league; the 
Governor had not gone to war with Y..ingi, but, by his ncontumacious defiance", 
Kingi had gone to war with the Governor. Little attempt was made to 
understand Maori customs; the humanitarians' contention that Kingi's tribal 
rights had been ignored was countered by the argument that to recognize 
native rights based on chieftainship would be to admit 11might was right"; 
the Maori concept of 11mana 11 was not understood, being interpreted as 11 the 
right 9f the strong over the weak 11 and "nothing but the old savage rule of 
the strong hand; •strength on one side and fear of that strength on the 
other. 1198 In any case, it was argued, any rights Kingi may have possessed 
were submerged by the fact of his rebellion; the question had become whether 
Kingi had the right to offer armed resistance to a peaceful survey of land, 
whether or not the land had been fairly purchased. 99 To Dr Monro , ~and 
League and King Hovement were but different names for the same thing·and ,· 
indicated the growth in the Haori mind of a "feeling of independence and 
insubordination, and contempt for the authority of Government. 11 Kingi used 
the Wai tara purchase as a pretext for challenging the Government. Though 
98. See in particular: RQ, 1858-60, p. 200, Weld; p. 212, Domett. See 
also Domett in HE 8 Decenber 1860, address to public meeting. 
99. PD 185E,-60, p. 226, Stafford. Also l~gi t., PP• 253-254, debate 
between Fox and Richmond over whether the survey should have begun 
before the purchase was completed. 
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the Wai tara purchase ,·ms no doubt valid, tl1e land dispute was really 
insi6mficant alongside the fact of native rebellion. 1 OO The only policy 
possible was the vigorous prosecution of the war until the Queen's supr~macy 
t , .. l d101 was re-es ao.Lis 1e • 
'11he weak lJOint of the Government 1 s case was the assumption that Kingi 
h l, 
was acting as the leader of a Taranaki Land League, the existence of which 
102 has since been sho1m to be a mJrth. Its sti0 ongest argument was to 
point to the existence of a native rebellion in the Colony and to argue 
11 tha,t the welfare of both races of Her 1-fajesty' s subjects peremptorily 
regui:res a vigorous prosecution of the war to a, successful conclusion., 11103 
On the vigorous prosecution of the war even the pa,rliamentary opponents of 
the Govermnen t I s war policy were agreed end revealed the weaknefJS of their 
opposi tion. 104 Government s-up1Jorters ~rere well aware of the opposition's 
reluctance to talrn their argument, that the invalidity of the Wai tara pur-
chase made the ·war unjust, to its logical conclusion. Weld twitted Feather-
ston, 
It is incomprehensible to me, Sir, how· anyone can at 
once say that the war is unjust and yet urge its 
vigorous prosecution • , • , 
and the opposition on its refusal to vote at all on Stafford's resolution 
affix-re:l.fo~; the culpability of 'ifiremu Xint~i and urg:1,ng.the vigorous prosecution 
of the war. 105 
100. PD, 1858-60, p. 339, 
101. :J.1he Government's case uas first stated by 17ichmond, .@, 1858-60, pp. 
178-11:37, '.11.he major contri1mtions by the Helson members to the debates 
on the war and native affa:\.rs were: PD, H?58-60, pp. 200-202, Held; 
PP• 211-214, Domett; 11po 223-228, Stafford PP• 255-258, 338-339, :Monro o 
102 Sinclair, The Eaori Land League, ppo 27-39. 
103. PD, 1858-60, p. 322, Stafford. See also loc.cito, pp. 255, 338, Nonro. 
104. See for exam1Jle: fD, 185c-60, PPo 186, 345, Carleton; pp. 188, 195, 
li1orsaith; p. 222, li'eatherston. 
105. l']., 1E58-6C, PJ?• 334-335. Fo1, Stafford's :resolution se_e loc.cH., 
p. 322. . 
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Realizing that the wealmess of the Government's posj_tion lay in its 
attempt to justify the Wai tara J>urchase, both the Helson representatives 
and the ;tfolson Examiner became impatient with the debates on the origins and 
justice of the war. The colony being in flames, it was time to stop talking 
d t · t' th f. ' t' 106 Tl E ' f lt tl G .,_ mak. an ge on wi 11 e ign 1ng·. 1e xanuner e · 1e over-.amenu was ing. 
too many qoncessions to their opponents on the question of the justice of the 
war, and thus giving the impression of being men without strong convic.tions. 
Indeed, there was a simple justification for the war: reason and argument 
having failed with the Ifaoris, 11right is ascertained by mightn, the only 
possible tribunal in this case was the battle-field, and thus it would be 
better fo1~ all if the issue was decided g_uickly .. 107 The editor of the 
Examiner counselled the Government to avoid cl.iscussion of the justice of the 
war, and to emphasise the fact that the Queen's authorit-y had been blatantly 
resisted, murders had been conlllli tted;.: and phmcJ.ering had occurred. In 
this way, the editor thought, the ministers would 
rally around them their supporters upon broad and 
intelligible grounds, instead of provoking discussions 
upon questions which must wait for their solution 
until open insurrection has been trodden down and 
extingi2ished. 108 
The debates on native affairs in the 1860 General Assembly may be 
divided into three phases. ~J.1h.e first phase, concerned mainly with the 
origins and justice of the war, began with the debate on the Native Offenders 
Bill, which proposed a trade embargo against the disaffected tribes, and 
lasted from 3 August, when the ·Bill was moved by C .W. Richmond, until the 
withdrawal of the Bill on 25 September.1 og During this first phase there 
106. J:12, 1858-1E.160, PP• 255,258, Monro; P• 334, Weldo 
107 o ]] 29 .,:iugust 1860. 
108o IHI: 19 September 1 B60. 
109. PD, 1858-60, PP• 178-230, 324-389, 466-.!.~97, 575-583. 
was also the debate on Carleton's :motion for a select coi-a:1i ttee of inq_uiry 
. t th t t 11 O · h d ' in o e ci1•c1.,uns ances leading o war, wlnc en ed in the decision to 
call Archdeacon Hadfie14 and Donald McLean to the Bar of the Bouse to give 
. , 111 evia.ence. At the conclusion of the Hadfield-McLean hearing, Stafford 
rnoved, on 16 August, his resolution affirming the justice of Gore Bro1me' s 
112 action at Wai tara and u1•gi11g the vigorous prosecution of the war. '11lie 
second phase, almost concurrent with the first, revolved around the debate 
on twelve resolutions moved by Henry Seuell on 10 Augu.st. The resolutions 
1·t J.. d .,__ ... t . . l n -"' t . t· 1 · 113 d a ·c emp ve vO se v ou some princip es I or .Lu ure na i ve po-icy, an we1'e 
finally adopted in a very watered down fo.rm on· 14 Septembei•.114 The 
Assembly's flagging interest in the native question was suddenly revived by 
the news that the Imperial Parliament was debating a bill to set up a Ifative 
Council for Hew Zealand. 0-11 2 October ]'ox proposed a remonstrance against 
Imperial interference in colonial affairs, a select committee of both Houses 
was set up to discuss the remonstrance and to consider a colonial scheme for 
a Hative Council. .An al terna ti ve Native Cotmcil Bill was drmm up and 
passed by the Assembly on 1 Wovember.115 However the Assembly had been 
rathel' precipitous in its action, for even before the local Native Council 
Bill was passed it was lear11t that the Imperial Parliament had in fact thrown 
out its Native Council Bill, before the original news of the Bill had even 
reached He1,r Zealand.116 The speed and unanimity with which the Assembly 
11 0. PD, 1858-60, PP• 232-245, 251 -270. 
111. PD, 1858-60, PP• 269-270. 
112. Jfor the Hadfield-EcLea.n hearing see: PD, 185£:-60, pp. 285-306. IPor 
the debate on Stafford's resolution see: loc.cit 01 PP• 321-345. 
113. See RQ, 18$8-60, pp. 283-224. 
114. PD, 1858-60,,pp. 271-28/.i-, 307-320, 351-362, 365-375, 459-464, 497-501, 
514.,.516. 
115, E12., 1858-60, pp. 610-625, 628-629, 656-657, 702-105, 785-787, 802. 
116. Iforrnll, British Colonial Policy, pp. 250-255; Dal ton, T,•Tar and Politics, 
PP• 11 9-1 21 • 
122. 
· passed the Jl,fa ti ve Co1mcil Act, creating an aclvisory ·Ha ti ve Co1.mci 1, 117 and 
t ' . ' t . 1 . l . 1 ' t . t . nf . 11 8 t d tl accep ing m11ns eria responsi '.l1_1 y in na ive aI airs, gran e 1e 
threat of Imperial interference, may be seen as a demonstration of the 
basic agreement on the natiye q1,,1.estion of the majori t-y of the ne:01bers. 
'11he:ce was an element of 1mre1:1,lity in the debates on native affairs 
as if neither the Government nor the Opr,osi tion -was. convinced of :.i:ts 
01'm argwnents. Significantly, the Cpposi tion did not question m:i..nisterieJ. 
statements a.bout the Land League or the King IIovement but tended to attack 
the Government for taking the initiative, in various ways, in beginning the 
war on questionable grou17.ds: The Wellington clique were no·t humanitarians 
or any more sympathetic towards the l'IE,ori than some of the Government 
supporters or mj_nisters; their opposition to the Government's war polic;;r 
was merely :political, a move in their political ge,me e,gainst the ,Stafford 
clig_ue. For instance Henry Sewell noted that the Wellington members took 
part in debates _on native affe,irs only when t1they were roused by some 
t 't f f t· f' l t 11119 oppor uni y or a ac ion 1g1. 
* * * * 
117·. A majority of twenty had previously rejected Sewell I s resolution calling 
for the establishment of a Native Council, see PD, 1858-60, pp. 365-374. 
118. The Stafford ministry had consistently opposed any attempt to cha11ge 
the existing administration of native affairs. Dal ton, War and Poli tics, i 
pp. 32-40, 120; Sinclair, Ori,gins of the I•ia,ori Wars, pp. 94-95. · 
119. Sewell, Jour-.o.al, iv, J?• 110, 19 August 1860. 
123. 
The meeting of the General Assembly provided a great deal of 
information on the origins of the war and on the problems of native 
policy, both in the past and for the fu tureo However, the Nelson newspapers 
did not interpret and disseminate this information impartially. The two 
Nelson news1Japers followed the proceedings closely. Both published reports 
of the debates, both printed, often at great length, the speeches of many of 
the members, and both reprinted, usually in full, some of the official 
papers presented to the Assembly. Given· the pe,rtisan nature of the news-
papers it is, perhaps, not very surprising that much of the reporting and 
commenting was one-sided. Speeches of opponents were simply not reported 
at all, or else they were published in very abbreviated form. In its 
reports of the debates in the General Assembly the EXf!-]dner gave lengthy 
extracts or reprinted in full the speeches of Govermaent supporters, content-
120 ing itself with passing mention of the Opposition speakers. 
explained its policy thus: 
We shall confine ourselves to noticing those parts 
only which strike us as throwing any fresh light 
upon the subjects, or as putting the facts already 
knovm in a new point of view. 1 21 
The ExaDiner 
In this respect the Colonist had a bette1· record. Its editor, being more 
reluc.tant to comment on the issues ra,ised by the debates on native affairs, 
was content to fill many of his edi toriaJ.s -..ri th factual reports or exh1 acts 
of speeches 1;1ade fror.1 both sides of the House. The Colonist tencled to se,ve 
120. See for exanple: N:gl_ 22 .August, 1 SepteE1ber, 15 September 1 c,60. 
Editorials on the deba,te on the Native 0:f:s"enders Bill. So;'Jetimes 
editorials consisted of extracts from speeches. 
121 • 1J! 1 5 September 1 E,60. 
124. 
most of its harsh coru:nents fo1" the Eelsor:. representatives' aJctitu.de to 
provincial issues, for example on the Helson f'rovincial Council sponsored 
bill :for Land in Compensation of Nelson ;Settlers, which the :Helson clique 
122 in the Assembly supported only half-heartedly. The J:-:'.elson newspa1Jers 
were provided ·with the information it had demanded before the Assembly met, 
their reaction and interpre_tation of tnis information was determined, like 
their reaction to the military conduct of the war, by their position on 
political issues both in the 11rovince and in the larger political arena 
provided by the Assembly. 
Both the Examiner and the Colonist, in common with the members of the 
General Assembly and the majority of the settlers, were agreed that the war 
was an Imperial war and should be prosecuted vigorously. Both accepted 
without question the Government's rationalization that Wiremu Kingi was 
acting as the leader of the Taranaki Land League. 'l1o the Colonist, King'i 
was "a contumacious native chief - a member of the continually increasing 
1,-,7 
anti-land-selling league 11 • c..:; The editor of the Examiner saw the Land 
League as part of a conspiracy by the Taranaki IiJa.oris to drive the English 
. t tl 12~-in O le seao 
Though the Colonist accepted. the premise that Kingi 1vas acting as a 
land leaguer it was less willing to accer)t the Government I s conclusion from 
122. NC 5 October and 19 October 1 e6o. The bill was to provide compensation 
for i1:rrirlg;r2.nts affected by the failure of the Hew Zealand Company to 
fulfif1 its promises, and rnainly involved compensating free passage 
inuuig·rants who were 1.mable ·:to find work when the;y arrived in Helson 
in the eighteen-forties. See PD 185E-60, pp. 1+17-1+22, 605-606. 
123. HO 28 Septembe1° 1860. 
124. I:T}& 5 September 1860. See also NE 19 t3eptember and 26 Se1)tember 1260. 
this, that Kingi was a,c ting illegally and was challenging the authority 
of the Cro1,m. It was not convinced that the Government, with its land 
league argument, had answered the doubts raised by Bishop Selwyn and William 
125 Jfartin as to the validity of the Wai tara purchase. By accusing Kingi 
of being a land leaguer the Government was merely avoiding the difficult 
question of native land rights. The editor of the Colonist supported the 
idea of ·a judicial enquiry into the nature of native land rights ancl to 
investigate 11 what ways the natives can legally enter into combinations to 
refuse to sell any more land to the Government without calling into question 
• ,1 
the sup11 emacy of the Croim. 126 The Colonist even went further and, 
accepting 'i'lilliam Nartin' s interpretation of the Maori King Novement, 127 
regarded the King Iriovement as little mo1°e than the decision of the Waikato 
Haoris 11 to make a stand against what the natives considered to be the 
alienation of their territorial possessionso 11 128 It may be suggested that 
the Colonist's liberal a t·bi tude towards the Ifaori Land League and Ifaori 
combinations against land selling was a reflection of its an 'ti-landom1ing 
and working-cla,ss leanings. '11he term "league 11 and 12aboriginal trade 
m1ionism 11 would. have less evil connotations to the readers of the Colonist 
than they would have for the more genteel and land-owning readers of the 
Exarn.iner. 128 The intention of the Colonist was to show the inadequate 
125. liQ. 19 June and 18 September 1 cl&0. 
126. NC 19 Ji.me 1860. 
1270 See: AJHR, 1860, E-1, pp. 27-29; William Nartin, The Taranaki Question: 
(1860), PP• 90-91. 
128. NC 18 September 1860. See also NC 2 October 1860. IPor a modern 
interpretation of the King Ifovement that agrees with the Colonist see: 
Sinclair, Qrigins of the F[aori Wars, pp. 75-76; H.K. P. Sorrenson, 11 T.l:ie 
Maori King Movement, 1858-1885 11 , Studies of a Smal 7 Democracy, pp. 33-39, 
129. For the connotations placed on 11 league 11 , 11 combination 11 , and 11 trade 
unionism" by the colonial gentry, see: Sinclair, Maori Land League, 
PP• 39-43. 
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grounds upon which the war was begun, ancl to oreakdo1m the Government's 
ar,gu.ment that it was started to defend B:ri tish sovereignty. 
Teira' s offer of the Uai ta1°a, the Colonist argued, was merely a move . 
in a Taranald tribal feud which Kingi countered by refusing to sell. 
Further, the Colonist continued, Gore BrovrDe should_ have been aware thaJi:; he 
. 130 was being involved ii1 a tribal dispute, though he was in a dilemma: 
He had to decide whether he would fight with the 
dissatisfied settlers with his 1fotive Comr.i.issioner 
at their head, or avail himself of· the proferred 
sale of a portion of le.nd which he lrnew Has a 
matter of dispute l)etween the party wishing to 
se11·and W. King. 131 
Kingi 's resista1ice to the survey of the disputed piece of lEmd, not completely 
unjustifiable, should have been treated the same way as the resistance to 
railway surveys in England - the riot act rather tha.'1 a declaration of war. 
should have been read to Kingi and his "band of harmless old women. 11 132 
Gore Brovme had allowed himself to be forced into the wa,:r by interested 
agitators, namely the Taranaki land-sharks. 133 
'l'he ,9oloni::J's argument, then, was that the wa1° had been entered into 
on inadequate grounds: the valicli t3r of the purchase was in doubt, the title 
to the land was disputed; the Lm1d·Leagu.e was of doubtful illegality and 
could not be used to turn Kingi into a rebel. Wiremu Kingi we,s a rioter, 
if anything, rather than a rebel against British authority. 
11 goaded on by a clique 11, 1 Y+ had over-responded to Kingi I s action and had 
130. :r:;c 21 September 1260. The Colonist referred to Gore Browne ts despatch 
of 29 ]:,\arch 1859 given to AJHR, 1860, E-3, pp. 2-3. See also Sinclair, 
Origins of the Maori Wars, pp. 141-142. 
131. NC 21 September 1860. 
132. NC 2 April 1861. 
133. NC 28 Septe2ber 1860 
begun the war while the armed forces in the colony·were insufficient.135 
By claiming the Governor h.s,d been influenced by interested settlers the 
Colonist was able to attack the Stafford ministry which it described as a 
Taranaki 11family compactn joined by the 11Nelson Contingentn,136 from "the 
stronghold of run-holders, merchants, and, though last, not least, of money-
lenders. 11 137 The Stafford ministry was criticized for failing, as the 
138 Governor's advisers, to make itself master of the native problem and was 
blamed for 11a war of races, which, in self-justification, it has been asserted 
must inevitably have come on some time •••• 11139 However, in blaming the 
Stafford ministry for the war, the Colonist soon found itself in a dilemma. 
It had been assumed that being an Imperial war all the expenses would 
be paid by the Imperial Government:140 . 
the mother country ••• is bound, not only 
to take upon itself all the cost, charge, 
and expense incident to such a state of things, 
but amply to compensate the various European 
settlers for any losses they may sustain 
during the contest between its representative 
and the native population, 141 
Both William Fox, the Opposition leader, and the Nelson Examiner had assumed 
Britain would pay the cost of the war, but both had emphasised the Governor's 
complete res:ponsi bili ty for the war because the Colonial ministry had no 
135, HC 28 September 1860. 
136. NC 2 April and 11 June 12'61 • 
1 37. NC 11 June -1 861 • 
138, li.Q. 18 September 1860. 
139. UC 23 Hovember 1860. 
140. Henry Sewell was one of the feu who thought it wa,s absurd to think the 
Imperial Government would pay for the war. Sewell, Journals, iv, 
p. 67, 21 Hay 1860. 
141 • UC 1 June 1 860. 
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share in the administration of native affairs.142 The Examiner reminded 
its readers that a,s lone; as the colony did not demand the manage11ent of 
native affairs the expenses of the war would be borne by the British 
Government. 143 It was important to maintain the idea tha,t the w2,r was a 
t1,mr not of the settlern, but of the British Government. 11144 In emphasising 
the Stafford ministry's role in fo1°cing the Gover-nor to proceed with the 
purchase of disputed land, and in rejecting the Gover:nr:1ent' s case based on 
the illegality of the Land League, the editor of the Colonist fou.ncl it more 
difficult to maintain the fiction of an Imperial war to uphold British 
sovereignty rather_ thBn a settlers' war to acg_ui1°e land, a war fo1° which 
the colony 110uld have to accept at least some responsibility and expenses. 
'Hle.t the Colonial Office was gradually begim1ing to_ thinl( along these lines 
,ms made ap1Ja.rent in Lewi,s's despatch to Gore Browne presented to the General 
145 Assembly on 25 September. J\wt as the editor of the Examiner had 
attempted to ra.tionalize the lack of military success by blaming incompetent 
military comma.nders, the editor of the Colonist blamed the war on the British 
Govermnen t because it had appointed incom:peten t Governors: 
the B1°i tish Government cannot escape the 
responsibilities of its own acts, so much 
increased by the incompetency of most of 
those sent out to govern the colonies, and 
the grasping selfishness of L1ruw of the 
interested advisers chosen by such GoveYnors. 146 
142. Fox to Godley, 5 I!Iay 1860, Canterbury Papers. HE 26 1'-'.iay, 25 July, 
1 9 ,'September 1860. 
143D NE 29 September 1860. 
141-i-o HE 19 September 1860 • . 
145. G.C. Lewis to Gore Browne, 26 July 1860, AJHR, 1860, E-3B, pp. 6-7. 
146. IQ f.2 October 1860, The editor was commenting on Lewis's despatch 
which was published by the Colonist on 9 October. 
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In this way the Colonist attempted to attack the ,':3tafford clique vrhile denying 
the war was a colonial wa,r, the costs of which woula. have to be bor-.i:1e by . . 
147 the colony. 
When the detested Stafford ministry finally fell from power in July 
1861 1 lf-S the Colonist was able to concentrate its attack on the Governor.149 
Some of these attacks Here·marked by a certain viTUlence: once the editor 
alluded to Walpole's ~on drovming himself because he was incapable in office 
and reminded Gore Browne'that his career had been "inefficient, inglorious 
and disastrous.n150 'l'he Colonist made no attempt t6 disguise its pleasure 
wl10n news was received that Gore Browne had been 1°ecalled: 
No one can rejoice more than ourselves that 
Gore Erowne ha,s to quit the field, and we 
care not who may replace him; a worse oi:ie 
we could not have - a man who would neither 
fight nor let it alone..; who drifted into 
this inglorious, but expensive war, 9... 151 
The antipathy of the Colonist towards Gore Brmme may thus be explained 
pa::ctly as a by-product of the Colonist's attack on the Staffo1~d clique, for 
which the Governor's predilections were well known. lrurther, it may be 
explained by the Colonist's disillusionment in the war policy, and concern, 
once it was obvious that the war would not be a quick ancl cheap solution to 
the native problem, to saddle the British Government with the respor:.sj.bility 
and expenses of the wa1,. 
147. NC 9 July 1861. 
148. Iilor comments see HC 12 Jul~, 1861 • 
149. See: NC 12 ,Tuly, 23 July, 6 August, 9 August, 13 August and 20 August 
1861. 
150. UC 23 July 1261 • 
151. NC 20 August 1860. 
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'11.he Colonist did not object to war with the Maori as such. It did not 
find the Bpa tched up n peace in 1861 congenial, 1 52 and it wannly applauded the 
' .oh t'l'-'-' 153 d ~1 • • .L' .1.., "''l t .. 186-;i; 154 recommencemen -c 01 os J. J. 1,1es an , ·0ne invasion OJ. L,fle ,,ai ,:a, o 111 ✓• 
Ho:r did it oppose the war po_licy out of sympathy for the IIao:ci or on humani t-
arian grounds. The lack of an immediate or quick victory enabled the 
Colonist to attack the Stafford ministry for encouraging the Gove1°nor to 
enter to adopt the war policy before it could be applied decisively. 155 
The editor of the Colonist was astute enough to see that he could use the 
arguments of the humanitarians, Selwyn and Martin, to charge the Government 
with not only an tmsuccessful, but an unjust and unnecessary war. 
'.1'.hough the lack of success was conceded and attributed to the incompet-
ence of the mili ta1s commanders, the lTelson Examiner did. not accept the 
argument that the war was unjust and unnecessary.· As the mouthpiece of the 
Stafford ministry the Exam:i.ne·r strove to justify the Government I s policy and 
,.., 
to a1~rer · the Government's informatioi1\·rhich enabled the Examiner to argue 
the Governnent I s case with greater conviction - it now at least had some idea 
what the Goverm:1ent' s case was. The Examiner kept the war issue and native 
affairs at the forefront of the lfolson settlers I attention: few editorials 
during 1860 and 1861 were on any subject tmconnectecl with the war or native 
:policy. Iforeover, it was not only the :J._ocal settler the Examiner was trying 
to convince, but the British public as well. 
1520 NQ 9 August 1861. 
153, i.':C 12 I:Iay and 9 June 1863. 
151+. ITC 18 September 18630 
155, llQ. 28 September 1860. 
It is possible that the 
131. 
irni::ortance the editor e.tta.ched to the native question was a reflection of 
his concern that the Government's, and the colonists', case ·was heard in 
Britain. 
'i!hile the .Assembly was in session the Exarni ne~ did little more than 
echo the opinion of the Government supporters in the Assembly. '.I1hough it 
,ms admitted that the Tara.ns,ki settlers had for a long time looked enviously 
at the land at Waitara it was claimed that the dispute was not over land. 
The Governn1ent' s argument that Kingi had no rights to the land offered by 
'.L'eira was acceptedo 1 56 " Buddle' s pamphlet was regarded as. a good his tcry 
of the native question and es ~ing -SD.w~ tha, t the Land League and the 
King Hovernent were both indications that the I'laoris were intending to throw 
off B1°i tish authority •1 57 In an attempt to discredit .Archdeacon Hadfield, 
it was claimed that 11a Native League to prevent the sale of any more· land 
to the Government had been formed at Otaki II unde1° the influence of Hadfield! 58 
To the editor of the Examiner there was little doubt as to the object of the 
i-rar; • J. 10 was 
to put down an insurrection which disturbs the 
peace of the country which .li§. inhabit, to secure 
to .11§. protection against savage outrage and aggression, 
to protect ..Q.!1£. lives and properties, and to maintain 
that ascendancy of British law without which the 
colony would be uninhabitable by civilized people.o •• 159 
The Examiner was sure that the Ifaoris were in revolt; what was at issue 
156. NE 19 September 1860. 
1 57. T. Buddle, T'.ae Haori King Movement in New Zealand, ( 1860). NE 25 
August 1860. For a discussion of Buddle 1s pamphlet and the part it 
played in the Government 1 s argur:1en ts see: Sinclair, The l'Iaori Land 
League, PP• 8-26. 
158 .. HE 26 September 1860. 
1590 NE 19 December 1860. 
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was not a piece of disputed land but British sovereignty over the Horth 
Island. 
However, the question of land title and the Wai tare, purchase still had 
to be de1)ated. Late in 1860 William Martin I s _'.l.jl.e ~ikranaki Question was 
published and early in 1 E161 came the Government's reply: Hates 91l.)~i:L 
Wi:) .. liam I-1artin' s I The Taranaki Question'. The Examiner devoted .. a series 
of six editorials, between 16 Janua:r"IJ and 2 Februa,ry, to discuss the 
question. Many of the editorials 160 were mainly extracts from Martin's 
pamphlet cotmtered by statements from the Government's Notes. The claim 
was made, appealing to the authority of Busby, Hobson, Fitzroy, Grey and 
-tt· l d th t r.-r~ • t · b 7 · ht J·ust d · d t. · t 161 l'1_c 1mon , a l'lc1.0r1 ri a_ rig . s 1 no ens • The a,1·g,,1_rnen t 
that the only rights recognized by the Na,oris we1·e thos.e based on the will 
~-ras 162 
of the strongest repeated. The Examiner came dovm on the side of the 
Govemwent end claimecl/tha t I-'tartin and other philo-Maoris were defending 
Kingi 11 upo11 an elabo1·ate theory of native rights, and upon his mm privileges 
as a British subject 11 , but that Kingi himself had rejected these rights and 
privileges by hoisting "the flag of T7aori independence.163 The editor 
returned to the arg1,unent that the Government was engaged in suppressing a 
, 
native rebellion and pointed out that the Maori advocates, by their writings 
and speeches, were giving the IJaoris 11a great moral assistance to their 
cause, and ••o encourage them to persist in their rebellion. 11164 
160. Nm,19 January, 23 Januar;J, 26 January 1861 especially. 
1 61 • NE 23 January 1861 • 
162. NE 26 January 1861. 
163. N]l. 2 February 18610 
164. NE 2 February 1861. See also NE 26 Janua!"J and 30 JanuariJ 1861. 
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Further proof that the Maoris were attempting to set up an alternative 
authority was thought to be given in the speech of the Hawkes Bay chief, 
Renata, in I:rovember 1860, when he claimed the Governor was in the wrong 
because Gore Br01me had refused to allow the rilaori King to adjudicate the 
Wai tara dispute. 165 By Harch 1861 it had become ciear that the real eneny 
was not Wiremu Kingi but the :Maori King; the Examiner interpreted the 
proposal, made in February, by Waikato chiefs not directly involved in the 
war, to make peace on the conditions of setting up a judicial inq_uiry into 
the Wai tara purchase, as an example of the r'1aori' s assertion of the "spiti t 
of independence and sava,ge f:reedom 11 and the assumr,tion by the King Movement 
of their right to sit in judgement on the Government's actions.166 · 
ilie E..··rnrniner' s arg1Jlilent, then, was that the justice of the Government's 
war policy did not depend on the validi·ty of the Wai tara purchase. T.ae 
war was not over land but over soverei@;nty .. The question of native land 
rights was unimportant, and the land dispute insig·11ificant, beside the 
fact of a native rebellion. In order to establish the supremacy of lawful 
autho:ci ty and ta SUJ?lJress arrned reoellion the war was both necessary and 
just. Incleed, this was the ,Stafford clig_ue I s apologia for .the waro 
I 
Stafford, addressing a public meeting in Nelson upon his re-election in 
i861, said -
It has been asserted by those who oppose the present 
Govenment, that the war now unfortune,tely existing 
a 1c Taranaki was entered into by the Government in 
order to obtain a pal try 600 acres of _lancl. So 
monstrous and absurd a charge as that a (}overnment 
would coolly pltmge a cou11t1°y into a civil war 
on grounds so unjust for an object so despicable 
carries its own denial - its most signal refutation 
on the face of it. 
165. NE 12 Janua~cy 1861 q 
-1 66. Rill 1 3 Harch 1 861 • 
Stafford i,rent on to a,rgue tha,t the l'1;ao:d.s had forced the Governor into 
· the war by their acts of rebeJ.lion. 167 
The Examiner's explanation of the 11ar in terrw of a native rebellion 
being .suppre:::ised, though not very decisively, by the Governor supported by 
the Colonial ministry, allowed it to deny any colonial responsibility fo1' 
the war and its expenses. When responsible government was introduced into 
Hew Zealand in 1856 the control of native affairs was reserved to the Crown 
acting tln°ou.gh its agent, the Governor, who could act upon or reject advice 
given to it by the colonial ministry, By arguing that the Governor had 
been fo1°ced into the .-rar by a native rebellion, the Stafford ministry and 
the Examiner could avoid the question of responsibility al together. T'ne;T 
could claim that the rebellion was a manifestation of the· state of the 
native mina.,168 or of the native attitude towards colonization.169 Native 
rebellion could be considered an inevitable consequence of colonizationo170 
Other, perhaps more rational, reasons could be given for the rebelli<Thness 
of the l:fo,ori, which would still leave the colony free of responsibility: 
the misrule of previous goverDors influenced by "a maudlin pseudo philan-
thropy'1;171 the parsimonious policy of the Colonial Office leading to the 
British failure to uphold authority by force from the beginning of colonizat-
. 172 ion., In any case ministerial responsibility could be disclaimed as long 
167. Stafford, 12 Januar-J 1861, ,lifil.16 January 1861. 
168. NE 11 April 1860. 
169. Stafford to Godley, 28 Hay 1860, Canterbury Papers. 
170. PD, 1858-60, p. 338, Nonro. 
171 • Weld to Godley, 18 July 1860, Canterbury Papers. 
1720 PD, 1858-60, PP• 257-258, Monro. 
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as the ministers could only advise the Governor on native affairs. As 
long as the colony did not claim control of native affairs it could avoid 
the costs of native policy and of the war.173 It is not surprising that 
the Examiner consistently a;r-gued against transfe:::·ring the control of native 
affairs to the Colonial Government. 
If we aspire after a complete independence, and wish 
to add a Minister of Foreign Affairs to manage our 
relations with the Aborigines, we shall first do 
well to sit do,;,m and count the costso 174 
By arguing that the war was not over a piece of land but over British 
sovereignty in the North Island, the Ei'Laminer could claim that the war 
was 11not of the settlers but of the British Government11175 and that "the 
cost of putting dovm the native insurrection ••• rests with the mother 
country, and not id,th uso 11 176 
It has been shovm above that the two Nelson newspape,rs were agreed that 
the war was an Impe1°ial responsibility but differed in their il'iterpretations 
of the causes of the conflict. '..foe Colonist saw the conflict as a land 
dispute escala,ted into an unjust and mmecessary war by an incompetent 
Governor advised by selfish ministers. The Colonist used the doubts on the 
validity of the 1i!ai tara purchas.e, cast, by the humanitarian critics of the 
war, to attack its political opponents, the Stafford clig_ue. On the other 
hand, the Exan~ as 8. supporter of Stafford, took a more imperialistic 
view of the war, and justified the GovernoT's action and the ministry's 
173. NliJ 25 July 1 19 September, 29 Septenber 1860. 
174, NE 29 September 1860. See also: NE 16 Ifarch 1861 • 
175, NE 19 SeptemlJer 1860. 
176. lrn:l 25 July 1860. 
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policy by e.ppee,linr; t0 the seditious e,ttitude of the Naori po1)ulatio11. 
The Governi"uen t had not imrol ved its elf in a land dispute but was supp1°e·s.sing 
a native rebellion and upholding the Queen's supremacy. The Examiner' s 
argmnent that the re-al issue of the war was British authority rather than 
native land rights explains its attitude to the ending of the Taranaki 
war in Harch 1 261 • 
The end of the fighting in Ta:ca,naki ims not regarded by either of 
the Nel.son newspapers as the cou.ing of peace. The Colonist had only 
11 slender confidence which a temporary peace, patched up by ministers and 
~ scarcely regarded by the natives, afford~ 177 However, the end of the 
~ 
fighting, the editor of the Colonist argued, offered the· opportunity to 
settle the question of native rights: a mixed commission should be set up 
to discuss and clarify the meaning of the Treaty of Wai ta.ngi. 178 Though 
he was later to su:ppo:rt wholeheartaily the Waikato invasion 179 the editor 
hoped that every effort would be made to improve race relations and war.aed 
that 
no family compact should be permitted to 
exist in '.Paranaki or elsewhere, however 
extensive it may be, or whatever opportunities 
(ministerial or otherwise) it may possess, 
capable at any moment, for their mm selfish 
ends, of embroiling the two ra,ces. 180 
To the editor of the Examiner the end of the fighting in Taranald would 
allow the real issv.e to be faced. No end to the war was possible 1.mtil 
1 77. NC 9 August 1861 • 
1 78. NC 2 April 1 861 • 
179. lJC 9 June, 28 July 
180. NC 2 Ap1°il 1861 • 
See also NC 6 Septemb~r 1861~ 
and 18 September 1863. 
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the Maori was completely defeated, and the editor looked forward to 11 its 
speedy transfer to some fresh locality, and its renei:ml on a le.rger scale 
and with greater activity ••• 0 The peace terms offered to the JYiaoris 
by the Governor were seen as part of a policy to enable the renewal of 
182 hostilities unhindered by doubts caused by a questionable land purchase. 
The leniency towards the Atiawa, from ·whom no compensation was to be demanded, 
and the intention ·l;o resume :Lnvestigations into the title of ·the land offered 
by Teira, were interpreted by the Examiner as recognition that the Atiawa had 
been fighting in a cause some Europeans had encouraged them to feEil to be 
just, and. as the Government 1 s confidence that the Haitara purchase would 
prove to be valid.183 The de1:1and for compensation and the ha::o.a.:Lng over 
of murderers 11ade on the Southern '11aranaki tribes, though in fact unrealistic, 
was welcomed by the editor, who urged the ernfiorcement of the terms on the 
Haoris by confiscating their lands. 18~- · 'Y.he decision to treat the Uail:ato 
1'18,oris separately was seen as a shrewd move by the Governor to divide the 
opposition so that the Waikato and the southern tribes could be dealt 1·,i th 
185 separately and more effectively. T'.ae stage was thus set for a,s:c1erti11g 
the t1parawount authority of the British Crmm11 by iHpressing on the native 
mind the subjug·ation of the Maori to J3ri tish law and a conviction of British 
186 sovereignty and the Queen's supremacy. Hmrnver, the editor was to be 
dismayed and disa1Jpoin ted by the withdrawal of troops from '.raranaki to 
Auckland before the southern '.I.1aranaki tribes had been punished. 187 
181 • NEJ 1.3 April 1861. 
182. HE 10 April 1861 0 
183. NE 20 A1)ril 1861. 
184, UEJ 24 April and 27 April 1861. 
185. HE 10 April ·1861. 
166. !iJ2. 1 3 April and 27 April 1861. 
187. HE 24 April 1861. 
The attitudes of the hamine:r on t}1e peace te:rms offered to the 
Tarana2d i,Jao:ris \'1ere consistent with its argimien t that the Gove1~L1ment , 
had been fighting in Tara.naki to uphold British authority rathe1° than 
to enforce a land sale. The title to the disputed ,land was to be invest-
igated, the Atiawa who could claim to be defending their land rights could 
be treated leniently. Those who had fotight against the British for no 
other reason than their membership of Land Leagues or King Ifovemen t were 
to be punished as rebels. However, the demand for the punishment of the 
south Taranaki Maoris by confiscating their land not- only showed that the 
, Examiner did not appreciate the fact tha~ the centre of interest was 
shifting to the Waikato, but reveals his basic concern was for land 
acquisition. Further, his dismay at the transfer of troops from Taranaki 
to Auckland as part of Gore Bro1me's determination to deal with the 
Waikato suggests the editor's unrealistic expectations of a war on two 
fronts; the disillusionment of the year long unsuccessful Taranaki 
campaign did not seem to have tempered the editor's belief in the superiority 
of the European and his arms. 
* * * * 
139. 
It has been argued above that the contrasting opinions and approaches 
of the r-Telson newspapers on the Taranaki conflict in-1860 may be understood 
against the background of local and colonial politics. Further, it has 
been sugt·ested that the political conflict wa,s not between parties based 
on principles, either constitutional or of race relations, but was fought 
between opposing factions striving for power either in the province, or in 
the colony, or in both. During the provincial period, the political struggles 
may best be described as faction politics rather than party politicso In 
ITelson, as in most other }Jrovinces, the newspapers ~rnre mouthpieces of 
provincial factions. What was u.i--i.usual about Helson was that one of the 
provincial factions was 11in 11 power at the colonial level, while the other 
provincial faction was "in11 at the local level. - '.Chus the Examiner supported 
both the Stafford minisfary- and the provincial opposition; the Colonist 
supi101°ted the Provincial 11 ministry 11 and opposed the Colonial Gover!'.l'::cent. 
The O}')inion on the '11a:cana1::i we,r held by the :Nelson ne1,rspe,pers was dete1"mined 
_,, 
less by racial attitudes or humani te,rian concerns than by the possession and 
location of power of the faction each rep1~esen ted. This \ms pa:rH culal'ly so 
in the case of the Examiner. 
It is sug,;:ested, then, that the consistent SUJ?J?Ort of the Colonial 
Govenn:_1ent by the Examiner and_ its anxiety to justify the Govermaent I s 
war i,olicy may be explained by ,Stafford 1 s pos,session of power at tl1e centre 
of colonial politics. The Examiner su1)ported the Government because the 
G-overmnent was in the possession of the Stafford clique. - It is not su:r]?ris-
ing the,t the Elxaruiner withdrew its support when the Stafford ministry was 
defeated in July 1861 and replaced by a ministry headed by Uillirnn Fox. 
·what is, pel"l1aps, more significant is that on the fall of the Stafford 
ministry the Examiner felt it ,,as time for a 1~econsidere,tio11 °of the gains 
and losses of 1..,1.:nion or separa.tion 11 , 188 and hacl concluded ths.t separation was 
preferable to being ruled by an Auckland-Wellington rninistry. 189 
Earl~,r in 1860 the Examiner had opposed the separation of the two 
islands prnposed by Heiny S_ewell and the Lyttleton Times as a solution to 
the divided interests and problems of the two islands, and to safeguard 
the South Island provinces' land funds. 190 Without an interest in maintain-
ing its land fund intact (the area of available land in Nelson. being almost 
exhausted) separatior;i. would not be in the interests of Helson as she would 
be placed in a subordinate position to the two southern giants.191 The 
offer that Helson would be capital of the South Island was not enough192 -
Nelson preferred to be the capital of the whole colony (not just part of it)! 93 ! 
Moreover, with Stafford finnly in power in the Central Government since 1856, 
Nelson interests were being well taken care of, and separation represented a 





1ifil 28 September 1861. 
NE 24 August 1861. 
Sewe 11 in 11'. 1 8 January ·1 660. LT 2 5 
1 5 J?ebrua:ry 1860. OW 2L~ liiarch 1860. 
1860, }fu,11 Papers. 
HE 21 March 1860. 
January, 1 February, 4 February, 
Sewell to Hall, 23 lfovember 
192. See for instance PD, 1856-57, po 17, Sewell. South Island support for 
Helson' s claim as capi te,l was so that when separation occurred the 
capital would be permanently established there. The purpose of this 
is not yery clear and the interpretation of it as a bait to gain 
Nelson support for separation is obviouso 
1 93. I~E 1 0 1:iarch and 1 7 March 1 B-60. 
194. LT1 I11 ebruary- 1860, suggests this as the reason for Nelson's op:;,iosition 
to separation. 
On 21 Harch 1860 the Examiner had argued that the sepa.re,tion of the 
two islands would threaten the interests of ITelson; · a year and a ha.lf 
later, on 2-1 August 1E'61, the editor was arguing that the interests of 
Helson we1'e so threatened that their protection deaanded "moving for· a 
serJaration. Ii During t:1e intervening eighteen months it had become obvious 
Jchat the:re would be no g_uick and easy solution to the native problems afflict-
ing the Horth Island. The war, w·hich had been welcomed as a cheap and 
decisive solution, had ended in a sjcalemate, leaving the native population 
in an even more agitated and rebellious mood than before the war had started. 
For was it any longer possible to believe the colony could disclaim any 
financial liability. T'De Colonial Office had dropped enough hi:nts that 
the colonists should not asm,une. the Imperial authorities 1 willingness to 
pay the costs of war.195 ll'urther, the colony could no longer plea insolvency,; 
for the discovery of gold had increased ·its ability to pay.196 '.l.1hus the 
rforth Island native problem remained as a hungry beast, threatening the 
lives of the Horth Island settlers and denanding to be fed Hith the resources 
of the South Island. 
However, what was probably· nore im1)ortant to the editor of the Exa1tlner 
was that the South Island, lTelson, or more specifically the Stafford. clique 
the Exarnine:r represented, no longer controlled the purse strings or the 
policy making in the central goverm0.ent. '11l1e Horth Island colonists had 
"combined sentimental philanthropy and missionary vanity, party opposition 
and selfish views of profit 11 to remove the Stafford ministry and Governor 
197 Gore Browne from power. The ]forth Island hacl given little· consideration 
195. NE 24 August 1261. See also: lforrell, British Colonial Policy, 
PP• 264-269. 
196. NE 28 September 1861. 
197. NE 2 October 1861 • 
to national interests; removing the Stafford ministry at a time when 
. t 198 mu. y was so necessary. The disaster was complete with the re-appointment 
of the autocratic Grey, who had 11always looked for instruments rather than 
associates. 11199 The South could no longer be sure of dictating a solution 
to the native problem that would safeguard its ovm interests. 
Now we in this Island have, for a long time, been 
looking on with great interest at the game which is 
now being played out at Auckland by the parties who 
are contending for the management of the natives; ·we 
have criticised the moves, we have ta.ken sides with 
the players;- we have blamed this plan, we have advocated 
that, until all at once we find that the game is to 
be played at our expense; and that whichever party 
wins will come to us for the stclJrns. 200 
The Examiner was no longer interested in a game the outcome of which it 
could no longer be sure of influencing. 201 
Though the Examiner listed the same arguments for separation as were 
given by Sewell in 1860 a,nd later to be given by the Otago sepa:rationists: 
. 202 the divided interests of the two islands; the differences of climate, 
geolog7 and population of the two islands; 203 the injustice of faxing the 
gold-digging population for purposes they have no interest in; 20'+ the 
neglect of South Island interests and problems by a l'Iaori-phobic central 
205 government~ however, the real reason for the Examiner's change of 
198. m~ 13 ,July 1861 • 
199. NE 12 August 1861. The ~ had hoped that the position would 
have been saved by Gore Browne reuminins governor and thus controlling 
Fox. NE 27 July 1861 • 
200. fill 21 ,September 1861 • 
201 • i'TE 19 October 1861 • 
202. £!]. 24 August 1861 • 
203. NEJ 25 September 1861. 
20l1-. Im 28 Septem.ber 1861 • 
205. HE 6 Kovember 1 S61 • 
heart over sepe.:ra,tion was the ca1)turing of the central government by the 
T- 11 · J. 7 • l d d b ·71 206 t/e_ ing0on c_ique 1ea e y .box. The Exantlner championed the separation 
cause not becmwe of altruistic conc·ern fo:r Sou.th Island interests bv.t as a 
manoeuvre in the battle for control of the central goven1ment · and of the 
colo;_1y 1 s resourceso 
Significantly, the Colonist favoured the Fox minisi;:t:'>J207 although it 
20° realized the ministry was ·unlikely to have any Nelson members. u J?urther, 
th C 1 . t d . t t. tl t . 1 d 209 . t. J. tl .L e o onis · argue ag-ains se1)a1°a ing 10 wo is an .s poin ing ou c · 1a c 
the Uest Indian colonies I expe:C'iences demonstrated the dangers of local self-
governrnent without a strong general gover11ment. 21 O The Colonist warned its 
readers to expect more activity in provincial affa:irs by the "Nelson b1°ead--
211 and-butter politicians" now that they had lost power in Auckland, and 
urged Nelson to support its 11working-man 1s superintendent. 11 • 212 
As the Colonist had predicted the Examiner Hith the approach of the 
elections for st1perintendent, bege,n to ta..lre a more active interest in local 
217-affairs. :> Indeed, the Examiner began to argue in favour of st:rengthening 
206. Fox the Examiner's reaction to Fox's victory see NE 13, 17, 20, 24, 27 
July and 3 August 1861 • Not~ .. for three weeks the editor devoted his 
time to discrediting the Fox ministry. 
207. MC 12 July and 27 September 1861 o 
208. NC 26 July 1861. 
209, NC 29 October 1861. 
210. NC 5 November 1861. For the West Indian situation see: lforrell, 
British Colonial Policy, pp. 377-4-52; P.Do Curtin, Two Jamacias, (1955), 
PP• 178-203Q 
211. NC 11 October 1661, 
212, }TC 22 November 1861. 
213. NEl 5 October, 6 Hovember, 4, 7, 12 and 18 December 1861. 
144. 
local governments214 and in an editorial discussi~1g the relative merits 
of centralism and provincialism _came out strongly in SUIJiJOrt of p1·ovi11cial-
ism, v'ihich would enable "the wea,l th of the provinces to stay uhere it is 
made." 215 It is apparent, then, that the f.ornier Hcentre.listu leanings 
of the Exam.·i ner and the newly acquired taste for a strong .central govern-
ment of the Colonist were resv.l ts of changes in the power game of colonial 
politics. 
The opinions of the lfolson newspapers on the political issues of the 
day were not determined by political principles, the rivalries were not 
over the location of powe1°, native i::,olicy, nor. the w.1ity of the colony. 
The struggle was for the posse,ssion of po,;ier and the control of the purne 
strings, both provincial and central. 
214. NE 7 September H361. 
21 5. N~ 11 September 1861 • 
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